FREEMAN V. STATE

By: Madison Hine

The Supreme Court of Maryland held that testimony regarding colloquial language, which a layperson can understand, does not require an “expert” qualification. Freeman v. State, 487 Md. 420, 431, 318 A.3d 1241, 1248 (2024). The court also held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by allowing a detective to define “lick” as a lay witness. Id.

In February 2020, Darryl Edward Freeman (“Freeman”) organized and participated in the armed robbery and murder of Bradley Brown. The state charged Freeman with 14 counts, including first-degree murder, first-degree assault, and armed robbery. At trial, Detective Wimberly testified to the definition of “lick” based on his experience working in the robbery unit of the police department. Freeman objected, stating that defining the term required an expert opinion, and Detective Wimberly was not qualified as an expert before the trial court. The court overruled this objection, and Detective Wimberly defined “lick” as robbery and “sweet lick” as easy to rob. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and the court sentenced Freeman to life for first-degree felony murder and a combined total of forty-eight years for the other convictions.

Freeman timely appealed to the Appellate Court of Maryland on the issue of whether the court admitted Detective Wimberly as a lay witness and whether this prevented him from testifying on the definition of slang terms. The appellate court held that the lower court implicitly qualified Detective Wimberly as an expert, and his testimony on the meaning of “lick” was “within the realm of expert testimony.” Freeman then petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Maryland, which granted the petition to resolve three issues: (1) whether the lower court abused its discretion in permitting Detective Wimberly to testify as a layperson; (2) whether Detective Wimberly’s opinion regarding slang terms was expert testimony; and (3) whether slang terms are beyond the knowledge of the average person.

The Supreme Court of Maryland began its analysis by distinguishing expert testimony from lay testimony. Freeman, 487 Md. at 431, 318 A.3d at 1248. Expert testimony is required only for matters that involve a type of “science or profession” that the average person would likely not understand. Id. (quoting Johnson, 457 Md. at 530, 179 A.3d at 994). The capacity for an average person’s understanding is not whether they are “already knowledgeable about a given subject, but whether [the matter] is within the range of perception and understanding.” Id. at 431, 318 A.3d at 1248 (quoting State v. Galicia, 479 Md. 341, 394, 278 A.3d 131, 161 (2022)).

The court then identified and discussed the types of matters that precedent established as expert testimony. Freeman, 487 Md. at 432, 318 A.3d at 1248–49. First, the court discussed matters requiring considerable study time, such as officers needing certain training and expertise to recognize drug transactions. Id. at 433, 318 A.3d at 1249 (citing Ragland, 385 Md. at 726, 870 A.2d at 620–21). Next, the court explained that matters involving a scientific test using specific terminology qualify as expert testimony. Id. at 433–34, 318 A.3d at 1249 (citing Blackwell, 408 Md. 691, 971 A.2d at 304). Similarly, police officers’ testimony regarding conducting and applying field sobriety tests requires specialized skills and training beyond the average person’s understanding. Id. at 433–34, 318 A.3d at 1249 (citing Blackwell, 408 Md. 691, 971 A.2d at 304). The court further stated that testimony regarding any form of data collection represented only by a “string of data” that requires interpretation is expert testimony. Id. at 434–35, 318 A.3d at 1250 (citing Johnson, 457 Md. at 534, 179 A.3d at 996). For example, although cell phones are a form of widely used technology, understanding the raw data is beyond the abilities of the ordinary person. Id. at 434–35, 318 A.3d at 1250.

Next, the court distinguished those matters requiring expert testimony from lay testimony regarding common technology. Freeman, 487 Md. at 434, 318 A.3d at 1250. The court previously held that GPS technology is familiar to the general public and understood by the average person. Id. at 434, 318 A.3d at 1250. (quoting Johnson, 457 Md. at 530–31, 179 A.3d at 994). The function of any online GPS tracking service is regularly used and requires no specialized skill to understand. Id. at 435, 318 A.3d at 1250. GPS data and service providers intend for their products to be used and understood by average accountholders. Id. at 435, 318 A.3d at 1250. The court concluded that because GPS data is familiar, easy to use, and designed for the average person, it is within an average person’s understanding and can be brought in through lay testimony. Id. at 434, 318 A.3d at 1250.

Finally, the court determined that defining slang terms merely requires the ability to hear and understand the use of language. Freeman, 487 Md. at 438, 318 A.3d at 1252. Furthermore, understanding colloquial language does not require any technical training or knowledge. Id. Although Detective Wimberly gained knowledge of the word “lick” from his experience in the robbery unit, the “nature of his opinion” did not rely on any skill or technique beyond that of a layperson. Id.

In the dissenting opinion, Justice Watts disagreed with the majority on two issues: (1) whether Detective Wimberly was properly admitted as a lay witness and (2) whether the term “lick” was within the common knowledge of a layperson. Freeman, 487 Md. at 440–42, 318 A.3d at 1253–54 (Watts, J., dissenting). Justice Watts explained that when a witness learned the meaning of a slang term due to their specialized training, it would be improper for them to testify as a lay witness. Id. at 440, 318 A.3d at 1253 (Watts, J., dissenting). Moreover, the term “lick” is not widely used; Detective Wimberly only knew its meaning through his experience in the robbery unit. Id. at 444–46, 318 A.3d at 1255–58. (Watts, J., dissenting). Therefore, it was improper for Detective Wimberly to be admitted as a lay witness when testifying on the meaning of “lick.” Id. at 453, 318 A.3d at 1261. (Watts, J., dissenting).

When witnesses provide testimony on “slang terms” that the average person can understand, they are not required to be qualified as experts. The majority’s interpretation of Maryland Rules 5-701 and 5-702 provided clarity for the lower courts. The court’s discretion on this matter rests not on whether the jurors are already familiar with the matters being offered as testimony but on whether they can understand it. Attorneys may find a way to make their witnesses’ testimony more easily comprehensible to the average person to avoid qualification of those witnesses as experts. This trial strategy can save parties the trouble of expert disclosure where it is not necessary.

Madison Hine is a third-year student at the University of Baltimore School of Law where she serves as the Symposium and Alumni Editor for Law Forum. She earned her bachelor’s degree in Criminology and Criminal justice from the University of Maryland. At UB, Madison is the Co-President of the Jewish Law Students Association and a Rule 19 student attorney in the Bob Parsons Veterans Advocacy Clinic. Following her graduation in Spring 2026, she will clerk for Judge Mayer in Baltimore County Circuit Court.