By: Marisa Basignani*

I. Introduction.

In July of 2024, word of a new high voltage transmission line, its proposed path cutting through seventy miles of rural land, blindsided rural Maryland residents.[1] Without prior notice, residents of Baltimore, Carroll, and Frederick Counties found multiple yellow lines crisscrossing an online map of Maryland.[2] As this news quickly percolated across the community, it became clear the lines represented the many possible routes of a new transmission line project known as the Maryland Piedmont Reliability Project (“MPRP”).[3] When Public Service Enterprise Group (“PSEG”),[4] an out-of-state energy and utility company that won the bid for construction of the MPRP, published the map on its website, it was effectively the first notice to local residents.[5] The background information published alongside the route map in early July indicated that PSEG’s internal process began more than six months earlier and involved routing and siting studies across central Maryland.[6] However, the MPRP’s potentially affected residents remained unaware of the project until early July 2024, when PSEG completed its studies, published the possible routes and scheduled public information sessions in the three affected counties.[7] After the map went live, notice of the project spread quickly, but largely through community social media pages and word-of-mouth.[8] Notice was confined mostly to unofficial channels because PSEG followed an accelerated timeline releasing the map on its website on July 8, 2024, and scheduling the public information sessions for July 9, 10, and 11, 2024, one in each affected county.[9] The reality that PSEG had not directly notified any landowners whose property lay within the MPRP’s possible routes compounded the immediate mistrust directed at PSEG.[10] While the available information at this early stage was limited, it did include an instantly explosive mention of eminent domain.[11]

By immediately including the possible use of eminent domain if landowner negotiations failed, PSEG kindled a firestorm of resistance to the MPRP project.[12] Most citizens understand eminent domain as a taking of private property by a government entity for a project directly benefitting the public, such as highways, schools, or public parks.[13] As more information emerged, it became clear that not only was the MPRP not that type of project, but  in reality it would have very little, if any, benefit to the state of Maryland and its citizens.[14]

This Comment explores the harmful impact on Maryland’s farmland and landowners resulting from the current broad definition of eminent domain, the potential legislative remedies to narrow Maryland’s use of eminent domain, and the few, if any, restrictions on the delegation of the sovereign power of eminent domain to private entities in service of corporate profits.[15] Part II explains the evolution of eminent domain in United States caselaw and its current interpretation both nationally and in Maryland.[16] It also includes an explanation of how local and regional energy markets have changed.[17] Part III discusses Maryland’s current approach to eminent domain, and how that power is delegated to private corporate interests.[18] It will also explore the ways in which the current laws fail to protect Maryland’s large agriculture industry, putting generational family farms at risk and allowing corporate interests to negate state granted land preservation and conservation easements.[19]

Part IV  explores potential legislative remedies  that could protect Maryland’s landowners and agriculture industry.[20] It will discuss alternative sources of energy, the regulation of data center construction and energy use, the “optimization” of existing grid infrastructures, and the prohibition of takings of lands in conservation or preservation easements.[21] Finally, this Comment will examine these proposals through the lens of how they might best support and protect Maryland’s property owners and farmers.[22]

II. Historical Background.

A. The Origins and Meaning of Eminent Domain.

The concept of eminent domain evolved from the feudal reality that a king could take property for any purpose without compensation.[23] In the European feudal system, ownership centered in the sovereign, who had no need to consider individual property rights.[24] This feudal understanding began to change in the late middle ages with the signing of the Magna Carta in 1215.[25] This transformational document demonstrated the beginnings of the protection of property rights, stating “[n]o Freeman shall be . . . de-seized of his freehold . . . but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the Law of the Land.”[26]

The term eminent domain itself, however, was first used by the Dutch scholar Hugo Grotius in his treatise On the Law of War and Peace.[27]  Originally written in Latin, it described “dominium eminens” or “supreme ownership” as the sovereign authority of the state to “use . . . destroy . . . or alienate” the property of its citizens for the purposes of “public advantage.”[28] Significantly, Grotius added that if the state does exercise this sovereign right, it should compensate the property owner “from the public funds.”[29] However, because the law considers eminent domain a sovereign right, “it requires no constitutional authority for its existence[,]” and is only restricted by prevailing law.[30]

More than 150 years later, the Founding Fathers chose to include such a restriction in the Bill of Rights as they sought to protect citizens from the new Constitution’s more powerful federal government.[31] In the Fifth Amendment, the drafters limited the new government’s right to take private property only for “public use” and with “just compensation.”[32] While this restriction was an integral ingredient in the collection of rights on which U.S. citizens continue to rely, the vague nature of the phrase “public use” allowed shifting interpretations of its meaning to take hold over the intervening centuries.[33]

