DANSHIN V. STATE

By: Katelin Carter

The Supreme Court of Maryland held that a defendant charged with murder is entitled to a jury instruction on the defense of others where there is some evidence supporting each element of the defense, even if the defendant offered inconsistent statements or denied being the perpetrator. Danshin v. State, 491 Md. 520, 541-51, 340 A.3d 199, 211-17 (2025). The court further held that statements made during a police interview, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, may constitute sufficient evidence to generate a defense-of-others instruction, and that credibility determinations and inconsistencies in those statements are matters for the jury to decide. Id. at 543-46, 340 A.3d at 213-14.

On June 22, 2022, Javier Gonzalez-Mena was shot and killed outside of a Red Roof Inn in Montgomery County, Maryland. At the time of the shooting, Gonzalez-Mena was in a tumultuous and violent relationship with Christina Jones, and Danshin had previously assisted Jones following a violent incident with Gonzalez-Mena. Jones told Danshin that Gonzalez-Mena had physically assaulted her and threatened to kill her.

After Gonzalez-Mena’s death, Danshin participated in a recorded police interview that was later introduced at trial. During the interview, Danshin stated that he observed Gonzalez-Mena pull Jones by her hair while wielding a machete and expressed his belief that Gonzalez-Mena was going to kill her. Although Danshin repeatedly denied being the shooter, he also stated that if he had fired the shot, it would have been because he believed that Jones was in imminent danger of lethal bodily harm.

The State charged Danshin with first-degree murder, use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, and illegal possession of a firearm. At trial, defense counsel requested jury instructions on the perfect and imperfect defense of others, arguing that Danshin’s statements provided some evidence to support the defense. The Circuit Court for Montgomery County denied the request, concluding that there was no evidence of an immediate or imminent threat to Jones. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed, holding that a defense-of-others instruction was unavailable because Danshin never admitted to firing the fatal shot. The Supreme Court of Maryland granted certiorari to answer “the lone question of whether the trial court erred in declining to instruct the jury on the law of defense of others.”

The court began by reaffirming that under Maryland Rule 4-325(c), a requested jury instruction must be given when it is: (1) a correct statement of the law, (2) is applicable under the facts, and (3) is not otherwise covered by the instructions actually given. Danshin, 491 Md. at 532-33, 340 A.3d at 206. To be applicable, the requesting party needs only to produce “some evidence” supporting each element of the defense, a standard the court described as a “low bar.” Id. at 532-33, 340 A.3d at 206.

Applying that standard, the court rejected the appellate court’s conclusion that Danshin’s denial of the shooting foreclosed a defense-of-others instruction. Danshin, 491 Md. at 550-51, 340 A.3d at 217. The court explained that Maryland permits defendants to advance inconsistent theories of defense and that a defendant is entitled to an instruction on any defense fairly supported by the evidence, even if those theories are in tension with one another. Id. at 543-44, 340 A.3d at 213. Whether the jury ultimately credits the defendant’s account is a separate matter that does not affect the defendant’s entitlement to the instruction. Id. at 544, 340 A.3d at 213 (citing Roach v. State, 358 Md. 418, 432, 749 A.2d 787 (2000)).

The court further held that Danshin’s police interview statements constituted “some evidence” supporting each element of the defense of others. Danshin, 491 Md. at 540-41, 340 A.3d at 210-11. Under Maryland law, the elements of perfect defense of others require some evidence that: (1) the defendant actually believed the person defended was in immediate or imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm; (2) that belief was objectively reasonable; (3) the defendant used no more force than reasonably necessary in light of the threatened or actual force; and (4) the defendant’s purpose in using force was to aid or protect the person defended rather than to punish the aggressor. Id. at 532-33, 340 A.3d at 206. Applying Maryland’s low “some evidence” threshold under Rule 4-325(c), the court analyzed each element separately. Id. at 538, 340 A.3d at 209.

First, the court determined that Danshin’s statements provided some evidence that he subjectively believed that Jones was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm. Danshin, 491 Md. at 541-46, 340 A.3d at 212-14. During his recorded interview, Danshin stated that he saw Gonzalez-Mena dragging Jones by her hair while wielding a machete and that it appeared he was going to “cut her… head off.” Id. at 528, 340 A.3d at 203. He further told detectives that he saw someone in “imminent threat of lethal bodily harm.” Id. at 528, 340 A.3d at 204. Even though Danshin also denied being the shooter at various points during his interview, the court held that inconsistent statements do not negate the existence of some evidence. Id. at 543-45, 340 A.3d at 213-14.

