By: Grace Andrews-Becker*

I. Introduction

The Blueprint for Maryland’s Future (the “Blueprint”) promises sweeping policy changes to Maryland’s education system, providing greater opportunities for every child and “unprecedented investments” for educational reform.[1] While this Blueprint proposes changes to teachers’ salaries, planning time, and training, it does not address the continued challenges teachers face in the workplaces and what rights they may have to address those challenges.[2]  Today, students demonstrate increasingly complex mental health and academic needs,[3] the state education system faces significant teacher shortages,[4] and over half the classrooms in the state have more than twenty students assigned to them.[5] A Howard County Public School teacher received caseloads averaging 150 students a year.[6] That same teacher transitioned to Baltimore City Public Schools, where they then taught a summer credit-recovery course to sixty-seven students.[7] Another teacher stated that they are responsible for teaching 93 students over three classes, meaning if they were to hold an individual check-in with each student, they would have less than 2.5 minutes with each student before class time expires.[8]

Senator Pamela Beidle brought a possible solution to these problems before the Maryland General Assembly in 2023 by introducing Senate Bill 206 (“S.B. 206”).[9] Maryland’s Education Code prohibits teachers from discussing class size as a subject in their collective bargaining over the terms and conditions of their employment.[10] S.B. 206, however, sought to repeal this prohibition and allow class size to be a permissive bargaining subject.[11] Identical versions of S.B. 206 were brought twice before the General Assembly in the 2022 legislative session and once in 2020.[12] All legislative attempts to repeal the current law, including S.B. 206, failed at the committee level for reasons not apparent in the legislative histories.[13]

Another development in Maryland policy and law further obscures this issue. As of July 1, 2023, Maryland enacted the Public Employee Relations Act (“PERA”).[14] Before PERA, Maryland organized its collective bargaining laws by work sector.[15] PERA realigned and consolidated the collective bargaining laws across all work sectors into one standardized Title.[16] Previous versions of PERA suggested repealing the prohibition to negotiate class sizes;[17] however, this is absent in the current version of the law.[18]

This comment evaluates class size as a permissive bargaining subject for Maryland’s public-sector collective bargaining laws. Part II illustrates the origins of collective bargaining laws across the country and how Maryland’s state laws and teachers’ unions fit into the national picture of collective bargaining.[19] Part III discusses the underlying issue warranting significant educational reform through collective bargaining.[20] Namely, this section examines the tension between Maryland teachers’ collective bargaining rights, PERA, and the Blueprint’s objective to establish Maryland as a national leader in education.[21] Part IV proposes a solution to the tension: repealing the current prohibition on class size as a bargaining subject and allowing class size as a permissive bargaining subject.[22] In support of this solution, Part IV explores how information-sharing between negotiating parties promotes equality among bargaining parties and generates creative problem-solving.[23] Finally, Part V reinforces that the difficulties teachers face in the classroom lead to general burnout and low retention, which warrants opening the discussion on an impactful workplace condition—class sizes.[24]

II. Historical Development

Collective bargaining imposes a mutual obligation on both an employer and an employee’s union representative to “meet, confer, and negotiate in good faith” concerning conditions of employment, including wages, workplace disputes, and worker safety.[25] With over fourteen million workers in the United States belonging to a union,[26] collective bargaining is a critical tool for employers and employees alike.[27] However, national support and laws governing employees’ collective action are inconsistent.[28]

A. History of Collective Bargaining Laws in the United States.

Initially, the U.S. did not welcome the idea of employees associating to improve the terms and conditions of their work.[29] One of the earliest employee strikes occurred in 1806 when Philadelphia shoemakers demanded pay increases.[30] The Mayor’s Court of Philadelphia indicted the union organizers under criminal conspiracy charges.[31] The first national labor organization in the U.S. arose in 1869 as the Knights of Labor (“KOL”).[32] The KOL was a secret organization for its first ten years and shifted towards regional control.[33] 1886 marked the end of the KOL, as that year brought nearly 1,600 strikes, violence, and widespread backlash against unionization.[34]

Despite this disapproval, workers continued to protest.[35] Decades of railways workers protesting in the early 1900s gave rise to the first federal collective bargaining statutes.[36] Because their protests led to frequent work stoppages and interruptions to interstate commerce,[37] Congress enacted the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”) in 1926, which guaranteed the right of railway workers to organize, join unions, and elect representatives free from employer influence.[38]  The RLA also instituted mandatory dispute resolution procedures to force workers and employers into good-faith negotiations over disputes.[39] Nine years following the RLA, the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) was passed and granted private-sector employees the right to unionize.[40]

It took over two decades following the NLRA’s passage for these rights to extend to the public-sector.[41] In 1962, President John F. Kennedy issued Executive Order 10988, recognizing that “efficient administration of the Government and the well-being of employees require[s] . . . orderly and constructive relationships.”[42] This order granted federal employees the right to bargain collectively and established three tiers of representation rights.[43] As a result of President Kennedy’s Executive Order, public-sector union membership surged.[44]  Local, state, and federal employee union memberships grew from ruffly nine hundred thousand members in 1960 to almost six million by 1976.[45] There was a similar occurrence among state legislatures; thirty-six states enacted public sector union rights laws by 1976.[46]

B. Inconsistencies in Collective Bargaining Laws Across the Nation

The history of collective bargaining laws highlight key differences between public and private-sector workforces. Private sector unions represent the interests of non-governmental workers against corporate abuse.[47] Therefore, the National Labor Relations Board and the NLRA regulate private-sector collective bargaining rights.[48] Public-sector employees represent federal, state, and local government workers, including teachers, police officers, and postal service staff.[49] There is no federal legislation providing public-sector employees the right to bargain collectively.[50] Thus, public-sector collective bargaining laws are subject to state regulation.[51]

Due to state regulation, public-sector collective bargaining laws are inconsistent across the country.[52] Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, Mississippi, and Arkansas expressly prohibit all collective bargaining across all work sectors.[53] Other states, such as Indiana, Oklahoma, and Texas, prohibit collective bargaining but make an exception for particular sectors, such as firefighters and police officers.[54] Some states, like Kentucky and Mississippi, only recognize teachers’ collective bargaining powers as a creature of case law.[55]

However, significant variance remains among states that permit collective bargaining.[56] For example, Nebraska and Massachusetts provide blanket bargaining laws for all public-sector employees.[57] Other states, such as Maine and California, specify their collective bargaining laws by work sector,[58] yet they consolidate the jurisdiction of these statutes under a centralized labor relations board.[59] There are also differences in the powers granted by these state statutes.[60] For example, Delaware prohibits workers from striking,[61] Minnesota only prohibits essential employees from striking,[62] whereas Maine prohibits any “work stoppages.”[63]

C. The Rise and Influence of Teachers’ Unions on Collective Bargaining Laws in America

Political activism was a central feature of the 1960s in America, as civil rights, student, and anti-war movements demanded changes in public policy.[64] Labor organizations also sought reform as the American economy expanded for nearly a decade without interruption, and union members knew the government had the means to meet their demands.[65] This knowledge increased union memberships[66] and empowered public employees to take risks, like striking.[67]

Teachers’ unionization served as a “pacesetter and barometer” for public-sector unionism and collective bargaining at the state and local levels.[68] Before Executive Order 10899, New York teachers acting under the United Federation of Teachers demanded collective bargaining rights from their school boards.[69] On November 7, 1960, election day, a strike occurred when “5,600 teachers, school secretaries, school counselors, and social workers struck [and] another 2,000 [school employees] called in sick.”[70] Over 300 teacher strikes occurred in the decade following the election day strike.[71]

The election day significantly affected teachers’ unionism and bargaining rights.[72] Notably, the nation’s first collective bargaining agreement with public school teachers was signed in New York City in 1962 as a direct result of the election day strike.[73] Union memberships steadily grew during this time as well.[74] The American Federation of Teachers saw its 50,000 members in 1962 grow to 225,000 within eight years.[75] This growth continued even in states without strong collective bargaining laws.[76] For example, eighty percent of teachers in Nebraska were union members by 1977 despite no changes in its state public policy.[77]

Much like general collective bargaining laws, modern-day teachers’ collective bargaining laws and union rights vary by state.[78] Out of fifty states, six prohibit collective bargaining across all public sectors.[79] Thirty-four states grant kindergarten through twelfth grade teachers at least some rights to organize and collectively bargain.[80] Nine states recognize bargaining rights so long as the school board permits it.[81] Tennessee takes a different approach and adopts “Collaborative Conferencing” between teachers and school systems.[82]  State approaches to other education professionals, such as support staff and higher education administrators, also vary.[83]

D. The Erosion of Public-Sector Collective Bargaining and Union Rights.

Despite the collective progress of bargaining laws and rights over the last eighty years, anti-union forces recently restricted the rights of public-sector employees.[84] One such restriction comes from state “Right to Work” laws.[85]

Right to work laws were initially restricted to private-sector employees.[86] Employees are not required to become full union members or pay union membership fees or dues.[87] Section 8(3)(a) of the NLRA, however, obliges unions to “fairly represent every employee in a recognized bargaining unit.”[88] Because the union must represent every employee in its bargaining unit, member or not, employees must pay agency fees or dues to support the union’s work.[89] But in 1947, Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act—added as Section 14(b) of the NLRA—allowing employees to evade union agency fees as state law permits.[90] Today, twenty-seven states prevent unions from collecting agency fees from the members they must represent through these right to work laws.[91]

In 2018, the United States Supreme Court addressed whether right to work laws could apply to public-sector employees in Janus v. AFSCME.[92] In its decision, the Court overturned forty years of precedent and held that public-sector employees were not required to pay agency fees for their union representation.[93] The Court reasoned that state laws that force agency fee payments violate the First Amendment because they compel employees to “subsidize private speech on matters of substantial public concern.”[94]

