The Supreme Court of Maryland held that there was substantial evidence to support the Prince George’s County Planning Board’s decision to approve an Amazon last-mile delivery hub.  Crawford v. Cnty. Council of Prince George’s Cnty., 482 Md. 680, 704, 290 A.3d 571, 585 (2023).  The court determined the dispute was a mixed question of fact and law, because the parties agreed that the Prince George’s County Planning Board (“Planning Board”) identified the correct statute and the record supported the Planning Board’s factual conclusions.  Id. at 695-96, 290 A.3d at 580.  Thus, the court applied the substantial evidence standard of review to this case.  Based on the proposed use of the property, sufficient evidence was in the record to support the Planning Board’s decision.  Id. at 704, 290 A.3d at 585. 

In 2020, Amazon acquired a building and land (collectively “Property”) in Upper Marlboro, Maryland.  The Property is in an employment park zoned for industrial use, including “warehouses and distribution facilities.”  The Property’s zoning designation is part of a larger Comprehensive Design Plan (“CDP”). Amazon intended for the Property to be used as a “last-mile delivery station” for housing merchandise before loading the merchandise into vehicles for delivery to customers.  After the acquisition, Amazon sought approval from the Planning Board to make improvements to the Property.  These improvements included the addition of new paved surfaces to accommodate increased traffic from Amazon’s delivery vehicles. 

In July 2020, the Planning Board held a hearing where it listened to comments from experts and the public regarding the Property.  During the public comment period, Petitioner Crawford contended that the proposed use was not warehousing as permitted by the zoning ordinance.  Nonetheless, the Planning Board can only deny applications that fail to comply with the applicable zoning ordinances or the CDP.  Thus, the Planning Board approved Amazon’s proposal, reasoning that the delivery model fell within the permitted uses within the zoning ordinance.

Crawford sought review from the Prince George’s County District Council, which affirmed the Planning Board’s decision.  The District Council can only reverse “if the decision was one the Planning Board was not authorized to make, is not supported by substantial evidence of record, is arbitrary or capricious, or is otherwise illegal.”  The Council highlighted that Amazon’s delivery center constituted a distribution business engaged in “operations to receive, store, sort, and deliver or distribute to customers.”  Crawford then sought judicial review in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, which affirmed the decision of the Planning Board.  The Supreme Court of Maryland granted certiorari before the Appellate Court of Maryland heard the case.

The Supreme Court of Maryland first addressed the applicable standard of review.  Crawford, 482 Md. at 692-93, 290 A.3d at 578.  Questions of law are reviewed de novo and limited to the application of law, whereas mixed questions of law and facts on the record are subject to the substantial evidence standard of review.  Id at 696, A.3d at 580.  The parties agreed that the Planning Board correctly identified the controlling statute and that the record supported the stated facts.  Id.  Therefore, the Court’s review turned on whether the Planning Board correctly applied the facts to the law, a mixed question of fact and law.  Crawford, 482 Md. at 695, 290 A.3d at 579-80.  Under this standard of review, courts affirm agency decisions if the agency’s decision is “fairly debatable,” and the agency reasonably reached its factual conclusions.  Id. at 695-696, A.3d at 579-80.

The Property is zoned for employment and industrial use, which permits use for “warehouses and distribution facilities.”  Crawford, 482 Md. at 696, 290 A.3d at 580 (citing PGCC § 27-515(b)(2)).  The Prince George’s County Code defines warehouse units as buildings used in a wholesale operation, or for the storage of goods for use in a distribution business.  Crawford, 482 Md. at 696, 290 A.3d at 580 (citing PGCC § 27-107.01(a)(256)).  To determine whether Amazon’s proposed use met this definition, the court analyzed whether substantial evidence supported the Planning Board’s decision.  Crawford, 482 Md. at 696, 290 A.3d at 580.

