By: Karrington Hatton   

The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the petitioner for post-conviction DNA testing admission under Maryland’s Criminal Procedure Code § 8-201 failed to show a reasonable probability that DNA testing could produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence.  Satterfield v. State, 483 Md. 452, 484 294 A.3d 166, 184 (2023) (citing Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 8-201 (West 2001)).  Additionally, because the petitioner did not meet this burden, the court was required to deny the petition without a hearing.  Satterfield, 483 Md. at 472, 294 A.3d at 177-78.  Lastly, the court found that unless a petition can be dismissed as a matter of law, a petitioner has a right to respond to the State’s answer.  Id. at 477-79, A.3d at 181-82.

In September 2006, John Satterfield (“Satterfield”) participated in the armed robbery of Randy Hudson and the murder of Hudson’s daughter’s grandfather, Eric Fountain (“Mr. Fountain”).  Satterfield was convicted of fourteen criminal offenses, including first-degree murder, and sentenced to life imprisonment plus 150 years.  The police identified Satterfield as a suspect based on their interview with Chalene Smith (“Ms. Smith”).  At trial, the State relied on Tori Kucz’s (“Ms. Kucz”) testimony to convict Satterfield.  Both Ms. Smith and Ms. Kucz participated in the crime and were in the getaway car in an alley near Mr. Fountain’s home.  The State also relied on DNA and cell tower evidence that placed Satterfield at the crime scene.  The authorities identified female DNA on an undamaged cigarette butt found outside of the murder victim’s house, consistent with Ms. Kucz’s testimony that she and Ms. Smith were in the alley smoking around the time of the crime.

In August 2022, Satterfield filed a petition for post-conviction DNA testing, alleging there was a reasonable probability that DNA testing of the cigarette butt would produce exculpatory evidence.  Satterfield argued that the results would impeach Ms. Smith and Ms. Kucz as witnesses.  The State filed an answer, and the Circuit Court for Baltimore County denied the petition without a hearing or an explanation.  Satterfield filed a motion for reconsideration, which the circuit court denied.  Satterfield then filed a notice of appeal to the Appellate Court of Maryland seeking review of his petition denial and the decision not to have a hearing or to allow him to reply to the State’s answer.  The appellate court then transferred the appeal to the Supreme Court of Maryland. 

The Supreme Court of Maryland clarified the following issues: (1) the standard for exculpatory evidence under Crim. Proc. § 8-201; (2) whether a petitioner for post-conviction DNA testing has a right to a hearing; and (3) whether a petitioner has a right to respond to the state’s answer.  Satterfield, 463 Md. at 465-84, 294 A.3d at 173-84.

The court first considered whether a “reasonable probability” existed that the DNA test would produce exculpatory evidence.  Satterfield, 483 Md. at 466, 294 A.3d at 174.  “Exculpatory” means evidence that would “tend to show” that the petitioner is innocent.  Id. at 467, 294 A.3d at 174-75 (quoting Givens v. State, 459 Md. 694, 707-08, 188 A.3d 903, 910–11 (2018)).  The court also proffered various non-exhaustive factors the court may consider for this determination, including the physical and temporal proximity of the evidence to the crime, how close in time the suspect’s interaction with the evidence was to the crime, and whether the evidence is instrumental to the crime.  Id. at 467-68, 294 A.3d at 175 (quoting Edwards v. State, 453 Md. 174, 199, 160 A.3d 642, 657 (2017)).

The court found that Satterfield failed to meet his burden of proof for the following reasons.  Satterfield, 483 Md. at 470, 294 A.3d at 176.  Although the cigarette butt was near the crime scene, it was not an instrumentality of the crime.  Id. at 468, 294 A.3d at 175.  Ms. Kucz already testified that she and Ms. Smith were smoking the night of the crime.  Id. at 469, 294 A.3d at 175.  Defense counsel previously challenged both witnesses’ credibility at trial and highlighted their motivations to lie.  Id. at 468-69, A.3d at 175.  DNA testing of the cigarette would not exculpate Satterfield, as the facts of the record already established the cigarette contained female DNA.  Id. at 461, 469, 294 A.3d at 171, 175-76.  Lastly, there was enough incriminating evidence unrelated to these witnesses to find Satterfield guilty.  Id. at 470, 294 A.3d at 176.  As such, the court found Satterfield’s petition insufficient as a matter of law and affirmed its denial.  Id. at 484, 294 A.3d at 184.