Across the country, Janus produced uneven effects across the country in less than a year.[95] Some states, such as California, did not experience severe losses to employee union representation post-Janus,[96] thanks to swift legislative action. The same day the Supreme Court issued its Janus decision, the Governor of California signed Senate Bill 866 into effect.[97] This law provided unions greater control over their dues authorization process by limiting employer communication regarding union representation and requiring employers to continue deducting union dues from payroll.[98]

Meanwhile, Maryland saw an uptick in its union membership and representation numbers post-Janus.[99] This increase in union memberships may be due to Maryland’s collective bargaining laws, which protect public-sector employees’ bargaining rights in a way not impaired by the Janus decision.[100] Moreover, the Maryland General Assembly amended provisions of public-sector labor laws, allowing exclusive bargaining representatives to “access employee orientation and employee contact information.”[101]

     Janus hit unions the hardest in states with weaker collective bargaining laws, such as West Virginia, which saw an overall decrease in union memberships and representation.[102] Before Janus, states like West Virginia could overcome these decreases with the help of national federations.[103] Unfortunately, Janus also affected the memberships and revenues of these national federations.[104] The American Federation of Teachers (“AFT”) lost over 80,000 members and $18 million in annual fee revenue, and the National Education Association (“NEA”) lost 88,000 members and $32 million in fee revenue, totaling a ten percent cut to its operating budget.[105] These losses are particularly troubling to the two largest national teachers unions, as the AFT and NEA can no longer repurpose revenues from stronger union states to subsidize unions with weaker state union laws.[106]

E. The Influence of Maryland’s First Teachers’ Union.

Maryland teachers’ unionization was pivotal in creating collective bargaining legislation for Maryland’s teachers.[107] In 1866, the Maryland State Teachers’ Association (“MSTA”) established itself as the first teachers’ union in the state.[108] By the 1940s, the MSTA implemented “robust legislative programs,” executive board officers, annual conventions, and publications.[109] These legislative programs “fundamentally transformed and improved” education across the state.[110]  By 1956, these programs created a teachers’ retirement system and worker’s compensation coverage and set minimum class sizes and teacher salaries.[111]

The MSTA’s efforts towards education equity ensured Maryland was a “national exemplar” in education.[112] Three years before Brown v. Board of Education,[113] the MSTA desegregated, removed “white” from its membership requirements, and merged with the Maryland Education Association.[114] By the mid-1960s, the MSTA passed a resolution to provide educational opportunities for students of any age, race, creed, physical and intellectual ability.[115]

F. Teachers’ Union Rights and Collective Bargaining Laws in Maryland.

Through its legislature, the Maryland General Assembly enshrined the right to collectively bargain for numerous sectors, including state employees, teachers, sheriffs, librarians, corrections officers, and first responders.[116] These sectors may use collective bargaining to negotiate economic and noneconomic provisions, such as wages and benefits, scheduling, uniforms, and workplace conditions.[117] Under these laws, employees have the right to organize freely and employers cannot interfere with an employee, their union, or their representative’s right to bargain collectively.[118] Moreover, Maryland prohibits employees from striking and employers from imposing “lockouts.”[119]

Teachers work under contracts negotiated between their union and the Board of Education.[120] Maryland law organizes the terms of contract negotiations into three categories: mandatory, permissive, and illegal subjects.[121] Parties must discuss and negotiate when the union representative or Board propose a mandatory subject.[122] Mandatory subjects include leave, work hours, tuition reimbursement, and planning time.[123] If one party raises a permissive subject to negotiate, the other may refuse to discuss it.[124] Permissive subjects include evaluation systems and whether bargaining sessions can be open or closed to employees or the public.[125] Finally, illegal subjects are those banned by state law, preventing either party from discussing or negotiating such subjects.[126] Maryland law prohibits teachers’ unions and school boards from negotiating over the calendar year and class size.[127]

G. Development on the Prohibition to Set Class Sizes.

Maryland’s first collective bargaining law concerning teachers was broad.[128] Codified in 1978 as section 6-408(b) of Maryland’s Education Title, the law required public school employers to meet and negotiate with employee organizations or its representatives “on all matters [] relate[d] to salaries, wages, hours, and other working conditions.”[129] Under this version of the law, there were only mandatory and illegal bargaining subjects.[130]

As a result, courts were left to determine whether a particular “other working condition” was a mandatory or illegal bargaining subject.[131] The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the “true intent and meaning of the provisions” of the Education Article gave deference to the school board’s interpretation.[132] Justifying this deference, the court stated that “literally almost any educational matter may relate to an employee’s working conditions” and to hold otherwise could shift educational policy decisions to the hands of teachers rather than school boards.[133]

The Maryland State Board of Education resolves whether class size constitutes an educational policy subject to the Board’s interpretation of whether it is a mandatory or illegal bargaining subject.[134] To determine this, the State Board of Education employs a two-step analysis.[135] First, the Board decides whether there is a statutory duty that supersedes its collective bargaining obligations.[136] If not, then the Board applies a balancing test weighing the employee’s interests against the school board’s interests.[137] In 1987, the Board concluded that no statutory duty superseded its obligations and, in conducting the balancing test, determined class size was a “significant matter of educational policy” that the local Board must decide.[138] In supporting its decision, the Board recognized class size as an important factor in educational quality.[139] When establishing class sizes, school systems must consider developments in research and requirements for special populations while maintaining the community’s interests.[140]

However, for teachers, all educational policies are working conditions, and for the Board, all teachers’ working conditions are educational policies.[141] The Supreme Court of Maryland confronted this elusive line between “educational policy” and “other working conditions” in 1987.[142] The court held that a broad reading of section 6-408(b) could allow union representatives to override the Board on matters of educational policy.[143] Such an interpretation, the court reasoned, would destroy any deference given to the Board in interpreting statutory bargaining subjects.[144] Moreover, the court will find the Board’s interests outweigh those of its teachers when a topic, such as academic calendars, involves considerations beyond those of teachers, such as scheduling other staff, and when negotiating those topics may take a long time and deprive the community of education.[145]

Despite the interpretive questions surrounding section 6-408(b), the Maryland General Assembly left section 6-408(b) unamended for nearly twenty-five years.[146] In 2002, the Senate Committee enacted an amendment under Senate Bill 233 and added numerous exceptions to section 6-408(b), including subsection 6-408(b)(3).[147] This exception states that “a public-school employer may not negotiate the school calendar, the maximum number of students assigned to a class, or any matter precluded by applicable statutory law.”[148] This provision was recodified to section 6-408(c)(3) in 2010[149] and again in 2023 to section 6-406.[150] Although this provision was recodified, its contents remained untouched.[151]

III. Issue: Maryland’s Progressive Collective Bargaining and Education Reform Falls Short In Addressing Teachers’ Workplace Conditions

A. Enacting the Public Employee Relations Act Modernized and Streamlined Collective Bargaining in Maryland.

Governor Wes Moore signed the Public Employee Relations Act (“PERA”) on April 24, 2023, which became effective on July 1, 2023.[152] PERA realigned, consolidated, and updated public-sector employees’ collective bargaining laws.[153]

Before PERA, laws specific to a particular work sector governed public-sector collective bargaining.[154] At face value, the sector-based approach allowed the respective workforces, boards, and unions to customize their approach to specific matters, such as executive representative elections or grievance proceedings.[155] In action, however, the sector-based approach became “overly complicated.”[156] This approach created three different public labor relations boards with different procedural processes to remedy disputes and jurisdiction over specific categories of public-sector work.[157] The sector-based approach required the state to fund and staff three labor boards, but each board was understaffed, underfunded, and “spread too thin” in its ability to resolve disputes between employers and employees.[158] This approach ultimately left employees with “delayed and inconsistent rulings.”[159]

To address these inadequacies, PERA abandoned the three-board, sector-based approach and established a singular Public Employee Relations Board.[160] Proponents of PERA are hopeful that a central board will streamline dispute procedures and officiate disputes consistently.[161] While this legislation is broad-sweeping, it accommodates the nuances of the respective work sectors because PERA requires the new board to appoint “deputy directors” to oversee and manage disputes.[162] These deputy directors are knowledgeable in public school, executive branch, and higher education labor relations.[163]

B. Although Maryland Implemented Progressive Collective Bargaining Laws, They Still Limit Teachers’ Bargaining Rights.

In addition to broad changes in collective bargaining for public employees in Maryland, PERA also attempted to make substantial changes to teachers’ collective bargaining rights.[164] The first version of PERA proposed “repealing and reenacting, with amendments,” section 6-406, which prohibited class sizes and school calendars as bargaining subjects.[165] During the first committee hearing over PERA, the Maryland Association of Boards of Education (“MABE”) expressed its strong opposition to changing that provision of the law.[166] Citing that such a change would be “dramatic and disruptive,” the MABE was concerned that adding class size and school calendar as permissive bargaining subjects would interfere with implementing the Blueprint into school systems.[167] The MABE also cited “significant funding and policy issues” to amending this law but did not elaborate on those funding and policy issues in its submission to the House Appropriations Committee.[168] MABE’s and Public School Superintendents’ Association of Maryland (“PSSAM”)’s  letters are the only documented opposition to PERA’s proposed section 6-406 amendment.[169] The second version of PERA removed the suggestion to repeal, reenact, and amend the prohibition on class size as a bargaining subject.[170]

As much promise as PERA shows for public employees’ collective bargaining rights, it still falls short of helping teachers fight against overwhelming workloads.[171] This shortcoming is particularly troubling because teachers are rapidly leaving the profession[172] due to feeling under-respected, overworked, and underpaid.[173] Teachers work approximately fifty-four hours per week and spend less than half that time directly teaching students.[174] Further, teachers do not feel they have control or influence over their schedules.[175] These feelings are due to the administrative control over teachers’ work and the general role teachers play in catering to the needs of their students.[176] One teacher reported that it could take as long as forty-five minutes to discipline a single student, contact their parents, and complete the necessary documentation—all of which must occur during school hours.[177]