B. Evolving Judicial Interpretations of “Public Use” in the U.S.

Until the mid-twentieth century, courts interpreted “public use” narrowly, restricting the government’s exercise of eminent domain to situations involving true “public use.”[34] This included taking private property for roads, bridges, parks, and public buildings and facilities.[35] Each of these public uses involved a clear public need for infrastructure, education, or recreation.[36] Therefore, the early interpretation of “public use” relied on a finding that the government needed a property for regular public use, typically understood to mean the public had access to the use.[37]

In Berman v. Parker (1954), the Supreme Court of the United States found the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945 constitutional, creating the first expansion of the definition of public use towards “public purpose.”[38] Rather than identifying a need for a public space and then acquiring the necessary property through eminent domain, the Redevelopment Act flipped the traditional order on its head, declaring specific areas of the District essentially uninhabitable and in need of “sound replanning.”[39] The Court reasoned that redeveloping blighted areas served a public purpose and a fair payment satisfied property owners’ rights, justifying the takings.[40]

Almost thirty years later in Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, the Supreme Court of Michigan allowed a government taking of an entire community within the City of Detroit, condemning over one thousand residences and hundreds of businesses.[41] The holding in Poletown allowed a private corporation to condemn the properties for the “public purpose” of building a plant and promoting economic development.[42]  This decision set a precedent for economic development and corporate profit to satisfy a broad definition of public use, not only in Michigan, but in courts across the country.[43]

In Hawaii Housing Authority (1984), the United States Supreme Court leaned into the definitional shift to public purpose that the Michigan court utilized in Poletown.[44]  The Court explained that any taking of private property “for the benefit of another private person” must be supported by a “justifying public purpose.”[45] However, “[w]here the exercise of eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause.”[46] The Court then clarified that the purpose of the taking, not the mechanics, determines its constitutionality.[47]

The Supreme Court’s broad interpretation in Hawaii Housing Authority remained the accepted precedent for twenty years until two decisions, County of Wayne v. Hathcock and Kelo v. City of New London, shifted it again.[48] In County of Wayne v. Hathcock, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed its decision in Poletown, temporarily narrowing the definition of public purpose.[49] The Supreme Court of Michigan held that a private pursuit of profit does not constitute a public use.[50] However, as a state court opinion, the court’s ruling in Hathcock did not hold authority outside of Michigan.[51]

Regardless, Michigan’s narrowed holding did not persist because the next year, in Kelo v. City of New London, the Supreme Court of the United States established a broader definition for public purpose that still stands as precedent today.[52] Specifically, the Court held that private property can be taken for private profit, but that such a taking would need to serve a public purpose of economic development.[53] In Kelo, the Court upheld the condemnation of a large waterfront neighborhood in New London, Connecticut, by private corporation, displacing many residents who had lived there for decades.[54] The purpose of the condemnation was to build a large manufacturing plant and revitalize the entire “blighted” area.[55]

The Kelo decision gained national attention, sparking outrage and sympathy for Ms. Kelo and her co-plaintiffs, including several elderly residents who had lived in these homes most of their lives.[56] The tragedy of Kelo is that after the Court allowed the condemnation to proceed, the private corporation abandoned the redevelopment project.[57] While the project’s cancellation did not help Ms. Kelo nor the other residents of New London, the publicity initiated a proliferation of eminent domain restrictions at the state level.[58] Responding to the public outcry, many state legislatures passed laws restricting the use of eminent domain by private interests for the purpose of economic development and corporate profit.[59] Notably, even some of the states that enacted restrictive legislation around eminent domain conspicuously omitted any limits on energy and transmission projects.[60]

C. Evolution of Maryland’s Eminent Domain Laws.

Maryland’s laws governing eminent domain underwent comparatively modest evolution, a consequence of the state judiciary’s historically broad reading of public use.[61]  In the nineteenth century, Maryland’s case law indicated that courts had already embraced  a broad construction of public use.[62] As early as 1873, the Court of Appeals of Maryland found that stimulating economic growth for the state satisfied the public use requirement and allowed a private enterprise to condemn private land, effectively interpreting “public use” to include takings that primarily benefitted private rather than public interests.[63] Maryland courts’ early willingness to apply a broad public use standard established this concept far earlier than many other states.[64] This expansive definition of public use continued through the twentieth century as Maryland courts, citing this early precedent, allowed for condemnation of private land for the benefit of private interests.[65]

In P.G. County. v. Collington Crossroads, the court held that “public use” is not restricted to instances where “the public literally or physically [is] permitted to use the property taken by eminent domain.”[66] In Baltimore v. Chertkof, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that “condemnation for urban renewal purposes embodies a broad concept of public use, not limited to actual use by the public, but rather to use benefitting the public.”[67] Chertkof expressed the spirit of Poletown, and beyond Maryland, the country gradually realigned with the broader definition of public use, later culminating in the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo.[68]