Second, the court determined that there was some evidence that Danshin’s belief was objectively reasonable. Danshin, 491 Md. at 546-48, 340 A.3d at 214-16. The reasonableness inquiry must be evaluated from the defendant’s perspective and includes consideration of prior knowledge that shapes perception of the event. Id. at 546-47, 340 A.3d at 213-15. A belief about imminent danger is necessarily informed by the defendant’s sensory perception at the scene, often “shaded by knowledge or perceptions of ancillary or antecedent events.” Id. at 546-47, 340 A.3d at 213-15. Here, Danshin’s prior knowledge that Gonzalez-Mena had previously beaten and threatened to kill Jones was properly considered as part of the context in which he perceived the machete raised above her neck. Id. at 548, 340 A.3d at 215-16. The court emphasized that antecedent knowledge may inform whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would perceive lethal danger, and that prior knowledge alone does not suffice; there must also be evidence that the relevant state of mind persisted to the moment of the use of force. Id. at 547-48, 340 A.3d at 215–16 (citing State v. Martin, 329 Md. 351, 365, 619 A.2d at 992 (1993)). Here, that requirement was met because Danshin linked his prior knowledge of Gonzalez-Mena’s abuse to what he claimed to be witnessing in real time, Gonzalez-Mena dragging Jones by the hair while holding a machete above her neck. Id. at 547-48, 340 A.3d at 215–16.

Third, the court found some evidence that Danshin used no more force than reasonably necessary in light of the perceived threat. Danshin, 491 Md. at 549, 340 A.3d at 216. Drawing on Guerriero v. State, the court reiterated that a person defending another may use “the same degree and character of force” that the person attacked could have used in self-defense. Id. at 549, 340 A.3d at 216 (quoting Guerriero v. State, 213 Md. 545, 549, 132 A.2d 466 (1957)). Applying that rule, the court reasoned that if Danshin’s account were believed, he saw Gonzalez-Mena manipulating a machete above Jones in a manner suggesting imminent decapitation. Id. at 549, 340 A.3d at 216. Because decapitation is plainly a fatal injury, the court concluded that gunfire could be viewed as a commensurate response to the lethal threat as Danshin perceived it. Id. at 549, 340 A.3d at 216. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to allow a jury to decide whether Danshin used the same degree and character of force with which Jones was allegedly threatened. Id. at 549, 340 A.3d at 216.

Fourth, the court held that there was some evidence that Danshin’s purpose in using force was protective rather than punitive. Danshin, 491 Md. at 549–50, 340 A.3d at 216–17. In response to detectives’ questions about why he shot Gonzalez-Mena, Danshin stated that he saw “someone in imminent threat of not just bodily harm but imminent threat of lethal bodily harm” and tied that perception to his knowledge that Gonzalez-Mena had previously harmed Jones. Id. at 550, 340 A.3d at 217. The court also relied on Danshin’s broader statement that he believed in protecting vulnerable people, explaining that his interview could reasonably be read to show that he acted out of a perceived duty to protect Jones when he saw her in danger, rather than out of retaliation for past abuse. Id. at 550, 340 A.3d at 217. Although whether that statement accurately reflected his actual motive was a question for the jury, it was sufficient to satisfy the low “some evidence” threshold. Id. at 550, 340 A.3d at 217.

The takeaway from Danshin v. State is that trial courts must faithfully apply the “some evidence” standard’s low threshold when evaluating requests for defense-of-others jury instructions. Defendants need not provide consistent or uncontested proof, nor must they admit to every factual detail needed to support the defense, to place the issue before a jury. This decision reinforces the jury’s role in assessing credibility and intent, while limiting the trial court’s ability to withhold defense instructions based on its perceived weakness in the evidence presented. For criminal law practitioners, Danshin is a reminder and reinforcement of the importance of developing any record evidence, particularly police interview statements, that can support the elements of a justification defense and ensure the jury is permitted to consider it.

Katelin Carter is a second year at the University of Baltimore School of Law, where she serves as a Staff Editor for Law Forum, a Teaching Assistant for Introduction to Lawyering Skills, a Property Law Scholar, and a member of the Honor Board. She earned her bachelor’s degree in English and Political Science, with a minor in Social Work, from Bridgewater College, graduating with honors. Katelin works as a law clerk at MPL Law Firm in York, Pennsylvania, assisting with municipal and land use matters. Her academic interests include land use, zoning, and tax law.