Unsurprisingly, teachers’ job satisfaction has reached an all-time low.[178] In 2008, sixty-two percent of teachers reported feeling “very satisfied” with their job.[179] In 2022, that figure dropped to twelve percent.[180] The Merrimack College Teacher Survey also reports that over half of teachers would not advise their younger self to pursue teaching, and forty-four percent of survey respondents stated that they were likely to quit teaching in the next two years.[181] Maryland’s teachers echo these sentiments.[182] In a poll conducted on behalf of the Maryland State Education Association (“MSEA”) through the NEA, ninety-two percent of educators who responded indicated that “their workload was a serious or very serious concern.”[183] Ninety-one percent stated that “burnout was a serious or very serious concern.”[184] This survey also found that sixty-one percent of educators said they would be “somewhat or much more likely to stay in the profession if class sizes could be reduced.”[185] Ninety percent stated that “having the ability to reduce class sizes would somewhat or greatly improve their working conditions.”[186]

In addition to collective bargaining reform, Maryland has taken substantial steps toward education reform. The Maryland General Assembly passed the Blueprint for Maryland’s Future in 2021 with the promise to “increase education funding,” “enrich student experiences,” and “improve the quality of education for all children in Maryland.”[187] The Blueprint has five pillars, the second of which is to strive to develop “High Quality and Diverse Teachers and Leaders.”[188] Under this pillar, the Blueprint promises to raise teaching salaries, create monetary incentives for board-certified teachers, and “raise expectations for teacher preparation and induction.”[189] The Blueprint does not mention teachers’ working conditions or any objectives for improving those conditions.[190]

Maryland stands at the crossroads of significant public-sector collective bargaining reform and a burnt-out, weakening teacher workforce. Smaller class sizes may be the “silver bullet” for a remedy, as class size is “at the root of the challenging working conditions” teachers face.[191] Decreased teaching staff results in larger class sizes and higher caseloads for teachers to manage.[192] But, because larger classes make it difficult for teachers and students to build and strengthen the relationships required to foster student success, class sizes become unmanageable.[193]

National context emphasizes this issue: Maryland is just one of nine states that classify class size as a prohibited subject of collective bargaining.[194] Meanwhile, fourteen states and the District of Columbia view class size as a legal bargaining subject.[195]

IV. SOLUTION: Repeal Section 6-406 and Allow Class Size as a Permissive Bargaining Subject.

Senate Bill 206’s sole objective was to “repeal the prohibition on public school employers from negotiating the maximum number of students assigned to a class.”[196] Senate Bill 206 did not require school boards to set minimum or maximum class sizes or force them to pay teachers more for larger classes.[197] Instead, it would have allowed teachers, union representatives, and labor boards to address, discuss, and negotiate class sizes at the bargaining table.[198]

Each attempt to repeal the prohibition on class size as a bargaining subject under section 6-406 of Maryland’s Education Title failed at the committee level.[199] Interestingly, most witnesses and testimony before various legislative committee hearings supported repealing section 6-406.[200] Although the legislative histories are silent regarding why these bills died,[201] the witness testimony and reports from those opposing Senate Bill 206 may explain its failure. County school boards and the PSSAM opposed at least one version of a bill to repeal section 6-406, and the MABE opposed all three bills to repeal section 6-406.[202]

A. Opposition to S.B. 206.

Those opposing Senate Bill 206 cited the inherent inequities among representative unions and school board’s bargaining power as a concern.[203] Notably, by including class size as a permissive subject for negotiation, the onus of raising it is placed on the local bargaining unit.[204] Depending on the bargaining units’ inherent strengths or weaknesses, this onus can create an inequity among local unions.[205] Moreover, the Washington County Board of Education raised concerns that the school board may be unable to negotiate class size  because it lacked control over its budget or the total number of students enrolled in the county.[206]

Opponents of Senate Bill 206 also cited insufficient resources as an issue with its enactment.[207] The MABE and the PSSAM worried that if teachers successfully negotiated restrictions on class sizes, public schools would not have the physical space or fiscal resources to accommodate smaller classes.[208] The Washington County Board of Education elaborated that budget constraints make it “nearly impossible for school boards to agree to any measure that will . . . expand the usable space in the school facility.”[209] The PSSAM considered that more classes require more teachers.[210] With the current teacher shortage and the new demands placed on teacher education and training by the Blueprint, finding teachers to staff more classes will be difficult.[211]

Finally, opponents of Senate Bill 206 raised concerns about the administrative impacts on school boards and the state labor board. The PSSAM explained that with the current system, superintendents and school boards allocate students to classes based on the number of teachers available.[212] This method is a “hugely important management and budget tool,” which could be upended if forced to allocate teaching staff based on the number of students enrolled.[213] Moreover, these opponents question how Senate Bill 206 will fit into PERA.[214] The current labor relations board has no experience handling class size disputes, which they fear could result in longer-than-anticipated resolutions.[215]

However, these concerns rely on misguided assumptions about how permissive bargaining subjects work and what a “successful” negotiation outcome could be should class size become a permissive bargaining subject. First, opponents claim that school boards do not have the power to negotiate over class size.[216] However, by repealing section 6-406, class size becomes a permissive bargaining subject, meaning the union and the board must agree to discuss and negotiate class sizes.[217] Hence, the board would retain full power to deny a request by a teachers’ union representative to discuss class sizes.[218]

Second, opponents assume that by enacting Senate Bill 206, teachers would successfully negotiate caps on class sizes.[219] However, Senate Bill 206 merely opens the door to a conversation and promotes information-sharing.[220] Instead of superintendents and school boards taking on all administrative problem-solving, these parties and teachers can develop solutions to specific school issues.[221] Moreover, including “deeply invested” teachers in their classrooms’ success allows for a more comprehensive approach to educational reform and problem-solving.[222]

B. Collective Bargaining on Class Sizes Lifts the Voices of the Community.

Although school boards may deny a request to discuss class sizes, mounting pressure from teachers’ unions and the community may leverage the board to address the issue.[223] Because an “educators’ working conditions are students’ learning conditions,” the community benefits from teachers addressing school conditions through collective bargaining.[224] The NEA and its affiliates, including the MSEA,[225] realize they can better address systemic issues by involving themselves with key stakeholders, community partners, and parents.[226] In doing so, these community members and unions unite to create proposals and secure the resources vital to student success.[227]

The witnesses and testimony reports supporting Senate Bill 206 illuminate the community’s concern and interest in class sizes.[228] Twelve of the twenty-eight witnesses in favor of Senate Bill 206 were community members or high school students.[229] Moreover, in a recent poll, Baltimore City families and students cited “class sizes of no more than twenty students” as a top five priority.[230]

Teachers explained how class size affects students and the community in testimony reports and witness hearings for Senate Bill 206. A Baltimore City Public School teacher shared that when they have smaller class sizes, they can notice “bruises and cuts that shouldn’t be there” or changes in a student’s disposition when classrooms are not “packed wall to wall with students.”[231] To that teacher, smaller class sizes provide the opportunity to build connections so students cannot easily hide signs of abuse or depression.[232] Another Baltimore City teacher raised concerns over students’ learning and workplace conditions.[233] This teacher taught classes based on groupings in the student’s skill levels; these are “danger zone,” “needs improvement,” “on grade level,” or “above grade level” classes.[234] Over ten years, this teacher taught one “above-grade-level” class, the only class they taught with less than twenty students.[235] Their sole “on grade level” class had twenty-two students, while their three “needs improvement” classes ranged from twenty-seven to twenty-eight students.[236] Their five “danger zone” classes ranged from thirty-one to forty-five students.[237] In addition to teaching forty-five students testing at a “dangerous level” below their grade, their classroom was did not have air conditioning.[238] The resulting learning and working environment was, in their words, “traumatic.”[239]

C. Information-Sharing Facilitates Creative Problem Solving.

Prohibiting class size as a bargaining subject harms the school board and its teachers.[240] When teachers cannot discuss class size, they can also not discuss its adverse effects on student learning, the community, or workplace conditions.[241] These discussions are necessary to bring awareness of such issues before the school board and allow parties to develop mutually beneficial solutions.[242] Prohibiting class size as a bargaining subject creates a communication barrier between boards and unions, which leads to distrust,[243] prolongs the negotiation process, and increases the odds of employees striking.[244]

i. Information Sharing Balances Inequities in Bargaining Power.

     Employers often have the upper hand compared to their employees or union representatives at the bargaining table.[245] When this power asymmetry is present during negotiations, the bargaining process becomes a learning process for employee unions, as they counter-offer their way closer to the employer’s resistance point.[246] However, employee unions struggle to negotiate close enough to the minimum terms the employer will accept through this process and often accept settlements that are farther from the employer’s resistance point.[247]

Information sharing between an employee’s union representative and employers can help resolve this asymmetric bargaining power in a way that benefits both parties.[248] When a union representative raises an issue, and an employer responds by voluntarily sharing information, the employee union can use that information to leverage a better offer for themselves.[249] Also, employers can implement “reality construction” to steer employees’ interpretation of the information they provide.[250]

The prohibition on negotiating class sizes creates a significant asymmetry in bargaining power between the teachers’ unions and school boards that warrants repealing the prohibition. Under current classroom conditions, class sizes pose an obstacle to student and teacher success and retention and section 6-406 leaves no opportunity for improvement on behalf of teachers.[251] In fact, “educators are held accountable through their evaluations over student outcomes, but they currently have no meaningful way to ensure that their classrooms have a manageable number of students.” [252] Repealing section 6-406 empowers teachers to speak up, as they would have “a tool that allows them to have a stronger voice for themselves and [] students.” [253] Considering teacher burnout and departures from the profession, allowing teachers to discuss class size is an opportunity of the utmost importance. [254]

ii. Information Sharing Generates Mutually Beneficial Solutions to Problems.