Nationally, the legacy of Kelo informs how courts across jurisdictions decide whether a public or private entity’s purpose in condemning land satisfies the public use requirement.[69] Now, individual states are left to narrow their definition of “public use” at the state level, leading to varying success.[70] For example, Maryland’s attempts to protect private property in the wake of Kelo were lackluster at best.[71] However, Maryland again has a chance to update its definition of “public use” and protect its residents in light of  the proliferation of data centers and their insatiable appetite for power.[72]

D. The Restructuring of the Energy Transmission Industry.

A fundamental shift in the structure of the energy marketplace complicates what Maryland constitutes “public use” in eminent domain takings for energy transmission lines.[73]  As regulations and energy needs changed, “merchant” transmission lines, and other similar entities not subjected to the same constraints as public utilities, increasingly enter state electricity markets.[74] Transmission needs and the focus on renewable energy continue to grow exponentially, creating more space in the electricity market for transmission lines built by merchant or out of state transmission companies.[75] As is currently true here in Maryland with PSEG and the MPRP, many transmission lines built by these other players cut across state lines to deliver electricity elsewhere without any measurable benefit to the land where they are built.[76] This occurs largely because states now regulate retail electricity sales, and the federal government, through FERC, regulates “wholesale markets that involve interstate commerce and interstate transmission of electricity.[77]  These changes to federal and state regulations created an “electricity generation and transmission system [that] has become more regional and national in nature.”[78] Amid this increased regionalization, projects like the MPRP act as giant extension cords, connecting power stations in one state to locations with unmet electricity needs in non-adjacent states.[79] State courts and legislatures must support public service commissions and focus on the question of how to define public use within eminent domain law for transmission lines that provide no discernable service to their own citizens.[80] However, courts often find sufficient public use in a myriad of different circumstances when public use is not defined by statute but instead reserved for  judicial interpretation.[81] The public must question how a state protects its rural lands and farms when the interpretation of public use are not substantively addressed by state law.[82]

III. Issue: Maryland’s Farmland and Private Property Owners are at Risk from an Overreach of Eminent Domain Power for Corporate Profit.

A. Maryland Law Does Little to Protect Private Property from Eminent Domain Takings by Private Interests.

During the fallout and public outcry following the Kelo decision, many states passed and amended state laws and constitutions to protect private property from government takings.[83] However, Maryland’s legislature failed to accomplish anything so meaningful.[84] Maryland legislators introduced more than forty bills aimed at curbing the broad power of eminent domain for projects that only marginally qualified as “public use.”[85] Ultimately, Maryland only passed one bill, SB 3, that was enacted into law.[86]

However, once codified, SB 3 did not substantively protect private property in the state.[87] The law merely restricted government condemnations to a timeline within four years of official authorization.[88] If the four year timeline expires, the condemner must seek new authorization.[89] This slight restriction does not accomplish meaningful change for Maryland’s landowners, but only serves to extend the process by creating an easily surmountable barrier.[90]

With prior efforts to reform Maryland’s eminent domain laws falling short of that goal, state law still contains several statutes involving a very broad definition of public use as it relates to the power of eminent domain.[91] This expansive definition provides a smooth process for government entities to take private property in Maryland for a variety of purposes.[92] Government entities can easily tweak their purposes to fit into the broad statutory definition of public use, such as highlighting the economic benefits of a project for the community.[93]

First, Section 12-803 of the Economic Development Article of the Maryland Code allows government takings of private property for economic development purposes.[94] Economic development does not historically satisfy the original intent of public use and is arguably not a public purpose.[95] Including economic development in the definition of public use allows local governments to condemn homes and businesses if officials are convinced the new owner will create jobs, pay more taxes, and boost the local economy.[96]  Maryland’s use of “economic development” in its takings statute is precisely why many other states narrowed their public use definition after Kelo, in the effort to prevent corporate interests from profiting at the expense of landowners.[97]

A second example is Section 5-215 of the Local Government Article in the Maryland Code, which grants local government entities broad authority to take property through eminent domain for urban renewal.[98] This statute directly references eliminating blight as a justification for taking property and pushing urban renewal.[99] The language specifically states that a government entity may take a family dwelling, provided it can show current deterioration and a likelihood the dwelling will continue to deteriorate, causing blight on the neighborhood.[100] Sections 5-215 and 12-803 are exactly the type of broad public use definitions that allow government overstep in private property takings derived from the Kelo holding.[101]

