THE MANSLAUGHTER BY VEHICLE STATUTE DOES NOT PREEMPT FELONY MURDER, AND A LIFE SENTENCE WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE FOR JUVENILE FELONY HOMICIDE OFFENDERS IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND NOT GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE CRIME COMMITTED.

The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that felony murder is not an unintentional crime.  Harris v. State, 479 Md. 84, 108, 276 A.3d 1071, 1085 (2022).  Therefore, Maryland’s manslaughter by vehicle statute, which applies to unintended homicides committed with a vehicle, does not preempt felony murder perpetrated with a vehicle.  Id. at 109, 276 A.3d at 1086.  The court also held that it is constitutional to sentence juvenile homicide offenders to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole.  Id. at 116, 276 A.3d at 1089-90.  Finally, the court held that sentencing a defendant to life imprisonment is not a grossly disproportionate punishment for the commission of a felony resulting in another person’s death.  Id. at 122-23, 276 A.3d at 1093.

On May 21, 2018, sixteen-year-old Dawnta Harris (“Harris”) skipped school with three teenagers and committed multiple burglaries in a stolen Jeep Wrangler.  During one of the burglaries, Harris remained in the Jeep while the other teenagers canvassed a home.  When Baltimore County Police Officer Amy Caprio (“Officer Caprio”) arrived at the home, Harris fled the scene in the Jeep with Officer Caprio in pursuit.  Upon entering a cul-de-sac, Officer Caprio exited her patrol car and ordered Harris out of the Jeep.  Harris stopped the Jeep in front of Officer Caprio and started to get out of his car.  However, he shut the door and accelerated, hitting Officer Caprio before speeding off.  Officer Caprio died from her injuries.

Harris was charged and convicted of first-degree felony murder in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City.  At his sentencing hearing, Harris’s counsel presented mitigating evidence and a pre-sentence investigation that included information such as Harris’s age and personal history.  After considering the evidence, the court sentenced Harris to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole.  Harris appealed the circuit court’s ruling to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, which upheld his conviction and sentence.  Harris then filed a petition for certiorari, which the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted.

Two issues came before the court: (1) is felony murder an unintended crime that, if committed with a vehicle, is preempted by Maryland’s manslaughter by vehicle statute; and (2) is a life sentence with the possibility of parole for a juvenile homicide conviction unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment?  Harris, 479 Md. at 92, 276 A.3d at 1075-76.

The Court of Appeals of Maryland began its analysis with an overview of statutory preemption, explaining that the General Assembly may preempt the common law by statutory enactments.  Harris, 479 Md. at 101, 276 A.3d at 1081.  The court next discussed the General Assembly’s intent behind the manslaughter by vehicle statute.  Id. at 110-11, 276 A.3d at 1086.  The General Assembly strived to homogenize competing theories of criminal responsibility that were implicated when unintentional homicides occurred as a result of driving in violation of public safety vehicle regulations.  Id.

The court then examined whether the manslaughter by vehicle statute preempts felony murder when committed with a vehicle.  Harris, 479 Md. at 103, 276 A.3d at 1082.  Felony murder is not an unintended crime because the intent to commit the underlying felony transfers to the intent necessary for first-degree murder.  Id. at 108, 276 A.3d at 1085.  Manslaughter by vehicle occurs when a person acts with gross negligence in causing the death of another while operating a vehicle.  Id. at 103, 276 A.3d at 1082 (citing Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 2-209(b) (West, Westlaw through 2022 Reg. Sess. of Gen. Assemb.)).  In enacting this statute, the General Assembly implicitly preempted all unintentional homicides that occur while operating a vehicle.  Harris, 479 Md. at 106, 276 A.3d at 1084 (citing Blackwell v. State, 34 Md. App. 547, 554-55, 369 A.2d. 153, 158-59 (1977)).  Therefore, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that because felony murder is not an unintended crime, the manslaughter by vehicle statute does not preempt it.  Harris, 479 Md. at 109, 276 A.3d at 1086.

Harris did not contest that he committed felony burglary or that his actions killed Officer Caprio while committing this crime.  Harris, 479 Md. at 111, 276 A.3d at 1087.  Therefore, Harris’s intent to commit felony burglary satisfied the requisite intent to find him guilty of felony murder.  Id.  This holding is harmonious with the rationale supporting the felony murder rule, which is to deter dangerous conduct by treating all killings resulting from the commission of a felony as murder due to the severity of these offenses.  Id. at 109-10, 276 A.3d at 1086.  Allowing the manslaughter by vehicle statute to preempt specific instances of felony murder would contradict its rationale, and Harris failed to provide a convincing reason to hold otherwise.  Id. at 110, 276 A.3d at 1086.

The court next addressed the constitutionality of sentencing juvenile homicide offenders to life in prison.  Harris, 479 Md. at 113, 276 A.3d at 1088.  Harris argued that his sentence was unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution because he did not receive an individualized sentencing hearing in which the sentencer considered his youth and attendant characteristics.  Id. at 114, 276 A.3d at 1088.  The court explained that mandatory life sentences without the possibility of parole for juveniles are unconstitutional because they present a substantial risk of disproportionate punishment.  Id. at 115, 276 A.3d at 1089 (citing Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012)).  Courts must consider “an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics” before sentencing a juvenile to life imprisonment without parole.  Harris, 479 Md. at 115, 276 A.3d at 1089 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 483).  These procedural requirements are satisfied if the juvenile offender receives an individualized sentencing proceeding in which the sentencer has discretion to impose a lesser punishment than life imprisonment without parole.  Harris, 479 Md. at 117, 276 A.3d at 1090 (citing Jones v. Mississippi, 141 U.S. 1307, 1311 (2021)).

In the instant case, the court explained that these requirements did not apply to Harris’s sentence because he was given the possibility of parole.  Harris, 479 Md. at 116, 276 A.3d at 1090.  The court further held that even if they did apply, Harris’s sentence would not violate the Eighth Amendment because he received an individualized sentencing proceeding and the sentencing court expressly considered Harris’s youth and attendant characteristics.  Id. at 119-20, 276 A.3d at 1092.

Finally, the court examined whether Harris’s sentence was grossly disproportionate to the crime committed.  Harris, 479 Md. at 121, 276 A.3d at 1093.  Whether a sentence is disproportionate is determined by evaluating considerations such as the seriousness of the crime and deference to the General Assembly.  Id. at 122, 276 A.3d at 1093.  The court explained that Harris’s commission of felony burglary that resulted in the death of Officer Caprio was extraordinarily serious.  Id.  Further, the court deferred to the General Assembly’s recognition of the severity of murder by noting that the Assembly decided to punish offenders convicted of first-degree murder, including felony murder, with life imprisonment.  Id. at 123, 276 A.3d at 1093.  Therefore, Harris’s sentence was not grossly disproportionate and did not violate the Constitution.  Id. at 122, 276 A.3d at 1093.

The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that felony murder is an intentional crime and therefore is not preempted by the manslaughter by vehicle statute if committed with a vehicle.  Although the goal of the felony murder doctrine is to deter dangerous conduct, the question remains whether it will be effective for juveniles.  Juveniles have underdeveloped brains and thus lack the capacity to fully appreciate the risks associated with their conduct.  In advocating for a sentence less than life imprisonment for a felony murder conviction, criminal defense attorneys should emphasize that imposing the same sentences on juveniles and adults contradicts courts’ long-standing recognition that children are different.

Kaitlyn Lyons is a First Year Staff Editor for the University of Baltimore Law Forum.