     School boards and teachers are accountable for different responsibilities in public education.[255] Information sharing exposes the various approaches and perspectives that school boards and union representatives take toward addressing issues and problem-solving.[256] Thus, when information sharing occurs, the school board and the teachers’ union representatives can better understand each other’s priorities, realign their goals, and establish a mutually beneficial solution.[257]

Goal realignment reflects how employees and employers can manage their expectations in the bargaining process and develop a solution that hits closer to their respective resistance points.[258] For example, when employers inform their employee’s union representatives of “bad news” or less-than-ideal conditions, employees might agree to forgo certain benefits or demands for the sake of the organization’s longevity.[259] Similarly, when employees voice their concerns, employers may revisit specific terms and conditions of employment—such as productivity targets—to ensure their workplace is in a competitive market position for production and future employee recruitment. [260]

Maryland’s teachers are willing to propose creative solutions that address the school board’s concerns about limited resources.[261] T. Nathan Ferrell of Baltimore City Public Schools welcomed this opportunity in the Senate Finance Committee Hearing on Senate Bill 206.[262] According to them, solutions do not need to cap class sizes.[263] Instead, these solutions can include implementing the Blueprint, developing retention strategies for support staff positions with high turnover, and addressing specific issues like pre-k expansions.[264]

D. Teachers and Boards Can Create a Custom Solution with Circumstances Specific to Maryland in Mind.  

Opponents of Senate Bill 206 considered the bill’s administrative impacts and how a permissive bargaining subject would work with PERA.[265] However, teachers’ union representatives and school boards can consider their circumstances when negotiating towards a custom solution. Given the variance in collective bargaining laws across the country,[266] each state faces particular circumstances regarding teachers’ collective bargaining rights.[267] This section provides examples of how teachers’ unions and school boards can work together to address the issue of class size in their negotiations.

For example, class size is a permissive bargaining subject in New Hampshire.[268] Each county school board and the representative teachers’ union created agreements specific to the county’s needs.[269] The Pelham Education Association and the Pelham School Board agreed to “make every effort to follow” the proposed class size guidelines.[270] The agreement between the Nottingham School Board and the Nottingham Teachers’ Association “strive[s] towards meeting the regulations of class size as set forth by the New Hampshire Department of Education . . . provid[ed] that classroom space is available and the quality of education would not be jeopardized.”[271] In contrast, the Nashua Board of Education and the Nashua Teachers’ Union sets maximum class sizes and outline what happens when excess students are in a class.[272]

California, where class size is a mandatory bargaining subject, is an example of how class size negotiations work under a single Public Employee Relations Board (“PERB”).[273] A centralized PERB is valuable for resolving ambiguities about a “class.”[274] For example, PERB defines “class size” as the number of students in a period and not the total number of students a teacher supervises in a workday.[275] Under PERB’s interpretation, a cohort can also constitute a class size.[276] Additionally, California’s PERB helps to reinforce collective bargaining agreements and memorandums of understanding during periods of heavy revision and uncertainty, such as the COVID-19 pandemic.[277] During the pandemic, the PERB’s Mediation and Conciliation Service assisted in swiftly negotiating terms between teachers’ unions and school boards under the guidance of the Education Employment Relations Act and statewide mandates.[278] Effectively, the PERB prevented school boards from unilaterally enforcing return-to-work protocols not discussed with teachers union representatives, as required by law.[279]

Like Maryland, Illinois prohibits class size as a bargaining subject.[280] However, the Chicago Teacher’s Union (“CTU”) “fought really hard,” and created a Joint Class Size Assessment Council.[281] The CTU appointed six Board members and six retired teachers to investigate reports on unmanageable class sizes.[282] They also created a “Class Size Table” with three tiers of class sizes: one tier set the limits, the second tier established an “acceptable-sized” oversized class, and the third tier established an “impermissible” oversized class.[283] Teachers who reported their class sizes as an “acceptably” oversized class had to refer to the Class Size Council before seeking further action.[284] Those teachers reporting an “impermissible” class size had an “automatic trigger” for the Council to investigate why their class size was so large and offer a solution.[285]

V. Conclusion

Before codifying the prohibition on negotiating class sizes under section 6-406, the Supreme Court of Maryland required showing that the Board’s interests outweigh teachers’ interests to justify whether a subject is a term or condition of employment subject to bargaining or an educational policy prohibited from collective bargaining.[286] However, when educational policies are working conditions,[287] equating the Board’s interests with the teachers’ is a better approach. In other words, the Board’s interests should not outweigh the teachers’ interests, but rather, the Board’s interests must be the teachers’ interests. The only way this can happen is to open discussions on these policies and workplace issues, when it requires repealing section 6-406.

Unfortunately, Maryland’s teachers are losing interest in teaching. State teacher attrition hit nine percent in the 2021–2022 school year, and nearly every local education agency started the school year with more teacher vacancies than in previous years.[288] Over half of these vacancies were due to teacher resignations.[289] Moreover, Maryland is not producing enough teachers to overcome this issue. Enrollment in Maryland’s teacher preparation programs has dropped thirty-three percent since 2012.[290]

Although the Blueprint is a promising plan, it does not adequately address the interests of teachers. While it proposes across-the-board salary increases and “growing the pipeline” for those who want to enter the teaching profession,[291] there is little guidance on what rights or mechanisms teachers may use to enforce their interests, their students’ interests, or their workplace conditions. For teachers to raise those interests, they must be able to discuss them with their school boards.

In justifying its interest-balancing analysis, the Supreme Court of Maryland cited that it did not want to deprive the community during protracted negotiations.[292] However, the community has been deprived for thirty-seven years because teachers cannot bring class size issues to the bargaining table. Classes are overcrowded, and teachers cannot address or help meet the unique needs of students.[293] Further, class sizes are an issue the community wants to address, as classes under twenty students are a “top five priority” among community members.[294]

Finally, involving teachers in certain educational policy decisions is beneficial. Allowing teachers to negotiate class sizes in their collective bargaining promotes information sharing, which teachers can use to amplify the community’s voices. Further, teachers’ unions and Boards of Education can come together to develop comprehensive policy changes that benefit everyone. After all, Maryland’s teachers’ unions have a history of successfully creating, enacting, and maintaining significant, industry-leading changes to collective bargaining laws and education reform.[295]

Amidst PERA’s significant changes to collective bargaining and the Blueprint’s push toward education reform, Maryland still falls behind other states concerning teachers’ collective bargaining rights.[296] Senate Bill 206 and its previous versions proposed a significant shift in favor of these rights, and for good reason. Therefore, it is in the best interest of students, teachers, boards of education, and the greater Maryland community to allow teachers to discuss class sizes at the bargaining table.

---

* Grace Andrews-Becker: J.D. Candidate 2025, University of Baltimore School of Law. I am grateful to my faculty advisor, Professor Andrew Ziaja, for his invaluable guidance throughout the research and writing process. I also extend my sincere appreciation to the entire University of Baltimore Law Forum staff for their diligent editorial efforts. I am especially thankful to my husband, Karson, and my family for their steadfast support throughout law school. Lastly, I wish to acknowledge the educators and school administrators who have profoundly influenced my life: Jackie Andrews, Cynthia Deckman, and Heidi Knight.

 

[1] Md. State Dep’t of Educ., Maryland Transforms: A Strategic Plan for Maryland by Maryland 12 (2023), https://strategicplan.marylandpublicschools.org/maryland-transforms/.

 

[2] See id.

 

[3] Mary Ellen Flannery, Class Sizes: A Growing Issue Among Educators, Nat’l Educ. Ass’n Today (June 14, 2023), https://www.nea.org/nea-today/all-news-articles/class-sizes-growing-issue-among-educators.

 

[4] Kristen Griffith, Maryland Still Has a Teacher Shortage, but This School Year Looks Better than Last, Balt. Banner (Aug. 8, 2023, 5:30 AM), https://www.thebaltimorebanner.com/education/k-12-schools/maryland-teacher-shortage-HKASK3IY7VFO3MJQC3U32DIX2Y/.

 

[5] Md State Dep’t of Educ., Class Sizes in Maryland Public Schools: 2021-2022 School Year 5, 19 (2023), https://marylandpublicschools.org/about/Documents/OCP/SpecialReports/ClassSizeReport-2021-2022.pdf.

 

[6] Education–Collective Bargaining–Certificated Employees–Class Size: Hearing on S.B. 206 Before the S. Fin. Comm., 2023 Leg., 445th Sess. 1 (Md. 2023) (statement of Timothy Nathan Ferrell, Balt. City Pub. Sch. Tchr.), https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/cmte_testimony/2023/fin/1PmjiJCMDw9uQ3A8lL445MmJnqVCKdOfz.pdf.

 

[7] Id.

 

[8] Education–Collective Bargaining–Certificated Employees–Class Size: Hearing on S.B. 206 Before the S. Fin. Comm., 2023 Leg., 445th Sess. 1 (Md. 2023) (statement of Samantha Zwerling, Md. State Educ. Ass’n), https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/cmte_testimony/2023/fin/1v_E1SDBFdgOtJ9Aw7unX7wyzjSCDlnlq.pdf.

 

[9] See S.B. 206, 2023 Leg., 445th Sess. (Md. 2023).

 

[10] Md. Code Ann., Educ. § 6-406 (West 2025).

 

[11] Md. S.B. 206.

 

[12] Id.; H.D. 890, 2022 Leg., 444th Sess. (Md. 2022); S.B. 962, 2022 Leg., 444th Sess. (Md. 2022); H.D. 1074, 2020 Leg., 442nd Sess. (Md. 2020).