First, the court turned to the meaning of storage, absent a definition in the statute.  Crawford, 482 Md. at 697, 290 A.3d at 581.  When statutory language does not provide a definition, the court can turn to a dictionary definition.  Id. (citing Berry v. McQueen, 469 Md. 674, 688-90, 233 A.3d 42, 49-50 (2020)).  Courts refer to dictionary definitions to determine an application that aligns with the statute’s legislative intent.  Crawford, 482 Md. at 697-98, 290 A.3d at 581 (citing Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 274-76, 987 A.2d 18, 28 (2010)).  The court applied the plain meaning of the term: to “lay away, accumulate.”  Crawford,482 Md. at 698, 290 A.3d at 581-82.  The court found that the evidence on record sufficiently supported a reasonable finding that Amazon’s last mile-facility was engaged in storage.  Id. at 698-699, 290 A.3d at 581-582.  Based on an industry manual, Crawford argued that merchandise is not ‘warehoused’ unless it is left in place for a minimum period.  Id. at 697, 290 A.3d at 581.  The court rejected this restriction because the Prince George’s County Code imposes no time minimum.  Id. at 698, 290 A.3d at 581.  Therefore, the court found that the Planning Board’s determination that Amazon’s proposed use, storage, was “fairly debatable,” thus satisfying the substantial evidence standard.  Id. at 699, 290 A.3dat 582.

Next, the court analyzed the plain meaning of the term distribute.  Id. at 699, 290 A.3d at 582.  The court again looked to the dictionary definition, reasoning that distribution here meant “to give out or deliver.”  Id.  Therefore, operations at the last-mile facility would consist of drivers loading goods into vehicles and driving the items to the customer.  Id.  The court held that the evidence before the Planning Board supported its approval of the facility.  Id.

Finally, the Court resolved the meaning of “distribution business” in the Prince George’s County Code.  Crawford, 482 Md. at 700, 290 A.3d at 582-83.  The statute does not define the term distribution business.  Id. at 700, 290 A.3d at 582-583 (citing PGCC § 27-107.01(a) (66.4)).  However, the statute does define a “distribution facility” as a facility that a wholesaler or retailer uses to store or distribute.  Crawford, 482 Md. at 700, 290 A.3d at 582-583 (citing PGCC § 27-107.01(a) (66.4)).  Notably, there is no minimum storage time requirement in the statute.  Crawford, 482 Md. at 698, 290 A.3d at 581-82 (citing PGCC § 27-107.01(a) (66.4)).  In the view of the court, it was “fairly debatable” that Amazon’s business activity consists of storage and distribution to a customer.  Crawford, 482 Md. at 699, 290 A.3d at 582.

The Court was not convinced that, by amending another section of the Prince George’s County Code, the County Council intended to include last-mile hubs in a separate statutory category.  Crawford, 482 Md.at 701-702, 290 A.3d at 582-583.  The amendment in question added a category of use, known as a “Merchandise Logistics Center[,]” whose definition more closely resembled the “last mile” model.  Id. at 702, 290 A.3d at 583-584.  However, the court reasoned that, even though the new category more closely resembles a “last mile” hub, the use nonetheless fits within the previously existing zoning category.  Id.  Additionally, the amendment of another code section does not automatically abrogate the existing provision in all other code sections.  Id. at 702-703, 290 A.3d at 584.

E-commerce represents a large and ever-increasing share of retail business activity.  Amazon and other online retailers have shifted to utilizing gig economy workers who often provide their own vehicles to deliver goods to the customer.  This evolution represents a shift from the centralized kind of warehousing, which was commonplace when the ordinance code was ratified.  By applying the substantial evidence standard, the Court has given significant deference to the Planning Board in applying the existing code to these emerging applications.  As a result, administrative agencies will play an outsized role in interpreting local zoning ordinances.  The ground is now ripe for the Maryland General Assembly to amend the existing code and appeal process to better meet the needs of a rapidly changing economy.

Ryan Powelson is a second-year law student at the University of Baltimore School of Law. Ryan attended Salisbury University and graduated in 2020 with a B.A. in Political Science. Before law school, Ryan worked for the Register of Wills in Anne Arundel County, Maryland. Last summer, he worked as a law clerk for the Maryland Office of the Attorney General, State Highway Administration. Currently, Ryan is an extern at the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Maryland.