IN RE M.P.

By: Caroline Byrd

The Supreme Court of Maryland held that a juvenile court’s denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. In re M.P., 487 Md. 53, 96, 314 A.3d 348, 373 (2024). The court also held that the newly enacted Juvenile Justice Reform Act’s (the “JJRA”) effect on the juvenile court’s jurisdiction applies to delinquency proceedings pending before the JJRA went into effect. Id. at 53, 314 A.3d at 348. Because the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction over the defendant (“M.P.”), the juvenile court erred in denying M.P.’s motion to dismiss. Id. at 62, 314 A.3d at 353.

The General Assembly of Maryland enacted the JJRA to establish a minimum age restriction on juvenile court’s jurisdiction. Under the JJRA, a juvenile court has jurisdiction over children who are at least thirteen years old and have allegedly committed a delinquent act, or children at least ten years old and have allegedly committed an act that, “if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime of violence.” The JJRA took effect June 1, 2022.

On May 5, 2022, the State filed a juvenile petition against M.P. for motor vehicle theft and related offenses committed on March 12, 2022, when M.P. was twelve. On June 30, 2022, M.P. moved to dismiss, arguing that the JJRA’s June 1, 2022, effective date divested the juvenile court of jurisdiction. The juvenile court denied M.P.’s motion, holding that jurisdiction was established when the State filed its petition and that the JJRA cannot retroactively apply. M.P. immediately appealed to the Appellate Court of Maryland and filed to stay the proceedings pending the appeal; the court granted both motions. Before the Appellate Court of Maryland issued a decision, M.P. filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of Maryland, which the court granted.

The court addressed two key issues: first, whether the juvenile court’s rejected dismissal could be immediately appealed under the collateral order doctrine, and second, whether the juvenile court retained jurisdiction over M.P. following the JJRA’s implementation. In re M.P., 487 Md. at 64, 314 A.3d at 354. The collateral order doctrine applies only in rare circumstances and is generally permitted in appeals on double jeopardy violations because the movant asserts a right that would prevent trial itself. Id. at 69–70, 314 A.3d at 357–58 (emphasis added). In double jeopardy cases, the appellant argues a right that would free them from being pulled into a second trial. Id. at 71, 314 A.3d at 358. The court analogized M.P.’s motion to dismiss to double jeopardy appeals because M.P. also asserts a right to avoid trial. Id. at 67, 314 A.3d at 356. Ultimately, the court found that M.P.’s appeal on jurisdictional grounds fell into the same “rarest of circumstances” category as double jeopardy appeals, and therefore, collateral order doctrine applies. Id. at 73, 314 A.3d at 359.

The Supreme Court of Maryland then introduced the collateral order doctrine, an exception to the final judgment rule, which requires a final judgment before a party can appeal. In re M.P., 487 Md. at 65, 68, 314 A.3d at 355–56. Appellate courts allow immediate appeals from interlocutory rulings in limited situations where the appeal “(1) conclusively determines the disputed question, (2) resolves an important issue, (3) resolves an issue that is completely separate from the merits of the action, and (4) would be effectively unreviewable if the appeal had to await the entry of a final judgment.” Id. at 66, 314 A.3d at 355 (quoting Stephens v. State, 420 Md. 495, 502, 24 A.3d 105, 109 (2011)).

The only contested element of the collateral order doctrine was whether the M.P.’s appeal was “effectively unreviewable.” In re M.P., 487 Md. at65, 314 A.3d at 355. The court analogized to In re O.P., where an immediate appeal was permitted after the court denied a child emergency shelter care because waiting until final judgment would pose a serious risk to the child’s safety and welfare. Id. at 72–73, 314 A.3d at 359 (citing In re O.P., 470 Md. 225, 271, 235 A.3d 40, 67 (2020)). Similarly, the court found that requiring M.P. to wait for final judgment risks causing the exact harm the JJRA sought to avoid. Id. at 67, 314 A.3d at 355. The legislative rationale of the JJRA pointed to the cognitive impact on pre-teens and the diminished capacity to understand the charges against them. Id. at 75–76, 314 A.3d at 360–361. Therefore, because the harm to M.P. would have already occurred, thus making their issue unreviewable, and the other elements of the collateral order doctrine were uncontested, M.P.’s motion to dismiss was immediately appealable. Id. at 73, 314 A.3d at 359–60.