 

[13] See S.B. 206, 444th Leg., Sess. (Md. 2022); see also H.D. 890, 442nd Leg., Sess. (Md. 2020); see also S. 962, 444th Leg., Sess. (Md. 2022); See also H.D. 1074, 442nd Leg., Sess. (Md. 2022).

 

[14] Haw. Lab. Rels. Bd., Rep. to the Haw. State Leg. Pursuant to H. Con. Res. No. 61, Reg. Sess. at 20–22 (2023), https://labor.hawaii.gov/hlrb/files/2023/12/HCR61-HD1-Rept-to-Leg-FINAL-12.28.2023.pdf.

 

[15] See id.

 

[16] Id. (explaining that PERA consolidates collective bargaining laws concerning state employees, public university and community college employees, public school system employees, and independent home care providers under one statute).

 

[17] H.D. 984, 2023 Leg., 445th Sess. (Md. 2023) (first unenacted version).

 

[18] See Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t, §§ 22-101–22-601 (West 2023).

 

[19] See infra Part II.

 

[20] See infra Part III.

 

[21] See infra Part III.

 

[22] See infra Part IV.

 

[23] See infra Section IV.A.

 

[24] See infra Part V.

 

[25] Am. Bar Ass’n, The Developing Labor Law: The Board, the Courts, and the National Labor Relations Act § 13.I.A-B (John E. Higgins et al. eds., 8th ed. 2023) (ebook).

 

[26] Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members–2024, at 1 (2024), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf.

 

[27] See Nat’l Educ. Ass’n’s Center For Advoc., Collective Bargaining: What It Is and How It Works (2017), https://www.nea.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/CB_What-It-Is-and-How-It-Works1.pdf .

 

[28] See generally Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt et al., Labor Law in the Contemporary Workplace 18–20 (4th ed. 2023); see infra Section II.B.

 

[29] Dau-Schmidt et al., supra note 29, at 18.

 

[30] Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Pullis, 3 Doc. Hist. 59 (1806).

 

[31] Dau-Schmidt et al., supra note 29, at 18.

 

[32] Patrick Grubbs, Cordwainers Trial of 1806, Phila. Encyc., https://philadelphiaencyclopedia.org/essays/cordwainers-trial-of-1806/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2025).

 

[33] Patrick Grubbs, Knights of Labor, Phila. Encyc., https://philadelphiaencyclopedia.org/essays/cordwainers-trial-of-1806/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2025).

 

[34] Id.

 

[35] See Jimmy Balser et. al., Cong. Rsch. Serv., LSB10861, The Railway Labor Act and Congressional Action 3 (2023), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10861.

 

[36] Id.

 

[37] Id.

 

[38] Id. at 1.

 

[39] Id.  

 

[40] Guidance: National Labor Relations Act, Nat’l Lab. Rel. Bd., https://www.nlrb.gov/guidance/key-reference-materials/national-labor-relations-act (last visited Mar. 18, 2024).

 

[41] See Nat’l Educ. Ass’n’s Center For Advoc., supra note 28.

 

[42] Exec. Order No. 10988, 27 Fed. Reg. 551 (Jan. 17, 1962).

 

[43] Id. (explaining that the three tiers of representation are exclusive representation, formal recognition, and informal recognition—tier determination is based on employee participation).

 

[44] Michael Goldfield, Public Sector Union Growth and Public Policy, 18 Pol’y Stud. J. 404, 404 (1989).

 

[45] Id.

 

[46] Joseph A. McCartin, “A Wagner Act for Public Employees”: Labor’s Deferred Dream and the Rise of Conservatism, 1970-1976, 95 J. of Am. Hist., 123, 126 (2008).

[47] See La Rae G. Munk, Collective Bargaining: Bringing Education to the Table 1 (Mackinac Ctr. For Pub. Pol’y ed., 1998).

 

[48] See Guidance: National Labor Relations Act, supra note 40.  

 

[49] See Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t, § 22-101(h) (West 2025).

 

[50] Collective Bargaining Laws, Nat’l Council on Tchr. Quality, https://www.nctq.org/contract-database/collectiveBargaining (Jan. 2019).

 

[51] Id.  

 

[52]  Dep’t Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, Collective Bargaining & Member Advocacy 2 (2022), https://www.nea.org/sites/default/files/2020-07/Fact%20Sheet.%20New%20Educators.pdf.

 

[53] Id.

 

[54] Pub. Emp. Lab. Rel. Bd., State Of N.M., Public Sector Collective Bargaining By State 129–33 (2022), https://www.pelrb.nm.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Public-Sector-Collective-Bargaining-by-State.pdf.

 

[55] Id.; see also Fayette Cnty. Educ. Ass’n v. Hardy, 626 S.W.2d 217, 219 (Ky. App. 1980) (“[A] public agency may elect to negotiate with a representative of its employees, although it has no duty to do so.”); see also Jackson v. Hazlehurst Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 427 So.2d 134, 137 (Miss. 1983) (holding that teachers have a constitutional right to join unions, which can be designated as collective bargaining representatives for school districts); Collective Bargaining Laws, supra note 51 (hover over state with cursor to reveal information).

 

[56] See Pub. Emp. Lab. Rel. Bd., State of N.M., supra note 55.

 

[57] Collective Bargaining Laws, supra note 51 (hover over state with cursor to reveal information).

 

[58] See Pub. Emp. Lab. Rel. Bd., State of N.M., supra note 55.

 

[59] See Me. Lab. Rel. Bd., https://www.maine.gov/mlrb/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2024); see also Cal. Pub. Emp. Rel. Bd., https://perb.ca.gov (last visited Mar. 18, 2024).

 

[60] See Dep’t Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, supra note 53.

 

[61] Del. Code Ann. tit. 19, § 1316 (West 2025).

 

[62] Minn Stat. Ann. § 179A.18 (West 2025).

 

[63] Me. Stat. tit. 26, § 979-C (2024).

[64] See generally Jack Barbash, Chapter 6: Unions and Rights in the Space Age, U.S. Dep’t of Lab., https://www.dol.gov/general/aboutdol/history/chapter6 (last visited Mar. 18, 2025).

 

[65] Id.

 

[66] See Goldfield, supra note 45, at 410–14.

 

[67] See Barbash, supra note 65; The Right to Strike, Tanner and Associates, P.C. (Sept. 16, 2021), https://www.rodtannerlaw.com/news/the-right-to-strike (identifying only twelve states that have right to strike laws); Robert Shaffer, Public Employee Unionism: A Neglected Social Movement of the 1960s, 44 Soc’y For Hist. Educ., 489, 491 (Aug. 2011) (discussing how, as new collective bargaining laws arose post-1960’s America, public employee strikes were often in defiance of the laws of the state).

 

[68] Goldfield, supra note 45, at 411.

 

[69] Nov. 7, 1960: Teachers Strike, United Fed’n of Tchr. (Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.uft.org/news/feature-stories/todays-history-lesson/nov-7-1960-teachers-strike.

 

[70] Id.

 

[71] 1960s: Teacher Power, Cal. Fed’n of Tchrs. (Nov. 19, 2023), https://www.cft.org/post/1960s-teacher-power .

 

[72] Id.; Nov. 7, 1960: Teachers Strike, supra note 70.

 

[73] 1960s: Teacher Power, supra note 72.

 

[74] See Goldfield, supra note 45, at 405–07.

 

[75] Id. at 406.

 

[76] Id. at 411.

 

[77] Id.

 

[78] See Nat’l Educ. Ass’n’s Center For Advoc., supra note 28.

 

[79] See Dep’t Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, supra note 53.

 

[80] Id.

 

[81] Id. (the nine states are Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Kentucky, Louisiana, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming).

 

[82] Id. “Collaborative conferencing” begins with a submitted written request to the district board of education. The board of education then appoints members to a special question committee to vote on whether the Board must participate in responding to the request and what, if any, organization will represent the employees in the requested matter. Predetermined mandatory and prohibited subjects guide the special question committee’s voting. After a vote to continue by the special question committee, the school board and the employee representative may enter a memorandum of understanding on the addressed terms and conditions of employment. JC Bowman, Collaborative Conferencing, Pro. Educ. of Tn., https://www.proedtn.org/page/CollabConferencing (last visited Feb. 19, 2024).

 

[83] See Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, Collective Bargaining & Member Advoc. Dep’t, Whitepaper: The Benefits of Collective Bargaining in Public Education (2022), https://www.nea.org/resource-library/whitepaper-benefits-collective-bargaining-public-education.

 

[84] See id; see generally Andrew Baker & Travis West, ‘Right to Work’ Laws and Impact on Unionization (2020), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/external/document/X8JDHS0O000000/labor-relations-professional-perspective-right-to-work-laws.

 

[85] Baker & West, supra note 85.

 

[86] Id.

 

[87] Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 26, at § 26.II.A.

 

[88] 29 U.S.C. § 159(a); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337 (1953) (citing Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 198, 202–04 (1944)).

 

[89] Dau-Schmidt et al., supra note 29, at 74.

 

[90] Id.

 

[91] Baker & West, supra note 85.

 

[92]  Id.; see also Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., 138 S.Ct. 2448, 2456 (2018).

 

[93] Baker & West, supra note 85.

 

[94] Janus, 138 S.Ct. at 2460 (2018).

 

[95] See Daniel DiSalvo & Michael Hartney, Teachers Unions In the Post-Janus World, 20 Educ. Next (July 7, 2020), https://www.educationnext.org/teachers-unions-post-janus-world-defying-predictions-still-hold-major-clout/.

 

[96] Bureau of Lab. Stat., News Release: Union Members–2018, U.S. Dep’t of Lab. 11 (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/union2_01182019.pdf (showing that in 2017, 15.5 % of employees in California were union members and 16.9% were represented by unions, and in 2018, 14.7% were members and 15.8% were represented by unions).

