By: Veronica Giron
The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the phrase “definite proof” as used in § 9-504(a) of the Workers’ Compensation Act (“the Act”) applies to the quality of evidence claimants must produce to meet their burden of production for an accidental hernia claim. United Parcel Serv. v. Strothers, 482 Md. 198, 204, 221-22, 286 A.3d 23, 27, 38 (2022). The court concluded that the burden claimants bear in accidental hernia claims is a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 212, 286 A.3d at 32.
In May 2016, while employed by United Parcel Service (“UPS”), David Strothers (“Strothers”) was injured while on the job. In September of that year, Strothers visited his physician, Dr. Joshua B. Macht (“Dr. Macht”), who confirmed that Strothers suffered a left inguinal hernia and an umbilical hernia that he believed were related to the work injury from May 2016. Thus, Strothers filed a workers’ compensation claim with the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Commission (“the Commission”), and the Commission granted his claim.
In September 2019, Strothers was again injured on the job while employed at UPS. Strothers visited Howard County General Hospital (“HCGH”) for treatment. A CT scan of Strothers’ abdomen revealed an increase in the size of fat in his hernia. Dr. Macht inferred this after comparing this imaging to abdomen imaging from May of 2016. Strothers promptly filed a First Report of Injury or Illness with the Commission. On November 14, 2019, Strothers underwent surgery for his September 2019 hernia. In January 2020, Dr. Macht evaluated Strothers and determined that Strothers’ 2019 hernia resulted from his 2019 work injury.
The Commission found in favor of Strothers, concluding that the 2019 injury during employment caused his current hernia and he was totally disabled from September 2019 to January 2020.
After the Commission denied UPS’s request for a rehearing, UPS filed for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Howard County. Agreeing with the Commission, the circuit court found that “definite proof” did not require an accidental hernia claimant to meet a higher burden of proof, and Strothers’ hernia was a new hernia resulting from the 2019 case. Next, UPS appealed to the Appellate Court of Maryland, which affirmed the Circuit Court’s opinion, determining that “definite proof” describes the quality of evidence and that Strothers met his burden by producing an expert medical opinion. Thus, UPS appealed this case to the Supreme Court of Maryland.
The Supreme Court of Maryland granted certiorari to determine whether the phrase “definite proof” under § 9-504 of the Workers’ Compensation Act refers to the quality of evidence the claimant is required to produce or to the burden of proof the claimant must meet, thereby elevating the standard from a preponderance of the evidence to clear and convincing evidence. Strothers, 482 Md. at 204-05, 286 A.3d at 27-28.
The Supreme Court of Maryland began its analysis by distinguishing between the burden of production and persuasion. Strothers, 482 Md. at 211, 286 A.3d at 31-32. Section 9-504(a) of the Act requires an employer to compensate an employee who sustains a hernia from an on-the-job injury so long as “the covered employee provides definite proof” that it was a new hernia. Id. at 214, 286 A.3d at 33 (quoting Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 9-504(a)(1)) (West 1991)) (emphasis added). Hernia claims are distinguished from other types of injuries due to the many “abdominal pressure[s] that can cause” them. Strothers, 482 Md. at 217, 286 A.3d at 35.
The court next looked to the plain language of the Act. Strothers, 482 Md. at 212-13, 286 A.3d at 32. Because the phrase “definite proof” was not defined by the Labor and Employment Article, nor was it found elsewhere in the Maryland Annotated Code, the court turned to the definitions of “definite” and “proof” at the time of enactment. Id. at 214-15, 286 A.3d at 33-34. The court defined the word “definite” as “‘precise in detail[]’; … meant to ‘restrict[]’ or ‘limit[]’ the noun it modifies.” Id. at 215, 286 A.3d at 33 (quoting Definite, Webster’s New International Dictionary of the English Language (2d. 1934)). To define “proof[,]” the court relied on a dictionary definition, reading “[t]hat degree of cogency, arising from evidence, which convinces the mind of any truth or fact and produces belief.’” Strothers, 482 Md. at 215, 286 A.3d at 33-34 (quoting Proof, Webster’s New International Dictionary of the English Language (2d. 1934)). Thus, “definite” as used in the Act means to “restrict or limit the type of proof needed” in hernia cases, indicating that the phrase refers to the quality of evidence necessary to meet the burden of production. Strothers, 482 Md. at 215, 286 A.3d at 34.
Next, the court considered the statutory purpose of the Act, which is to protect workers, as well as their families, who are facing hardships after sustaining work-related injuries. Strothers, 482 Md. at 217, 286 A.3d at 35 (quoting Matter of Collins, 468 Md. 672, 686, 228 A.3d 760 (2020)). The General Assembly intended for the Act to be followed in accordance with this purpose but also recognized that hernias can result from numerous causes. Strothers, 482 Md. at 217, 286 A.3d at 35. To remedy this, the General Assembly required more of hernia claimants by requiring “definite proof.” Id. The court found that interpreting definite proof to apply to the burden of production rather than the burden of persuasion “harmonious[ly] balance[d]” the Act’s remedial purpose and the heightened hernia claims requirement. Id. at 218, 286 A.3d at 35.
The court noted that the General Assembly has not modified the statute’s language to indicate that definite proof heightens the burden of persuasion a claimant must meet. Strothers, 482 Md. at 218, 286 A.3d at 36. The General Assembly is aware of the burden of persuasion and has in the past placed the most demanding standard, clear and convincing evidence, on serious, life-altering matters. Id. at 219, 286 A.3d at 36. Given the Act’s remedial purpose, the court found it unlikely that the General Assembly would require the heaviest burden be placed on workers seeking compensation for hernias sustained on the job. Id. at 219-20, 286 A.3d at 36. Thus, the court concluded that the fact that the General Assembly did not clearly require the clear and convincing evidence standard for the burden of persuasion, further indicated that “definite proof” refers to the quality of evidence offered. Id. at 220, 286 A.3d at 37.
Having established that the phrase “definite proof” applies to the quality of evidence required to meet his burden of production, the court found that Strothers’ satisfied this burden by producing the expert medical opinion of Dr. Macht, who concluded that the September 2019 hernia was a new hernia unrelated to the hernia sustained in May 2016. Strothers, 482 Md. at 220, 286 A.3d at 37. Because UPS failed to present its own expert medical evidence to dispute Dr. Macht’s opinion, the court could not conclude that the Commission misinterpreted the law in determining that Strothers had satisfied his burden of proof. Id. at 221, 286 A.3d at 37-38.
The Supreme Court of Maryland held that, as used in § 9-504(a) of the Workers’ Compensation Act, “definite proof” describes the quality of evidence a claimant must produce to satisfy their burden of production under a workers’ compensation claim seeking compensation for an accidental hernia. Moving forward, any claimant who brings a workers’ compensation claim for an accidental hernia will not be confused as to the standard for satisfying their burden of production and persuasion, allowing them to prepare their case better. Hernia claimants will not have to meet their burden by clear and convincing evidence but rather by the lesser standard of preponderance of the evidence. However, claimants must ensure they provide definite proof that their hernia resulted from a work-related injury. This clarity will create efficiency in the judicial system by ruling out claims that do not produce “definite proof” and allowing those that do to proceed.

Veronica Giron is a second-year J.D. Candidate at the University of Baltimore School of Law and a Staff Editor for the University of Baltimore Law Forum. Veronica received her Bachelor of Arts in Criminal Justice and Criminology from the University of Maryland, College Park in 2017. Veronica is currently working as a Practice Management Intern at Miles & Stockbridge P.C. After graduation, Veronica plans to pursue a career in litigation.






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