B. The Process Through Which a Private Entity or Utility Secures the Right to Exercise Eminent Domain from the State.

Unlike state governments, private entities or individuals do not possess the right of eminent domain.[102] If a private entity seeks to use private land for any purpose, it can negotiate with the landowner with an offer to purchase.[103] However, unlike state governments, if an owner declines to sell, that entity cannot exercise the power of eminent domain to condemn the land.[104] That power belongs to the state alone to use or grant to other entities.[105] However, a private entity can exercise the power of eminent domain if, in the case of a utility, it can prove the necessity of the project to the Maryland Public Service Commission (“MPSC”) through a process codified in state law.[106]

Section 7-207 of the Public Utilities Article of the Maryland Code outlines the process through which a power company, a private entity, must apply for approval to the MPSC.[107] First, the power company must request a certificate of public convenience and necessity (“CPCN”) through official filing with the MPSC.[108] That certificate, once approved, grants that privately owned power company with the state’s power of eminent domain should negotiations with landowners fail.[109] In theory, the MPSC approval process exists as a comprehensive administrative review before granting such power to a private entity like an electric or power company.[110] However, there is no substantive guidance in state law on how the MPSC should evaluate true public use, especially in the context of transmission lines and rural protected lands.[111]

Unfortunately, this process typically favors private interests over local landowners.[112] States, localities, and private interests enter the process with superior knowledge and influence, far more than the average private citizen.[113] By using this knowledge to their advantage, localities often don’t need to use the power of eminent domain at all.[114] Instead, merely the threat of eminent domain or condemnation proceedings can provide sufficient inducement to the landowners to capitulate and sell.[115] For example, sometimes landowners do not understand they do not need to sell willingly to the government or the entity seeking to buy their property.[116] However, even if a landowner is aware of their rights not to sell or their right to challenge in court the amount offered in just compensation, they may have little faith that a long, expensive court battle would conclude in their favor.[117] Regardless of the path these landowners take, in each case the result is the same, a relinquishment of private property to the government.[118] A landowner’s property is either “voluntarily” sold in response to a threat of eminent domain or subject to a government taking for “just compensation,” all in the name of corporate profits.[119]

C. Maryland’s Agriculture Industry is Particularly Vulnerable to Government Takings for Large Utility Projects.

Under the current MPSC approval process Maryland’s agricultural land is particularly vulnerable to government takings, particularly for transmission lines.[120] Agriculture has been an integral part of Maryland’s economy and identity for centuries.[121] Today, agriculture is the state’s largest commercial industry, contributing $8.5 billion dollars to its economy annually.[122] Agricultural land encompasses over two million acres throughout the state: approximately twelve thousand and five hundred acres of farmland and eighty-one percent of those farms are family-owned.[123] Unfortunately, open farmland can be attractive to a utility planning a route for high voltage transmission lines, essentially becoming a blank canvas of land vulnerable to the power of eminent domain.[124]

Contrary to its broad eminent domain laws, Maryland is among the five states leading the nation in land conservation efforts.[125] In fact, over one million acres of farmland have been protected in just those five states.[126] In Maryland, these efforts involve the “state Purchase of Agricultural Conservation Easement[s],” or PACE programs, to mitigate the proliferation of large developments across Maryland’s rural lands.[127] When the state purchases an agricultural conservation easement through PACE, the contract typically grants the easement in perpetuity, effectively protecting that land from any development, subdivision or sale into the foreseeable future.[128] Most landowners participate in the PACE program because they believe in the goals of the program and view the payment they receive from the state as a bonus.[129] However, the unfortunate reality is that conservation easement contracts do not protect the land from takings by eminent domain.[130]

Essentially, when a landowner signs a conservation easement contract with the state, they are legally prevented from selling or subdividing their land in perpetuity.[131] Perversely, one of the only permissible transactions under such a contract is to grant an easement, either voluntarily or through eminent domain, to a private utility or other type of private or government entity.[132]

The effect of the PACE program effectively turns Maryland’s open farmland into a prime target for a utility company seeking a clear development path across the state.[133] The unfortunate result of this contract exception follows a circular path: first, the state pays a landowner through the PACE program; next, that property remains protected undeveloped farmland in perpetuity; then, however, that land becomes far more attractive than developed land to utility companies conducting siting studies for new transmission lines.[134] Therefore, the landowner who contracted with the state for an agricultural conservation easement to protect their land has instead potentially placed themselves directly in the crosshairs of a taking through eminent domain.[135] Thus, despite decades of being at the forefront in its efforts to protect rural farmlands, Maryland’s failure to remove the threat of eminent domain from such farmlands distinguishes it from the other states leading in rural land protection.[136]