 

[97] See Jason Fischbein & Joss Teal, California Legislature Reacts to Supreme Court’s Blow Against Unions, San Diego Bar Ass’n (Aug. 2018), https://www.sdcba.org/?pg=FTR-Aug-2018-5; see also Janus, 138 S.Ct. at 2456.

 

[98] Id.

 

[99] Bureau of Lab. Stat., supra note 97 (showing that in 2017, 10.8% of employees in Maryland were union members and 11.8% were represented by unions, and in 2018, 11% of employees were union members and 12.1% were represented by unions).

 

[100] State of Md. Off. of the Att’y Gen., General Guidance On the Rights and Duties of Public-Sector Workers and Employers After Janus (2018), https://www.marylandattorneygeneral.gov/news%20documents/After_Janus.pdf (explaining that Janus does not override existing agreements between unions and its members to pay dues.).

 

[101] Id.

 

[102] Bureau of Lab. Stat., supra note 96 (In 2017, 11% of employees in West Virginia were union members and 11.9% were represented by unions, and in 2018, 10% of employees were union members and 10.8% were represented by unions).

 

[103] DiSalvo & Hartney, supra note 96.

 

[104] Id.

 

[105] Id.

 

[106] Id.

 

[107] See Across Three Centuries, MSEA Labor Activism Makes Gains for Educators and Students, Md. State Educ. Ass’n (Sept. 15, 2023), https://marylandeducators.org/across-three-centuries-msea-labor-activism-makes-gains-for-educators-and-students/.

 

[108] Id.

 

[109] Id.

 

[110] Id.

 

[111] Id.

 

[112] Id.

 

[113] Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that state laws permitting racial segregation in public schools are unconstitutional).

 

[114] See supra note 107 (noting that the Maryland Education Association was formerly known as the Maryland State Colored Teacher’s Association).

 

[115] Id.

 

[116] Zaakary Barnes, Pol’y Specialist, Emp., Lab. & Ret., Presentation to the Maryland Senate Finance Committee on behalf of the National Conference of State Legislatures 2 (Oct. 10, 2023), https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/meeting_material/2023/fin%20-%20133414115609789187%20-%20Briefing%20Materials%2010-10-23.pdf.

 

[117] See id. at 4.

 

[118] See id. at 8.

 

[119] Id.

 

[120] Bargaining Your Contract—Your Right and Duty, Md State Educ. Ass’n (Dec. 8, 2017), https://marylandeducators.org/bargaining-your-contract-your-right-and-duty/.

 

[121] Id.

 

[122] Id.

 

[123] Id.

 

[124] Id.

[125] Id.

 

[126] Bargaining Your Contract—Your Right and Duty, supra note 121.

 

[127] Id.

 

[128] See Montgomery Cnty. Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery Cnty., 311 Md. 303 (1987).

 

[129] Md. Code Ann., Educ. § 406(b) (originally enacted as 1978 Md. Laws 198–99); Montgomery Cnty. Educ. Ass’n, 311 Md. at 305.

 

[130] Garrett Cnty. Teacher’s Ass’n, Inc. v. Garrett Cnty. Bd. of Educ., State Bd. Opinion No. 88-6 (Apr. 27, 1987).

 

[131] See Bd. of Educ. for Dorchester Cnty. v. Hubbard, 305 Md. 774 (1986) (addressing kindergarten teachers who sought relief from the courts when the county Board of Education refused their grievance that class sizes were unmanageable and an additional teacher was needed; however, the specific issue of whether class size was a mandatory subject was not addressed since the teachers lost on procedural grounds).

 

[132] Id. at 791.

 

[133] Id. at 792.

 

[134] Garrett Cnty. Teacher’s Ass’n, Inc., State Bd. Opinion No. 88-6 at 67. (Board of Education overruled a county hearing examiner’s decision that class size was a lawful subject of negotiation and arbitration because class size determines a teacher’s working conditions and has minimal “system wide impacts.”)

 

[135] Id. at 68.

[136] Id.

 

[137] Id.

 

[138] Id. at 69.

 

[139] Id.

 

[140] Garrett Cnty. Teacher’s Ass’n, Inc., State Bd. Opinion No. 88-6 at 69.

 

[141] Montgomery County, 311 Md. at 310. An education association sought judicial review on whether school calendars were subject to collective bargaining negotiations. Id. The Association argued for a broad reading of § 6-408(b), insisting the school calendar constituted hours and working conditions for teachers, but the Court rejected this argument and held academic calendars as educational policies prohibited from negotiations. Id.

 

[142] See id. at 303.

 

[143] Id., at 314.

 

[144] Id.

 

[145] Id. at 320.

 

[146] See Negotiations Between Public School Employers and Employee Organizations, Ch. 287, S.B. 233, 2002 Sess. (Md. 2002) (amending § 6-408(b) (1978)).

 

[147] Id. 

 

[148] Id.

 

[149] Public School Relations Board – Fairness in Negotiations Act, Ch. 324, S.B. 590, 2010 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2010) (amending and recodifying § 6-408(b)(3)).

 

[150] Public Employee Relations Act, Ch. 114, H.B. 984, 2023 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2023) (recodifying § 6-408(b)(3) to § 6-406 (2023)).

 

[151] See id.; compare with Md. Code Ann., Educ., § 6-406(c)(3) (West 2024).

 

[152] H.D. 984, 2023 Leg., 445th Sess. (Md. 2023).

 

[153] Id.

 

[154] Public Employee Relations Act: Hearing on H.D. 984 Before the H. Appropriations Comm., 2023 Leg., 445th Sess. 1 (Md. 2023) (statement of Jazz Lewis, Member, H. Appropriations Comm.), https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/cmte_testimony/2023/app/1NhGR1c_g5OQXCqkuynwrqh2h68SZVhSg.pdf.

 

[155] See id.

 

[156] Id.

 

[157] Id. The three former public labor relations boards included the State Labor Relations Board, the State Higher Education Labor Relations Board, and the Public Schools Labor Relations Board. See Md. Code Ann., State Pers. & Pens. §§ 3-201–3-209 (repealed 2023); State Pers. & Pens. §§ 3-2a-01–3-2a-09 (repealed 2023); Md. Code Ann., Educ. §§ 6-801–6-807 (repealed 2023).

[158]  Public Employee Relations Act: Hearing on H.D. 984 Before the H. Appropriations Comm., 2023 Leg., 445th Sess. 1 (Md. 2023) (statement of Jazz Lewis, Member, H. Appropriations Comm.), https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/cmte_testimony/2023/app/1NhGR1c_g5OQXCqkuynwrqh2h68SZVhSg.pdf; see also Public Employee Relations Act: Hearing on H.D. 984 Before the H. Appropriations Comm., 2023 Leg., 445th Sess. 2 (Md. 2023) (statement of Denise Gilmore, Legis. and Pol. Dir., Am. Fed’n State, Cnty. and Municipal Emps.), https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/cmte_testimony/2023/app/1FA84cTPn4Czt4ITdhqrZJlfXZbv-LtI9.pdf (“The total staff the state employs for these three boards is just two people. Maryland’s Labor Boards have a total budget of about $440,000, which pales in comparison to states like Washington and Ohio, who have budgets of nearly $5.3 million and $4.18 million, respectively.”).

 

[159] Public Employee Relations Act: Hearing on H.D. 984 Before the H. Appropriations Comm., 2023 Leg., 445th Sess. 1 (Md. 2023) (statement of Jazz Lewis, Member, H. Appropriations Comm.), https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/cmte_testimony/2023/app/1NhGR1c_g5OQXCqkuynwrqh2h68SZVhSg.pdf; see also Public Employee Relations Act: Hearing on H.D. 984 Before the H. Appropriations Comm., 2023 Leg., 445th Sess. 2 (Md. 2023) (statement of Denise Gilmore, Legis. and Pol. Dir., Am. Fed’n State, Cnty. and Municipal Emps.), https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/cmte_testimony/2023/app/1FA84cTPn4Czt4ITdhqrZJlfXZbv-LtI9.pdf (“Our current set up means Maryland public employees can wait years at times to get decisions on an unfair labor practice charge on disputes with their employer.”).

 

[160] H.D. 0984, 2023 Leg., 445th Sess. (Md. 2023).

 

[161] Public Employee Relations Act: Hearing on H.D. 984 Before the H. Appropriations Comm., 2023 Leg., 445th Sess. 1 (Md. 2023) (statement of Jazz Lewis, Member, H. Appropriations Comm.), https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/cmte_testimony/2023/app/1NhGR1c_g5OQXCqkuynwrqh2h68SZVhSg.pdf.

 

[162] Public Employee Relations Act: Hearing on H.D. 984 Before the H. Appropriations Comm., 2023 Leg., 445th Sess. 1 (Md. 2023) (statement of Kristy Anderson, Gen. Coun., Md. State Educ. Ass’n), https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/cmte_testimony/2023/app/11-bCs2akX3L1uUQGPo2eofr6ZrpxXCzQ.pdf.

 

[163] Id.

 

[164] See H.D. 984, 2023 Leg., 445th Reg. Sess. (Md. 2023) (unenacted).

 

[165] See id.

 

[166] See Public Employee Relations Act: Hearing on H.D. 984 Before the H. Appropriations Comm., 2023 Leg., 445th Sess. 1 (Md. 2023) (statement of John Wollums, Couns., Md. Ass’n Bds. of Educ.), https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/cmte_testimony/2023/app/171zhlUecenpelALdazXlp4p62Fj_v429.pdf.

 

[167] Id.

 

[168] Id.

