By: Michaela “Odi” Odian
The Supreme Court of Maryland held that a prosecutor’s “objectively reasonable” interpretation of Maryland’s juror intimidation statute was enough to issue an arrest warrant made in good faith and, therefore, cannot be civilly liable for their mistake of law. Rovin v State, 488 Md. 144, 156, 321 A.3d 201, 207 (2024). Next, the court decided that true threats are not protected speech and can warrant arrest. Id. Finally, Maryland’s juror intimidation statute, Md. Code Ann. Criminal Law Article §9-305 is not “unconstitutionally vague.” Id. at 156, 158, 198, 321 A.3d at 207-08, 233.
Ms. Valerie Rovin’s daughter was convicted of driving under the influence. Upset by this, Ms. Rovin sought out the jury foreperson and confronted him at his workplace. Ms. Rovin argued with the foreperson and stated that she would have someone “from Nicaragua [to] ‘take care of’” the foreperson. The foreperson verified that the person from Nicaragua was real, felt threatened by Ms. Rovin’s words, and reported the incident to the police.
The State Attorney’s Office (“State”) advised the officer who responded to the call that Ms. Rovin’s conduct violated Maryland’s juror intimidation statute, which prevents impeding a juror’s duties through threat or force. The District Court Commissioner found probable cause to issue a warrant for Ms. Rovin’s arrest. Ms. Rovin was arrested and placed under house arrest until her trial. The court acquitted Ms. Rovin of her juror intimidation and assault charges at her bench trial. Her threat was not imminent, and the trial court found the juror intimidation statute did not apply to this case because the foreperson completed their jury service before Ms. Rovin threatened them. The trial court held that the juror intimidation statute was prosecuted based on a mistake of law.
Ms. Rovin then brought a civil suit against the prosecutor and the officer, alleging violation of various tort laws and her rights under Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Appellate Court of Maryland reversed, finding Ms. Rovin needed discovery to prove the State acted with gross negligence and malice to override the Maryland Tort Claim Act (“MTCA”), which protects State personnel from civil liability when acting within their State roles.
The Supreme Court of Maryland granted certiorari and disagreed because they argued that officers were “not entitled to absolute [Judicial or Prosecutor] immunity[.]” The court remanded the case back to the circuit court to determine if the Heien v. North Carolina principle could be applied to grant the officer immunity. In Heien, the Court held that an officer who arrests someone based on a “reasonable suspicion” that they violated the law is protected from civil liability. Ms. Rovin then amended her complaint to add more violations of various tort laws and rights under Articles 40 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the State after the moved for the motion arguing the mistake of law framework under Heien, and the appellate court affirmed. Ms. Rovin petitioned the Supreme Court of Maryland for a writ of certiorari, which the court granted. The court addressed whether the State may be civilly liable for a wrongful arrest based on a “good faith” warrant and had reasonably relied on the prosecutor’s interpretation, whether the State interpreted the juror intimidation statute reasonably, and whether Ms. Rovin’s words were protected speech. Rovin, 488 Md. at 173-74, 321 A.3d. 201, 217-18.
The Supreme Court of Maryland refused to apply Heien because the facts in Heien weredistinguishable from those of Ms. Rovin’s case. Rovin, 488 Md. at 176, 321 A.3d at 219. Heien involved an officer at a traffic stop who arrested another without a warrant, but here, the officer had a warrant from a judicial officer to arrest Ms. Rovin. Id. at 176, 321 A.3d at 219 (citing Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54 (2014)).
The court then analyzed how probable cause can protect State agents from civil liability by applying United States v. Leon and Messerschmidt v. Millender. Rovin, 488 Md. at 185-93, 321 A.3d at 224-29. In Messerschmidt, an officer can be protected from civil liability for false arrest if there is probable cause for the arrest proven through a warrant. Rovin, 488 Md. at 192, 321 A.3d 201, 229 (citing Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546 (2012)). However, while a “warrant is not an absolute shield,” it is given great weight to prove the officer had probable cause to perform the arrest, which results in the plaintiff having a high burden to prove there was no probable cause. Rovin, 488 Md. at 181-82, 192, 321 A.3d at 222-23, 228-229. (quoting Messerschmidt, 565 U.S. at 547).
