A JUVENILE’S CONFESSION IS ADMISSIBLE WHEN HE CONFESSED AFTER KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY WAIVING MIRANDA RIGHTS AND IS PRECLUDED FROM A DURESS DEFENSE IF HE VOLUNTARILY PLACED HIMSELF IN A POSITION WHERE COERCION TO COMMIT A CRIME WAS REASONABLY FORESEEABLE.

The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that when Miranda rights are clearly presented to a juvenile, the juvenile is generally able to understand his rights as presented, and an interrogation is not expressly coercive, then a juvenile may knowingly and voluntarily waive Miranda rights and voluntarily confess to a crime.  See Madrid v. State, 474 Md. 273, 288-89, 254 A.3d 468, 476 (2021).  Further, the court held a duress defense requires a “present, imminent, and impending threat,” and is unavailable as a matter of law when a defendant voluntarily or recklessly placed himself in a situation that made coercion to commit a crime reasonably foreseeable. Id. at 289, 254 A.3d at 476.

Darwin Naum Monroy Madrid’s (“Madrid”) association with MS-13 began in 2015.  In 2016, at the age of sixteen, Madrid was ordered to kill Carlos Tenorio-Aguirre, a rival gang member.  Madrid traveled on foot to Tenorio-Aguirre’s apartment, where he wounded Tenorio-Aguirre and fatally shot another man.

Later that evening, police arrested Madrid.  During interrogation, Detective Cruz (“Cruz”) told Madrid he knew Madrid was an undocumented immigrant, but that he still had rights.  Cruz then read Madrid his Miranda rights in Spanish, both his and Madrid’s first language.  When asked, Madrid confirmed he understood his rights.  During the interrogation, Cruz mention that Madrid was likely in danger of being killed by both MS-13 and the rival gang.  Twenty minutes into the interrogation, Madrid confessed. 

 At trial, Madrid moved to suppress his confession, claiming he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights and his confession was involuntary under Maryland common law, the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, and Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.  The circuit court denied the motion.  Madrid then sought a duress defense, claiming he only complied with the “hit” to avoid gang punishment he expected to occur “as soon as possible.” The circuit court declined Madrid’s request for a jury instruction on duress and the jury convicted him of first-degree murder and attempted murder.  The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decisions and the Court of Appeals granted certiorari to consider whether Madrid properly waived his Miranda rights; whether his confession was voluntary under Maryland common law, the Due Process Clause, and Article 22; and whether he was entitled to a duress defense. 

The Court of Appeals began with a comprehensive analysis of a juvenile suspect’s rights during interrogation.  See Madrid, 474 Md. at 309-321, 254 A.3d at 488-495.  To admit a confession, the state must first prove that a juvenile was properly advised of his Miranda rights and knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights before confessing.  Id. at 310, 254 A.3d at 488(citing Gonzalez v. State, 429 Md. 632, 637, 57 A.3d 484, 486-7 (2012)).  Rights may be administered orally or in writing.  Id. at 324, 254 A.3d at 497.  Under Maryland common law, the Due Process Clause, and Article 22, a confession must not be “the product of an improper threat, promise, or inducement by the police,” or result from “police conduct that overbears the will of the suspect and induces the suspect to confess.”  Madrid, 474 Md. at 317, 320, 254 A.3d at 492, 494 (citing Lee v. State, 418 Md. 136, 159, 12 A.3d 1238, 1252 (2011); citing U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; citing Md. Decl. of Rts. art. 22.).  Applying a totality of circumstances approach, the court considered factors such as the length of the interrogation and the age, background, education, experience, character, and intelligence of the suspect. Madrid, 474 Md. at 320-21, 254 A.3d at 495 (quoting Hof v. State, 337 Md. 581, 596-97, 655 A.2d 370, 377-78 (1995)).

Here, the Court of Appeals found Madrid knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and voluntarily confessed.  Madrid, 474 Md. at 328, 254 A.3d at 499.  Madrid had lived and attended school in the United States for two years, his Miranda rights were administered in Spanish, and he was a “self-sufficient young man” who worked, earned money, and financially supported himself and his mother.  Id. at 322-23, 330, 254 A.3d at 496, 500.  The court did not find Cruz’s statements about Madrid’s immigration status or gang threats intimidating or coercive because they were statements of fact, not promises of protection or inducements to confess.  Id. at 327, 254 A.3d at 498-99.  Finally, Madrid was not subjected to a lengthy, overbearing, or inappropriate interrogation.  Id. at 330, 254 A.3d at 500. 