 

[169] Public Employee Relations Act: Hearing on H.D. 984 Before the H. Appropriations Comm., 2023 Leg., 445th Sess. 1 (Md. 2023) (Mary Pat Fannon, Pub. Sch. Superintendents’ Ass’n of Md.), https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/cmte_testimony/2023/app/1PK4v-9MGMTpcimz5zcnwRh_HGwNfyCec.pdf; Public Employee Relations Act: Hearing on H.D. 984 Before the H. Appropriations Comm., 2023 Leg., 445th Sess. 1 (Md. 2023) (statement of John Wollums, Couns., Md. Ass’n Bds. of Educ.), https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/cmte_testimony/2023/app/171zhlUecenpelALdazXlp4p62Fj_v429.pdf; see also Committee Testimony and Witness List: HB0984, Md. Gen. Assembly (Mar. 7, 2023),

https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Legislation/WitnessSignup/HB0984?ys=2023RS,

 

[170] See H.D. 984, 2023 Leg., 445th Reg. Sess. (Md. 2023) (unenacted).

[171] See Workload Overload: How Educators Can Combat the Crisis of Class Size, Caseloads, and Workloads, Md. State Educ. Ass’n (Jan. 25, 2022), https://marylandeducators.org/workload-overload-how-educators-can-combat-the-crisis-of-class-size-caseloads-and-workload/.

 

[172] See id. (noting that 48% of schools are struggling to hire full-time teachers).

 

[173] Ileana Najarro, Here’s How Many Hours a Week Teachers Work, Educ. Wk. (Apr. 14, 2022), https://www.edweek.org/teaching-learning/heres-how-many-hours-a-week-teachers-work/2022/04.

 

[174] Id. 

 

[175] Id. (stating that sixty-three percent of teachers reported “strongly disagree” to the idea that “they have a lot of control and influence over their schedule such as the classes they teach and non-academic duties they take on.”).

 

[176] Id.

 

[177] See id.

[178] Madeline Will, Teacher Job Satisfaction Hits an All-Time Low, Educ. Wk. (Apr. 14, 2022), https://www.edweek.org/teaching-learning/teacher-job-satisfaction-hits-an-all-time-low/2022/04.

 

[179] Id.

 

[180] Id.

 

[181] Id.

 

[182] See Matt Small, Burnout, Stress Affecting Most Maryland Teachers, Poll Finds, Md. Matters (Feb. 19, 2022), https://www.marylandmatters.org/2022/02/19/burnout-stress-affecting-most-maryland-teachers-poll-finds/.

 

[183] Id.

 

[184] Id.

 

[185] Id.

 

[186] Id.

 

[187] What Is the Blueprint for Maryland’s Future?, Md. State Dep’t of Educ., https://blueprint.marylandpublicschools.org/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2024).

 

[188] Md. State Dep’t of Educ., supra note 2, at 12–13 (providing the five pillars: Early Childhood Education, High Quality and Diverse Teachers and Leaders, College and Career Readiness, More Resources for all Students to be Successful, and Governance and Accountability).

 

[189] Id.

[190] See id.

 

[191] Workload Overload, supra note 172.

 

[192] Id.

 

[193] See id.

 

[194] Collective Bargaining Laws, supra note 51 (showing that Maryland, Maine, Indiana, Tennessee, South Dakota, Nebraska, Wisconsin, Kansas, and Alaska all prohibit class size as a bargaining subject).

 

[195] Id. (showing that New Hampshire, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Florida, Iowa, North Dakota, Colorado, Idaho, Oregon, and Nevada allow class size as a permissive bargaining subject while California and Minnesota define class size as a mandatory bargaining subject).

 

[196] See S.B. 206, 2023 Leg., 445th Sess. (Md. 2023) (unenacted).

 

[197] Id.

 

[198] Id.

 

[199] Id.; see also H.D. 890, 2022 Leg., 444th Sess. (Md. 2022); S.B. 962, 2022 Leg., 444th Sess. (Md. 2022); H.D. 1074, 2020 Leg., 442nd Sess. (Md. 2020).

 

[200] Twenty-eight out of thirty-six witnesses and testimony reports supported S.B. 206, seventeen out of twenty supported S.B. 962, and five out of nine supported H.B. 1074.  See Committee Testimony and Witness Signup: S.B. 206, Md. Gen. Assembly, https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Legislation/WitnessSignup/SB0206?ys=2023RS (last visited Mar. 18, 2024); Committee Testimony and Witness Signup: H.B. 890, Md. Gen. Assembly, https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Legislation/WitnessSignup/HB0890?ys=2022RS (last visited Mar. 18, 2024); Committee Testimony and Witness Signup: H.B. 1074, Md. Gen. Assembly, https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Legislation/WitnessSignup/HB1074?ys=2020RS (last visited Mar. 18, 2024).

 

[201] H.D. 890, 2022 Leg., 444th Sess. (Md. 2022); S.B. 962, 2022 Leg., 444th Sess. (Md. 2022); H.D. 1074, 2020 Leg., 442nd Sess. (Md. 2020).

 

[202] See Committee Testimony and Witness Signup: S.B. 206, supra note 201; Committee Testimony and Witness Signup: H.B. 890, supra note 201; Committee Testimony and Witness Signup: H.B. 1074, supra note 201.

 

[203] Education–Collective Bargaining–Certificated Employees–Class Size: Hearing on S.B. 206 Before the S. Fin. Comm., 2023 Leg., 445th Sess. 1 (Md. 2023) (statement of Mary Pat Fannon, Pub. Sch. Superintendents’ Ass’n of Md.), https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/cmte_testimony/2023/fin/19ptjRNudXlfChxc8Y9tqEwzyR0-0T2_C.pdf; see also Education–Collective Bargaining–Certificated Employees–Class Size: Hearing on S.B. 206 Before the S. Fin. Comm., 2023 Leg., 445th Sess. 1 (Md. 2023) (statement of Jamie Brown, Wash. Cnty. Bd. of Educ.), https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/cmte_testimony/2023/fin/1qvR1FRHwdE5R-bSp8TQ7b9Kr4f_I0WMF.pdf.

 

[204] Education–Collective Bargaining–Certificated Employees–Class Size: Hearing on S.B. 206 Before the S. Fin. Comm., 2023 Leg., 445th Sess. 1 (Md. 2023) (statement of Mary Pat Fannon, Pub. Sch. Superintendents’ Ass’n of Md.), https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/cmte_testimony/2023/fin/19ptjRNudXlfChxc8Y9tqEwzyR0-0T2_C.pdf.

 

[205] Id.

 

[206] Education–Collective Bargaining–Certificated Employees–Class Size: Hearing on S.B. 206 Before the S. Fin. Comm., 2023 Leg., 445th Sess. 1 (Md. 2023) (statement of Jamie Brown, Wash. Cnty. Bd. of Educ.), https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/cmte_testimony/2023/fin/1qvR1FRHwdE5R-bSp8TQ7b9Kr4f_I0WMF.pdf.

 

[207] Id.; Education–Collective Bargaining–Certificated Employees–Class Size: Hearing on S.B. 206 Before the S. Fin. Comm., 2023 Leg., 445th Sess. 1 (Md. 2023) (statement of Mary Pat Fannon, Pub. Sch. Superintendents’ Ass’n of Md.), https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/cmte_testimony/2023/fin/19ptjRNudXlfChxc8Y9tqEwzyR0-0T2_C.pdf.

 

[208] Education–Collective Bargaining–Certificated Employees–Class Size: Hearing on S.B. 206 Before the S. Fin. Comm., 2023 Leg., 445th Sess. 1 (Md. 2023) (statement of Mary Pat Fannon, Pub. Sch. Superintendents’ Ass’n of Md.), https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/cmte_testimony/2023/fin/19ptjRNudXlfChxc8Y9tqEwzyR0-0T2_C.pdf; Education–Collective Bargaining–Certificated Employees–Class Size: Hearing on S.B. 206 Before the S. Fin. Comm., 2023 Leg., 445th Sess. 1 (Md. 2023) (statement of Jamie Brown, Wash. Cnty. Bd. of Educ.), https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/cmte_testimony/2023/fin/1qvR1FRHwdE5R-bSp8TQ7b9Kr4f_I0WMF.pdf.

 

[209] Education–Collective Bargaining–Certificated Employees–Class Size: Hearing on S.B. 206 Before the S. Fin. Comm., 2023 Leg., 445th Sess. 1 (Md. 2023) (statement of Jamie Brown, Wash. Cnty. Bd. of Educ.), https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/cmte_testimony/2023/fin/1qvR1FRHwdE5R-bSp8TQ7b9Kr4f_I0WMF.pdf.

 

[210] Education–Collective Bargaining–Certificated Employees–Class Size: Hearing on S.B. 206 Before the S. Fin. Comm., 2023 Leg., 445th Sess. 1 (Md. 2023) (statement of Mary Pat Fannon, Pub. Sch. Superintendents’ Ass’n of Md.), https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/cmte_testimony/2023/fin/19ptjRNudXlfChxc8Y9tqEwzyR0-0T2_C.pdf.

 

[211] See id.

 

[212] Id.

 

[213] Id.

 

[214] Education–Collective Bargaining–Certificated Employees–Class Size: Hearing on S.B. 206 Before the S. Fin. Comm., 2023 Leg., 445th Sess. 1 (Md. 2023) (statement of John Wollums, Couns., Md. Ass’n Bds. Educ.), https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/cmte_testimony/2023/fin/1B2HqrIZaaRaySp0X2TCX2NXIKlPvq_hr.pdf.

 

[215] Id.

 

[216] Id.

[217] See Education–Collective Bargaining–Certificated Employees–Class Size: Hearing on S.B. 206 Before the S. Fin. Comm., 2023 Leg., 445th Sess. (Md. 2023) (statement of Cheryl Bost, Md. State Educ. Ass’n), https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/cmte_testimony/2023/fin/1Y1hZHtBESGr1RzIA3I0G_A8Yc4wPMnDu.pdf; see alsoBargaining Your Contract—Your Right and Duty, supra note 121.

