How should the possible bias for or against child witnesses be addressed in voir dire questions presented to jurors? In Charles Mitchell v. State of Maryland, the Supreme Court of Maryland addressed this issue, holding that – contrary to its opinion in Stewart v. State – voir dire questions regarding child witness bias can be specific grounds for the disqualification of jurors.[1]

In May 2022, Charles Mitchell (“Mitchell”) was convicted of one count of sexual abuse of a minor by a family member.[2] The victim and the State’s key witness was Mitchell’s daughter.[3] Before jury selection, Mitchell asked the trial judge to ask the jurors two questions: “Do you have any concerns about a child testifying? Does anyone not believe that a child is capable of lying about a serious crime like this?”[4] The trial court agreed only to ask the first question.[5] Mitchell did not ask for more questions and did not express dissatisfaction with this ruling.[6] Despite this, the Supreme Court of Maryland found that the court’s failure to rephrase Mitchell’s question and ensure that the jury was properly screened for disqualifying bias against child witnesses was an error entitling Mitchell to a new trial.[7]

In Charles Mitchell, the Supreme Court of Maryland held that Stewart’s narrow holding – that only a specific selection of voir dire questions (e.g., bias against a witness’s occupation as apolice officer, race, or screening for any jurors who would “prefer the testimony of State’s witnesses over defense witnesses”) are required to be asked by trial judges during voir dire –should be abrogated in light of recent case law.[8] Instead, the court created a broad rule that a trial “court must ask prospective jurors a question designed to uncover [any disqualifying] bias … when the court reasonably determines that such bias could affect the fairness of the trial.” [9] The court proffers two requirements for making this determination: (1) the case involves a witness that may be favored or disfavored simply based on their “occupation or category”; and (2) the witness’s testimony is important to the case.[10]

Justice Fader’s concurrence explained more about what it means for a witness’s testimony to be “important” to the case: (1) when the credibility of the witness is “implicated with respect to a contested issue in the case;” and (2) where “a challenge to the testimony would relate to the witness’s status.”[11] Furthermore, Justice Fader explained that the majority’s holding puts the burden on trial courts to rephrase trial counsel’s “deficient voir dire” where a question is directed to revealing disqualifying bias and where the trial court can easily rephrase the question to meet this goal.[12] Justice Gould dissented, stating that the new rule itself may not be problematic but that the court’s willingness to find that the trial court abused its discretion by not rephrasing Mitchell’s question is unreasonable.[13] Gould explained that Mitchell did not attempt to challenge the ruling or explain that the court’s question was insufficient to reveal disqualifying bias, and as such, the court should not be responsible for stepping in.[14] Justice Eaves and Hotten concurred and dissented, stating that the majority’s ruling may open the floodgates for “fishing expeditions” against Maryland’s notably limited voir dire.[15]

Mitchell provides Maryland practitioners with broader freedom to question witnesses by explicitly allowing juries to be screened for and disqualified for bias against child witnesses. Furthermore, Maryland judges are now required to ask voir dire questions when potential bias against a witness can affect the fairness of the trial. Maryland judges must also be careful not to reject proposed voir dire questions without rephrasing them if their purpose is to reveal disqualifying bias.

Karrington Hatton is a third-year day student at the University of Baltimore School of Law and a second-year Staff Editor for Law Forum. Karrington graduated from Towson University in 2022 with a B.S. in Law & American Civilization and a minor in Theatre Arts. Before law school, he interned with the Honorable Judge Charles H. Dorsey III in the Baltimore City Circuit Court. In his 1L summer, Karrington studied abroad at Scotland’s University of Aberdeen School of Law, studying Comparative Human Rights Law and Comparative Business Law. He is currently working in the University of Baltimore Mediation Clinic for Families and as a teacher’s assistant for 1L legal writing students.

[1] Charles Mitchell v. State of Maryland, No. 8 slip op. at 29 (2023); Stewart v. State, 133 Md. 146 (2007).

[2] Mitchell, slip op. at 2.

[3] Id.

[4] Id.

[5] Id.

[6] Mitchell, slip op. at 2 (Gould, J., dissenting).

[7] Mitchell, slip op. at 30.

[8] Id. at 13, 29.

[9] Id. at 17.

[10] Id.

[11] Mitchell, slip op. at 1 (Fader, C.J., concurring).

[12] Id. at 2 (Fader, C.J., concurring).

[13] Mitchell, slip op. at 2 (Gould, J., dissenting).

[14] Id.

[15] Mitchell, slip op. at 9 (Eaves, J., which Hotten, J., joins., concurring and dissenting).