D. Justifications for the use of eminent domain power for transmission lines.

In contrast to the arguments against Maryland’s current use of eminent domain for energy transmission projects, some groups in support for such use argue it creates efficiency, increases the state’s ability to support “critical infrastructure,” and has a relatively “limited impact on landowners.”[137]

First, the argument that the exercise of eminent domain creates efficiency in this context often refers to a project that cannot go forward due to one landowner refusing to negotiate or demanding “the entire economic surplus from the infrastructure proposal.”[138] Without that one remaining plot of land, the government cannot build the requisite infrastructure, and if the holdout landowner understands this dynamic, they may ask for a larger sum than “just compensation.”[139] Without the ability to exercise eminent domain, a state in this situation faces the possibility of rising project costs or project cancellation altogether.[140] Therefore, the government often views eminent domain as the only answer in these situations, justifying its use of eminent domain to take the plots of land for “just compensation” without interfering with the project.[141]

Supporters also argue that the state must retain the ability to “support critical infrastructure” which is equivalent to, and satisfies, the public use component of eminent domain law.[142] Critical infrastructure typically refers to vital systems within a state or nation, such as communications, emergency services, healthcare, and energy.[143] Because these critical systems are integral to the proper functioning of the state or nation, the government deems eminent domain necessary for the good of the whole.[144] However, this justification enters the murky waters of what constitutes proper public purpose and use.[145] The government must define how public use or purpose supports that transmission projects are critical infrastructures for it, even though the projects will only deliver power out of its jurisdiction.[146]

Finally, a strong argument exists that eminent domain takings for the sole purpose of transmission lines, pipelines, and other similar projects has a relatively limited impact on affected landowners because the land in question is not a landowner’s entire parcel, but merely an easement on a portion of the land.[147] It is almost certain that landowners subjected to a taking of their entire property, as seen in Poletown, Hawaii Housing Authority, and Kelo likely experience a far greater impact than those from whom the government takes an easement.[148] However, the government’s belief that a partial taking through a permanent easement is far less disruptive than a full taking potentially skews the analysis of the public use of the project.[149] If a state agency does not consider an easement to be a true taking in the same sense as when an entire property is taken, the government often will not place the same weight on the analysis of whether the use is truly public and justifies the use of eminent domain.[150] This reasoning also influences the amount of “just compensation” courts decide a landowner is owed for an easement that still allows continued use and control of most of the property.[151]

IV. Solution: Maryland Must Protect the State’s Rural Lands Through Legislative Action.

A. The Maryland Public Service Commission Must Require Applicants to Consider Grid Optimization.

The current MPSC approval process requires certain environmental studies and a tacit acknowledgement that the applicant explored alternatives to new transmission lines in its planning process.[152] In light of the increasingly large demands on the electric grid resulting from data centers, new artificial intelligence technologies, and the general rapid growth of technology, the state must update the MPSC approval process with more rigorous standards.[153] Unfortunately Maryland’s current relaxed requirements lack serious explorations of the potential to upgrade and optimize the existing grid to meet these needs.[154] Therefore, for-profit energy companies will continue to prey on Maryland’s farmlands for their own gain until Maryland implements stronger CPCN application requirements.[155]

Various Maryland legislators are attempting to push reform and introduced many MPRP inspired bills during the 2025, and now the 2026, Maryland General Assembly legislative sessions.[156] This includes Senate Bill 0952: Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity – Transmission Lines – Grid Enhancing Technologies (“SB 0952”).[157] If enacted, SB 0952 would require that CPCN applicants conduct, as part of their application, a “grid optimization study” exploring the potential for Maryland to increase its current transmission capacities without constructing new transmission lines.[158] The study, made public for comment once complete, must explore various possibilities in grid enhancement technologies.[159] Although SB 0952 ultimately did not pass in 2025, similar legislative efforts to reform and bolster the MPSC’s CPCN process are an important piece of the puzzle in preventing the proliferation of new transmission line construction.[160] However, implementing additional protection in the CPCN application process alone cannot adequately safeguard vulnerable rural landowners.[161] Maryland must also amend its eminent domain statute to strengthen rural landowner rights and ensure fairer procedures during utility and transmission line developments.[162]

B. Necessary Changes to Maryland’s Eminent Domain Statute.

Maryland’s agriculture and farmlands are particularly vulnerable to takings for high voltage transmission lines.[163] Many of these vulnerable green spaces are currently in agricultural conservation easements and as such, deserve protection from the threat of eminent domain.[164] Sadly, neither Maryland’s eminent domain statute nor the conservation easement contracts protect these lands from government takings.[165] Currently, conservation easement regulations facilitate the opposite outcome, allowing an “overlay easement” if the state grants a utility company “condemning authority.”[166]