Next, the court examined the procedural requirements of Crim. Proc. § 8-201, governed by Maryland Court Rules 4-701 through 4-709.  Satterfield, 483 Md. at 470-72, 294 A.3d at 176 77 (citing Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 8-201).  If a petitioner cannot show a reasonable probability that DNA testing would likely show that the petitioner is innocent under Crim. Proc. § 8-201, the court must deny the petition without a hearing.  Satterfield, 483 Md. at 472, 294 A.3d at 177-78.  If the court does not hold a hearing, it must provide a written explanation of why a hearing is not required.  Id. at 473, 294 A.3d at 178.  Since Satterfield did not meet the requirements of Crim. Proc. § 8-201, the circuit court was not required to hold a hearing.  Id. at 474, 294 A.3d at 178.  The court acknowledged that, although the circuit court failed to provide an explanation, remand would be “futile” because the petition was frivolous.  Id. at 483, 294 A.3d at 184.  Thus, the lack of explanation was not a reversible error.  Id.

The court also conducted a holistic examination of Maryland Rules 4-707 and 4-708 to determine whether Satterfield should have been allowed to reply to the State’s answer to his petition before the court issued its ruling.  Satterfield, 483 Md. at 475-76, 294 A.3d at 179-80.  The court conceded that, although Rule 4-708 seems to give the petitioner a right to respond, Rule 4-707 does not require courts to wait for the petitioner’s response in order to make a ruling.  Id. at 476, 294 A.3d at 180.  The notes of the Rules Committee state that when the denial of a petition requires a finding of fact, a right to respond should be warranted out of fairness.  Id. at 478, 294 A.3d at 181.  In other words, unless the petition is insufficient as a matter of law, the petitioner should have the right to respond.  Id. at 479, 294 A.3d at 181.  The court also acknowledged a right to respond when the State’s response is inadequate.  Id. at 482, 294 A.3d at 183-84 (citing Blake v. State, 418 Md. 445, 448, 15 A.3d 787, 789 (2011)).  The court found that the rules are ambiguous and may prevent justified petitioners from responding, but the Rules Committee, while acknowledging this issue, chose not to alter the language.  Satterfield, 483 Md. at 478-79, 294 A.3d at 181-82.

In Satterfield’s case, the circuit court denied the petition, deeming it insufficient as a matter of law; as such, Satterfield did not have a right to respond.  Satterfield, 483 Md. at 462-63, 482, 294 A.3d at 172, 183.  Furthermore, the court found that Satterfield’s unsuccessful motion for reconsideration served the same effect as the requested response.  Id. at 482, 294 A.3d at 183. 

In Satterfield, the court reaffirms the burden on petitioners seeking post-conviction DNA testing.  Reinforcing facts established at trial is not enough to meet this standard.  Furthermore, because trial courts can sometimes consider the petition and the state’s response alone to make a ruling, petitioners are reminded to make their strongest arguments upfront and, if possible, file a quick response.  This burden may be challenging for imprisoned petitioners who file a petition pro se and have yet to be appointed counsel; the petition could be denied before an attorney reviews it for legal sufficiency.  The rules governing how a court grants a hearing have also been greatly clarified – favoring strong petitions and punishing those who allege insufficient facts to meet DNA testing requirements under Crim. Proc. § 8-201.

Karrington Hatton is a second-year day student at the University of Baltimore School of Law and a first-year Staff Editor for Law Forum. Karrington graduated from Towson University in 2022 with a B.S. in Law & American Civilization and a minor in Theatre Arts. Before law school, he interned with the Honorable Judge Charles H. Dorsey III in the Baltimore City Circuit Court. In his 1L summer, Karrington studied abroad at Scotland’s University of Aberdeen School of Law, studying Comparative Human Rights Law and Comparative Business Law. He then returned to UB last fall as a teacher’s assistant for 1L legal writing students.