The Court then considered the duress defense by establishing the essential elements required to warrant a jury instruction.  See Madrid, 474 Md. at 331-338, 254 A.3d at 501-5.  A duress defense is possible when a defendant reasonably believed he was in imminent danger of death or serious harm, he could not reasonably escape, and he killed because of this duress.  Id. at 332, 254 A.3d at 502 (quoting Md. Crim. Pattern Crim. Jury Instructions, § 4:17.5C (Md. State Bar Assoc. 2021)).  This defense cannot be raised if the compulsion to act stems from the defendant’s “own fault, negligence or misconduct.”  Madrid, 474 Md. at 333, 254 A.3d at 502 (quoting Howell v. State, 465 Md. 548, 551, 214 A.3d 1128, 1130 (2019)).  A mere fear of harm at some unspecified time in the future is not sufficient for a duress defense. Madrid, 464 Md. at 338, 254 A.3d at 505 (citing Howell, 465 Md. at 565-66, 214 A.3d at 1138-39).

Here, the Court of Appeals held that Madrid’s fear of retribution “as soon as possible,” was more akin to a generalized fear of future harm than an imminent threat.”  Madrid, 464 Md. at 338-39, 254 A.3d at 505.  Madrid was outside with an unarmed companion when the “hit” order arrived, indicating a clear opportunity to escape.  Id. at 339, 254 A.3d at 505.  The court also emphasized that fear of gang retribution cannot justify a duress defense without expanding it to shield nearly every gang member ordered to commit a crime.  Id. at 340, 254 A.3d at 506.

Finally, the Court of Appeals addressed the question of whether the duress defense is unavailable when a defendant placed himself in a position to be coerced.  Madrid, 464 Md. at 341, 254 A.3d at 507.  Previously, the Court of Special Appeals did not permit a duress defense where an adult defendant was voluntarily or recklessly involved in the situation that created the alleged duress.  Id. at 341-42, 254 A.3d at 507 (citing Williams v. State, 101 Md. App. 408, 425 646 A.2d 1101, 1110 (1994)).

Here, the Court of Appeals established that, as a matter of law, a duress defense is unavailable to a defendant—including a juvenile—who voluntarily or recklessly placed himself in a situation where coercion is the foreseeable result.  Madrid, 474 Md. at 342, 254 A.3d at 507. By voluntarily associating with MS-13, Madrid did just that.  Id.  Because criminal activity, including murder, is a known requirement of MS-13 membership, such coercion was not only foreseeable, but inevitable.  Id. at 342-43, 254 A.3d at 507-8.  Thus, Madrid was barred from a duress defense as a matter of law.  Id. at 343, 254 A.3d at 508.

In Madrid, the Court of Appeals explored a juvenile’s ability to act voluntarily, both during an interrogation and as part of a criminal gang.  Clarifying what makes a juvenile’s confession voluntary is an important step toward protecting the rights of young suspects. However, the totality of circumstances approach permits a court to exercise discretion in weighing the importance of factors such as age, intelligence, and experience when determining voluntariness.

The court’s holding that a juvenile defendant is precluded from a duress defense when he voluntarily placed himself in a situation that makes coercion foreseeable will limit young defendants’ access to this defense.  Despite its expansive discussion of voluntariness in the first half of its opinion, the court did not consider whether Madrid was capable of voluntarily consenting to join MS-13 as a child.  Although the court aimed to prevent abuse of the duress defense, this omission invites future questions about the nature of consent in gang-related crimes involving minors and, in fact, all crimes committed by minors at the behest of adults.

Erin Carrington Smith has a B.A. in Political Science from Loyola University Maryland and an M.A. in National Security Affairs from The Institute of World Politics. Prior to law school, Erin spent six years working in the Consular Affairs’ Legal Coordination Division at the U.S. Department of State. She then spent seven years working as a freelance writer and editor while raising her daughter, Sally. Aside from her role as Resource Editor on the Law Forum Executive Board, Erin is a Research Assistant for Prof. Shanta Trivedi, a Legal Writing Fellow, and serves as a law scholar for Prof. Michael Higginbotham. Erin also works part time as a Law Clerk at the Angelos Legal Group in Timonium, MD.