Four exceptions to Messerschmidt, outlined in Leon, remove the officer’s immunity: an affidavit that is known to be false misled the judge; the judge abandoned their “judicial role” and was rubber stamping; the affidavit for the warrant is vague and unreasonable; or the warrant is so lacking that no reasonable officer could believe it was valid. Rovin, 488 Md. at 192, 321 A.3d at 229. (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984)). The State no longer has immunity if a plaintiff can prove one or more Leon exceptions. Rovin, 488 Md. at 192, 321 A.3d at 229. Therefore, the court’s next analysis was whether the State had a reasonable interpretation of the juror intimidation statute that formed the basis for the warrant. Id.
The court found the juror intimidation statute ambiguous, but it held the State’s interpretation of it was reasonable after examining its legislative intent. Rovin, 488 Md. at 207, 321 A.3d 201, 238. The term “juror” extends to times when the court selected jurors for a specific term, and their duty did not end until the specific term was over. Id. at 207, 321 A.3d at 238. Since the State’s interpretation was homogenous to the legislative history, they had an objectively reasonable interpretation of the statute, the District Court Commissioner had probable cause to issue the warrant, and the officer had no reason to find the warrant unreasonable or lacking. Id. at 215, 321 A.3d at 243.
Next, the court determined that the officer could believe Ms. Rovin intended to threaten the foreperson, making her speech a true threat. Rovin, 488 Md. at 219-20, 321 A.3d at 245-46. For speech to fall outside the protection of the First Amendment, it must constitute a true threat, which involves statements or actions that suggest the speaker intends to cause unlawful harm or violence to someone. Id. (citing Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66, 74 (2023)). It does not matter whether the speaker intended to make a threat; rather, it depends on whether the person hearing the speech believes there is a threat. Rovin, 488 Md. at 218-19, 321 A.3d at 245. Ms. Rovin’s words made the foreperson fearful of potential harm from the Nicaraguan person. Id. at 220, 321 A.3d at 245-46. Therefore, Ms. Rovin’s words to the foreperson could have amounted to a true threat, which gave the officer probable cause for the arrest. Id.
Finally, the court found the juror intimidation statute not to be vague. Rovin, 488 Md. at 222, 321 A.3d at 247. A statute becomes unconstitutionally vague when an ordinary person cannot define the requirements of the statute. Id. at 221, 321 A.3d at 246. Ms. Rovin argues that the juror intimidation statute was unconstitutionally vague because she and the State had different interpretations, which led to her acquittal. Id. at 220, 321 A.3d at 246. Ms. Rovin’s argument is unconvincing because vagueness is not found through an acquittal. Id. at 222, 321 A.3d at 247.
Justice Watts dissented because the court had remanded the case to determine if the Heien principle applied. Rovin, 488 Md. at 225, 321 A.3d at 249 (Watts, J., dissenting). Watts agreed with the majority that Heien did not apply here but argued that the court was incorrect in applying Messerschmidt because the circuit court did not consider those principles when granting summary judgment, and it was not cited in the State’s brief. Id. at 230-31, 321 A.3d at 252 (Watts, J., dissenting). At the end of her dissent, Watts states, “[t]his decision will be one of the most impactful decisions of this [c]ourt.” Id. at 238, 321 A.3d at 257 (Watts, J., dissenting).
The Rovin decision extends the MTCA immunity to police officers when they have probable cause for arrest. This ruling encourages police officers to consult prosecutors and rely on their interpretation of the law. However, Leon is now binding case law in Maryland, creating a higher bar for a plaintiff to prove a lack of probable cause for wrongful arrests. Also, the court states that the juror intimidation statute was ambiguous at first glance and required an extensive review of the legislative history, which would not be common knowledge to laypeople. Therefore, the Maryland legislature should review the juror intimidation statute and refine the language to avoid further mistakes of law.
Michaela “Odi” Odian is a third-year J.D. candidate at the University of Baltimore School of Law and Editor-in-Chief for the University of Baltimore Law Forum. She received her Bachelor of Science in Neuroscience with a minor in Interdisciplinary Ethics from Belmont University. Odi was a law clerk for the Maryland Department of Health and Mayer Law, LLC. Currently, Odi is a law clerk at Miller Stern Lawyers, LLC and hopes to pursue a career in healthcare law.
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