One potential solution is the passage of bills like SB 955.[167] During the 2025 Legislative Session, Senator Chris West introduced SB 955: The 2025 Eminent Domain Improvements Act (“SB 955”).[168] SB 955 contained three changes to current eminent domain law.[169] However, most importantly, the proposal prohibits entities constructing overhead transmission lines from using a condemning authority on any property already in agricultural conservation easement.[170] Considering Maryland’s large percentage of farm and rural lands in conservation easements, SB 955’s provision prohibiting overhead transmission lines is necessary to protect those lands.[171] This, together with the bill’s other provisions, will protect farms, relieve some of the financial burden associated with court proceedings and allow more landowners to fight condemnation.[172]

As a leader among the states in enacting policies that protect rural and agricultural lands, Maryland must not allow these lands to fall victim to unnecessary transmission line projects.[173] Permitting this transmission line encroachment on rural lands could slowly whittle away the state’s progress towards preserving its agricultural heritage.[174] While it did not pass in 2025, Maryland should again attempt to pass a bill similar to SB 955 to protect its long-standing tradition of preserving agricultural and rural land.[175]

V. Conclusion.

Maryland’s efforts to preserve farms and rural lands lead the nation and serve as an example to other jurisdictions.[176] The MPRP project brings to light the energy transmission challenges inherent in modern society.[177] The interplay between rural lands, a growing need for energy transmission, and the problems that arise from their relationship is not disappearing anytime soon.[178] If Maryland seeks to maintain and protect its rural and farm lands while addressing the state’s modern energy challenges, it must enact legislation similar to SB 955 to balance growing energy needs with protecting rural residents.[179]

Protecting land in agricultural conservation easements has been the first step in protecting rural lands for decades.[180] Closing the easement contract loophole that allows government takings of those lands is paramount to their full protection.[181] However, that process is now insufficient and Maryland must also amend the MPSC approval process that is fast becoming an integral element in protecting Maryland landowners from corporate greed.[182] Mandating a more robust application and approval process will likely increase private entities’ costs, particularly associated with conducting grid optimization studies.[183]  Creating time and cost hurdles through the approval process will ideally help achieve Maryland’s agricultural goals.[184] However, PSEG currently demonstrates no interest in exploring alternatives because of its concerns that the alternatives may involve higher costs and will chip away at company profits.[185] Yet, regardless of PSEG’s concerns, Maryland must prioritize protecting its agricultural commerce, residents, and private land, not corporate

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*Marisa Basignani: J.D. Candidate 2026, University of Baltimore School of Law; B.A. in Government and Politics, University of Maryland College Park; Managing Editor 2025-2026, University of Baltimore Law Forum. She would first like to extend her thanks and appreciation to her faculty advisor, Professor John Lynch, for guiding her through the initial stages of this process and providing invaluable insight, particularly in property law. An additional thank you to Professor Gregory Dolin, who graciously agreed to step in as advisor in the final two months when Professor Lynch was unable to continue. Many thanks to Volume 55’s Executive Board for guiding the writing process and finding sufficient potential to select this Comment for publication, as well as to the 2025-2026 Executive Board and editors for shepherding this publication over the finish line. Finally, she would not have made it through the Comment process or this law school journey without her community of incredibly talented University of Baltimore School of Law colleagues and the unconditional support of her husband and three children.

[1]   The First 30 Days, Stop MPRP, Inc. (Aug. 9, 2024), https://stopmprp.com/f/the-first-30-days (on file with the University of Baltimore) [hereinafter The First 30 Days].

[2]   See Proposed Route, Pseg, Inc., https://corporate.pseg.com/aboutpseg/companyinformation/thepsegfamilyofcompanies/psegrenewabletransmission/mprp-proposed-route.ashx (on file with the University of Baltimore) (last visited Jan. 12, 2024) [hereinafter Proposed Route].

[3]   Id.

[4]   See Who are PSEG & PJM, Pseg, Inc., https://corporate.pseg.com/aboutpseg/companyinformation/thepsegfamilyofcompanies/psegrenewabletransmission/mprp-pseg.ashx (last visited Sept. 15, 2025) (on file with the University of Baltimore Law Forum).

[5]   See Proposed Route, supra note 2 (“The resulting 10 Alternative Route corridors (labeled as Routes A – J) were released publicly on July 8, 2024 . . . . Public information sessions (held July 9th, 10th & 11th in the three counties within the Study Area) along with the online survey tool (open from July 8th to July 26th) were utilized to collect public comments.”).

[6]   See id. (“The route was developed earlier in 2023 by PSEG . . . . The resulting 10 Alternative Route corridors (labeled as Routes A – J) were released publicly on July 8, 2024.”).

[7]   Id.