 

[218] See Bargaining Your Contract—Your Right and Duty, supra note 120.

 

[219] See Education–Collective Bargaining–Certificated Employees–Class Size: Hearing on S.B. 206 Before the S. Fin. Comm., 2023 Leg., 445th Sess. 1 (Md. 2023) (statement of John Wollums, Couns., Md. Ass’n Bds. Educ.), https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/cmte_testimony/2023/fin/1B2HqrIZaaRaySp0X2TCX2NXIKlPvq_hr.pdf.; Education–Collective Bargaining–Certificated Employees–Class Size: Hearing on S.B. 206 Before the S. Fin. Comm., 2023 Leg., 445th Sess. 1 (Md. 2023) (statement of Jamie Brown, Wash. Cnty. Bd. of Educ.), https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/cmte_testimony/2023/fin/1qvR1FRHwdE5R-bSp8TQ7b9Kr4f_I0WMF.pdf.

 

[220] See Education–Collective Bargaining–Certificated Employees–Class Size: Hearing on S.B. 206 Before the S. Fin. Comm., 2023 Leg., 445th Sess. 1 (Md. 2023) (statement of Gerimi Belin, Balt. Tchr. Union), https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/cmte_testimony/2023/fin/12P855d6wUvT–_YunMF53AEk3p5yr6hN.pdf.

 

[221] Id.

 

[222] See Education–Collective Bargaining–Certificated Employees–Class Size: Hearing on S.B. 206 Before the S. Fin. Comm., 2023 Leg., 445th Sess. 1 (statement of Duncan Evans, Balt. Tchr. Union), https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/cmte_testimony/2023/fin/14wtZp8Rl7PsHhP3OJK41HRDXyffbRC1O.pdf.

 

[223] See Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, supra note 84; see also Ken Green, How Unions Build Strength Through Community Engagement, UnionTrack (Oct. 29, 2019), https://uniontrack.com/blog/community-engagement.

 

[224] Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, supra note 84.

 

[225] NEA Affiliates, Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, https://www.nea.org/nea-affiliates (last visited Feb. 20, 2024) (select Maryland on the map; then click “join” to be redirected to the Maryland State Education Association).

 

[226] Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, supra note 84, at 5.

 

[227] Id.

 

[228] See Committee Testimony and Witness Signup: S.B. 206, supra note 200.

 

[229] See id.

 

[230] Ferrell, supra note 7.

 

[231] Education–Collective Bargaining–Certificated Employees–Class Size: Hearing on S.B. 206 Before the S. Fin. Comm., 2023 Leg., 445th Sess. 1 (Md. 2023) (statement of Franca Muller Paz, Balt. City Pub. Sch. Tchr.), https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/cmte_testimony/2023/fin/1rlo_X7uNqrvl0QYtSGKsnaY_3PmQ_Ooa.pdf.

 

[232] Id.

 

[233] Education–Collective Bargaining–Certificated Employees–Class Size: Hearing on S.B. 206 Before the S. Fin. Comm., 2023 Leg., 445th Sess. 1 (Md. 2023) (statement of Cheryl Lynn Owens, Balt. City Pub. Sch. Tchr.), https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/cmte_testimony/2023/fin/1tAdRTBjd4vTS0hkVPyhiECQ1sAE5YLhb.pdf.

 

[234] Id.

 

[235] Id.

 

[236] Id.

 

[237] Id.

 

[238] Id.

 

[239] Education–Collective Bargaining–Certificated Employees–Class Size: Hearing on S.B. 206 Before the S. Fin. Comm., 2023 Leg., 445th Sess. 1 (Md. 2023) (statement of Cheryl Lynn Owens, Balt. City Pub. Sch. Tchr.), https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/cmte_testimony/2023/fin/1tAdRTBjd4vTS0hkVPyhiECQ1sAE5YLhb.pdf.

 

[240] See Explainer: Could Educators Bargain Class Size? Md. State Educ. Ass’n (Mar. 10, 2024), https://marylandeducators.org/explainer-could-educators-bargain-class-size/.

 

[241] See id.

 

[242] See Andrew Hasty & Darnice Marsh, Creating Value Through Labor-Management Partnerships at Work, U.S. Dep’t of Lab. Blog (Aug. 23, 2023), https://blog.dol.gov/2023/08/29/creating-value-through-labor-management-partnerships-at-work.

 

[243] Id.

 

[244] Motohiro Morishima, Information Sharing and Collective Bargaining in Japan: Effects on Wage Negotiation, 44 ILR Rev. 469, 471 (Apr. 1991) (comparing information sharing strategies and its effects on collective bargaining agreements in Japan and the United States).

 

[245] Id.

 

[246] Id.

 

[247] Id.

 

[248] See id.

 

[249] Id.

 

[250] Morishima, supra note 245, at 471.

 

[251] See Education–Collective Bargaining–Certificated Employees–Class Size: Hearing on S.B. 206 Before the S. Fin. Comm., 2023 Leg., 445th Sess. (Md. 2023) (statement of Cheryl Bost, Md. State Educ. Ass’n), https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/cmte_testimony/2023/fin/1Y1hZHtBESGr1RzIA3I0G_A8Yc4wPMnDu.pdf.

 

[252] See Education–Collective Bargaining–Certificated Employees–Class Size: Hearing on S.B. 206 Before the S. Fin. Comm., 2023 Leg., 445th Sess. 1 (statement of Duncan Evans, Balt. Tchr. Union), https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/cmte_testimony/2023/fin/14wtZp8Rl7PsHhP3OJK41HRDXyffbRC1O.pdf.

 

[253] Id.

[254] Id.

 

[255] See Hasty & Marsh, supra note 243.

 

[256] Id.

 

[257] See id.; see also Morishima, supra note 245, at 472.

 

[258] See generally Morishima, supra note 245.

 

[259] Id. at 473.

 

[260] Id. at 472–73.

 

[261] See Ferrell, supra note 7.

 

[262] Id.

 

[263] Id.

 

[264] Id.

 

[265] Education–Collective Bargaining–Certificated Employees–Class Size: Hearing on S.B. 206 Before the S. Fin. Comm., 2023 Leg., 445th Sess. 1 (Md. 2023) (statement of Jamie Brown, Wash. Cnty. Bd. of Educ.), https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/cmte_testimony/2023/fin/1qvR1FRHwdE5R-bSp8TQ7b9Kr4f_I0WMF.pdf; Public Employee Relations Act: Hearing on H.D. 984 Before the H. Appropriations Comm., 2023 Leg., 445th Sess. 1 (Md. 2023) (Mary Pat Fannon, Pub. Sch. Superintendents’ Ass’n of Md.), https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/cmte_testimony/2023/app/1PK4v-9MGMTpcimz5zcnwRh_HGwNfyCec.pdf.

 

[266] Supra Section II.C.

 

[267] Supra Section II.B.

 

[268] Collective Bargaining Laws, supra note 51.

 

[269] Compare An Agreement between The Pelham Educ. Ass’n and The Pelham Sch. Bd. 2020-2024, at 10 (2019), https://www.pelhamsd.org/Downloads/2020-2024-SIGNED-PEA-AGREEMENT.pdf, with  NEA-NH/NEA, Agreement between the Nottingham Sch. Bd. and the Nottingham Tchr.’s Ass’n 2020-2023, at 3, (2020), https://www.nh.gov/pelrb/collective/documents/nottingham_teacher6.pdf, and Local 1044 AFT, AFL-CIO, Agreement between the Nashua Bd. of Educ. and the Nashua Tchr.’s Union 2021-2025, at 22 (2022), https://www.nh.gov/pelrb/collective/documents/nashua_teach7.pdf.

 

[270] An Agreement between The Pelham Educ. Ass’n and The Pelham Sch. Bd., supra note 270, at 10.

 

[271] Agreement between the Nottingham Sch. Bd. and the Nottingham Tchr.’s Ass’n, supra note 270, at 3.

 

[272] Agreement between the Nashua Bod. of Educ. and the Nashua Tchrs’ Union, Local 1044 AFT, supra note 270.

 

[273] Collective Bargaining Laws, supra note 51; see also California Pub. Emp. Rel. Bd., https://perb.ca.gov (last visited Feb. 17, 2024).

 

[274] See Grossmont Educ. Ass’n v. Grossmont Union High Sch. PERB Dec. No. 313a, ¶ 7 (1984); see also Oxnard Fed’n of Tchr.s and School Emp., Local 1273 v. Oxnard Union High Sch. Dist. PERB Dec. No. 2803, at 43 (2022).

 

[275] Grossmont Educ. Ass’n, PERB Dec. No. 313a, at ¶ 7.

 

[276] Oxnard Fed’n of Tchr.s and School Emp., Local 1273, PERB Dec. No. 2803, at 43.

 

[277] Id.

 

[278] Id.

 

[279] Id.

 

[280] Collective Bargaining Laws, supra note 51.

 

[281] Class Size: Common Concerns, Chicago Tchrs. Union, https://www.ctulocal1.org/rights/concerns/class-size/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2024).

 

[282] Id.

 

[283] Id.

 

[284] Id.

 

[285] Id.

 

[286] Montgomery Cnty. Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery Cnty., 311 Md. 303 (1987).

 

[287] Id.

 

[288] Letter from Mohammed Choudhury, State Superintendent of Schs., to the Members of the State Bd. of Educ. (July 26, 2022) (on file with author).

 

[289] Id.

 

[290] Id.

 

[291] The Blueprint for Maryland’s Future in Action, Md. State Dep’t of Educ., https://blueprint.marylandpublicschools.org/blueprint-in-action/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2024).

 

[292] Montgomery Cnty. Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery Cnty., 311 Md. 303, 318 (1987).

 

[293] Supra Section IV.B.

 

[294] Ferrell, supra note 6.

 

[295] Supra Section II.E.

 

[296] Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, supra note 84.