The court then resolved whether the juvenile court retained jurisdiction over M.P. after the JJRA’s effective date. In re M.P., 487 Md. at 82, 314 A.3d at 365. Absent legislative guidance, the majority found that new statutes apply prospectively rather than retroactively. Id. at 85, 314 A.3d at 367 (citing Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396, 406, 754 A.2d 389, 394 (2000)). The United States Supreme Court provides an exception requiring intervening statutes that confer or remove jurisdiction to apply, regardless of when the conduct occurred. Id. at 86, 314 A.3d at 367 (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 511 U.S. 244, 274 (1994)). Similarly, the Supreme Court of Maryland has held that when the legislature passes statutes lessening penalties for offenses after the defendant allegedly committed those offenses, then the court must apply the lesser penalty. Id. at 86–87, 314 A.3d at 367. The court applied this precedent to M.P. because the JJRA lessens the penalty for M.P.’s alleged offenses and ousts the juvenile court of its jurisdiction. Id. at 87–88, 314 A.3d at 367–68. Therefore, any actions the juvenile court took after JJRA’s effective date were void of jurisdiction over M.P. Id. at 88, 314 A.3d at 368.

Next, the court, through a plain reading of the JJRA, held the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction over M.P. and erred in denying the motion to dismiss. In re M.P., 487 Md. at 88–89, 314 A.3d at 368–69. The JJRA states the juvenile court lacks jurisdiction over children alleged to have committed a nonviolent delinquent act under the age of thirteen. Id. at 74, 314 A.3d at 360. Because M.P. was twelve, and the car theft was undisputedly nonviolent, the court held the JJRA divested the juvenile court of its jurisdiction. Id. at 62, 314 A.3d at 353.

Justice Gould dissented from both appeal issues, focusing on whether the JJRA divested the juvenile court of jurisdiction. In re M.P., 487 Md. at 97, 314 A.3d at 374 (Gould, J., dissenting). Justice Gould asserts that M.P. did not meet the “effectively unreviewable” element of the collateral order doctrine because M.P. did not assert an important right that requires immediate resolution, and a court can still address the jurisdiction issue after final judgment. Id. at 100–01, 314 A.3d at 376 (Gould, J., dissenting). Finding no support for a retroactive application to pending cases, Justice Gould contended the JJRA should apply only to petitions filed after June 1, 2022. Id. at 99–100, 314 A.3d at 375 (Gould, J., dissenting).

The Supreme Court of Maryland held that a juvenile court’s denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is immediately appealable via the collateral order doctrine when the child was twelve at the time of the alleged nonviolent act. In re M.P., 487 Md. at 59, 314 A.3d at 35. This precedent could increase interlocutory appeals in juvenile cases, leading to more pre-trial challenges and delays as the court tries to resolve such appeals. Additionally, the court’s statutory interpretation of the JJRA is significant because it emphasizes the need for clear legislative intent when applying new laws to ongoing cases. The majority’s decision may lead to unintended retroactive applications of laws, which could generate future disputes regarding legislative intent and statutory interpretation. Another concern is how lower courts will interpret this ruling in future cases, particularly in balancing the need for timely justice with the new opportunities for appeal. Overall, this decision will reshape Maryland’s juvenile law procedures but may also create new legal challenges as courts and practitioners navigate its implications.

Caroline Byrd is a third-year student at the University of Baltimore School of Law and serves as the Comments Editor for Law Forum. She earned her bachelor’s degree in Political Science with a minor in Political Communications from James Madison University. Caroline is currently a Teaching Assistant for Introduction to Lawyering Skills and the Communications Director for Students Supporting the Women’s Bar Association. She is passionate about advancing women in the legal profession and promoting access to justice. In the spring semester, she will serve as a Property Law Scholar.