[8]   See Anonymous Member, Facebook (Hereford Zone Community Group), BLUF: What’s our collective goal? (July 9, 2024, at 10:05 ET), https://www.facebook.com/groups/344505095690044/posts/2864776220329573/ (on file with the University of Baltimore Law Forum); see also Rona Kobell, Baltimore County Residents Fume over 70-mile Power Line, The Balt. Banner (Aug. 22, 2024, at 14:36 EDT), https://www.thebanner.com/community/climate-environment/baltimore-county-maryland-piedmont-reliability-project-ZAFYD6KMCFDBZANBQU6FDZE5II/ (on file with the University of Baltimore Law Forum) (reporting Baltimore County residents’ responses to the map).

[9]   See Anonymous Member, supra note 8;Kobell, supra note 8.

[10] See Proposed Route, supra note 2; see also Anonymous Member, supra note 8 (explaining that the routes were not released to the public for months after their development).

[11] Image posted by Jen Frederick, Facebook (Hereford Zone Community Group), Is it possible PSEG will seek to acquire property via Eminent Domain? (July 8, 2024, at 18:22   ET), https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=1173251837123383&set=p.1173251837123383&type=3 (on file with the University of Baltimore Law Forum).

[12] See Gabrielle Lewis, Residents skeptical, raise objections to possible PSEG regional transmission line routes, The Frederick News-Post (July 10, 2024), https://www.fredericknewspost.com/news/economy_and_business/residents-skeptical-raise-objections-to-possible-pseg-regional-transmission-line-routes/article_1488a76b-84f2-518c-a2a0-83d88a78ba6f.html (on file with the University of Baltimore Law Forum); Tyler Durden, 1000s Of Marylanders Furious About Eminent Domain Risk For New Transmission Line Powering AI Data Centers, ZeroHedge (July 17, 2024, at 19:05 ET), https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/thousands-marylanders-furious-about-eminent-domain-risk-new-transmission-line-powering-ai?EdNo=222 (on file with the University of Baltimore Law Forum); Suzi Ford, Facebook (Hereford Zone Community Group), Our community came out in full force (July 9, 2024), https://www.facebook.com/groups/344505095690044/posts/2865000680307127/ (on file with University of Baltimore Law Forum).

[13] History of the Federal Use of Eminent Domain, U.S. Dep’t of Just. (Jan. 30, 2024), https://www.justice.gov/enrd/condemnation/land-acquisition-section/history-federal-use-eminent-domain (on file with the University of Baltimore Law Forum) (explaining that its use was “traditionally to facilitate transportation, supply water, construct public buildings . . .” as well as creating and preserving open green spaces and “natural beauty” in the form of public parks).

[14] See Frequently Asked Questions: Why is Stop MPRP Opposing the Project, Stop MPRP, Inc., https://stopmprp.com/about-the-mprp#0354927e-842d-4496-a50b-28733857f8fd (on file with the University of Baltimore Law Forum) (last visited Jan. 12, 2025) (explaining that the main impetus of the project is “the rapid growth of data centers in Virginia . . . “); see also PJM Interconnection, Reliability analysis rep: 2022 RTEP Window 3, at 4 (2023), https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/committees/teac/2023/20231205/20231205-2022-rtep-window-3-reliability-analysis-report.pdf (on file with the University of Baltimore Law Forum) (citing increased demand from data centers “particularly in northern Virginia” in its 2022 load forecast and indicating that “[s]ince then, data center loads within northern Virginia have been increasing at an unprecedented rate” (emphasis added)).

[15] Maryland Eminent Domain Laws, Ins. for Just., https://ij.org/issues/private-property/eminent-domain/maryland-eminent-domain-laws/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2024) (on file with the University of Baltimore Law Forum) [hereinafter Maryland Eminent Domain Laws] (explaining that the Kelo decision, Maryland lawmakers introduced more than forty bills regarding eminent domain, but the legislature passed only one bill that fails to substantively protect property rights).

[16] See infra Sections II.B-C.

[17] See infra Section II.D.

[18] See infra Sections III.A-B.

[19] See infra Section III.C; see also Articles & Updates, Impact, Stop MPRP, Inc.,  https://stopmprp.com/articles-and-updates?blogcategory=Impact (on file with the University of Baltimore Law Forum) (last visited Jan. 10, 2025) (highlighting the numerous families and landowners, whose farms they believed were safeguarded from sale or development through preservation easements, now threatened by the proposed route of the MPRP).

[20] See infra Part IV.

[21] See infra Part IV; see also Chris West, Six Legislative Solutions to Maryland’s Energy Crisis, Friends of Chris West, https://senatorchriswest.com/sendy01/w/fP8uoLKk1J8DpPQJAfMb8Q/xZr3K9nWTCj892Xmt7b621qQ/jvpbAAQyH77S892DOqKUGgNg (on file with the University of Baltimore Law Forum) (last visited Mar. 14, 2026) (summarizing the six bills introduced or co-sponsored by Senator Chris West during the General Assembly’s 2025 session).

[22] See infra Section IV.B.

[23] Sondra A. Berchin, Regulation of Land Use: From Magna Carta to Just Formulation, 23 UCLA L. Rev. 904, 906 (1976).

[24] William D. McNulty, Eminent Domain in Continental Europe, 21 Yale L.J. 555, 558 n.7 (1912).

[25] Dale Orthner, Toward A More “Just” Compensation in Eminent Domain, 38 McGeorge L. Rev. 429, 431 (2007).

[26] Id. (quoting Magna Cartach. 39 (1215)).

[27] Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace 63, 140 (Francis W. Kelsey et al. trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1925) (1625).

[28] Id. at 807.

[29] Id. at 385.

[30] Lore v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 354 A.2d 812, 814 (Md. 1976) (citing Riden v. Phila., Balt. & Wash. R.R. Co., 35 A.2d 99, 100 (Md. 1943)).

[31] America’s Founding Documents: The Bill of Rights, Nat’l Archives, https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/bill-of-rights (on file with the University of Baltimore Law Forum) (last visited Nov. 23, 2025).

[32] U.S. Const. amend. V; Just Compensation, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (“Under the Fifth Amendment, a payment by the government for property it has taken under eminent domain — usu. the property’s fair market value, so that the owner is theoretically no worse off after the taking.”).

[33] See History of Eminent Domain and Its Abuse, Inst. for Just., https://ij.org/issues/private-property/eminent-domain/eminent-domain-history (on file with the University of Baltimore Law Forum) (last visited Nov. 3, 2024) [hereinafter History of Eminent Domain] (defining eminent domain as the state’s inherent power to take private property for public use).

[34] Id.

[35] Id.

[36] Id.

[37] Id.

[38] Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 28, 36 (1954) (holding that properties may be taken to facilitate redevelopment of neighborhoods deemed unsafe, harmful to “public health, safety” and generally a blight on the nation’s capital).

[39] Id. at 28-29.

[40] Id. at 28, 35-36 (defining blighted areas as “substandard housing . . . including the use of buildings in alleys as dwellings for human habitation” and explaining that “miserable and disreputable housing conditions may do more than spread disease and crime and immorality. They . . . also suffocate the spirit . . . make living an almost insufferable burden . . . an ugly sore . . . on the community which robs it of charm”).

[41] See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 457-59 (Mich. 1981); see also History of Eminent Domain, supra note 33 (explaining that the court allowed the City of Detroit “to bulldoze an entire neighborhood . . . to give the property to General Motors for an auto plant” without even the pretext of finding “blight”).

[42] Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 457 (reasoning that “promoting industry and commerce” would add jobs and taxes to state revenue, satisfying the need for a public purpose).

[43] History of Eminent Domain, supra note 33.

[44] Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 243-44 (1984) (reasoning that the state’s interest in remedying “the skewed residential fee simple market” and overpriced land values by compelling large landowners to break up their estates satisfied the public use clause even if the land was immediately transferred to other private individuals).

[45] Id. at 241.

[46] Id.

[47] Id. at 244.

[48] County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 770 (Mich. 2004); Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489-90 (2005).

[49] Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 770 (holding that the County’s stated intention to condemn properties and then transfer to private interests was “inconsistent with the common understanding of public use”).

[50] Id. at 786-87.

[51] Id.

[52] Kelo, 545 U.S. at 485.

[53] Id. at 484-85.

[54] Id. at 475, 489.

[55] Id. at 472.

[56] Ilya Somin, The story behind Kelo v. City of New London – how an obscure takings case got to the Supreme Court and shocked the nation, The Wash. Post (May 29, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/29/the-story-behind-the-kelo-case-how-an-obscure-takings-case-came-to-shock-the-conscience-of-the-nation/ (on file with the University of Baltimore Law Forum); Kelo, 545 U.S. at 475.

[57] History of Eminent Domain, supra note 33.

[58] History of Eminent Domain, supra note 33.

[59] Eminent Domain, Ins. for Just., https://ij.org/issues/private-property/eminent-domain (on file with the University of Baltimore Law Forum) (last visited Feb. 28, 2026); see also Elva E. Tillman, The Use of Eminent Domain for Economic Develop. In Balt. Md.: Ten Years After Kelo, 75 Md. L. Rev. 815, 820-21 (2016) (explaining that after Kelo, 21 states enacted new legislation limiting the use of eminent domain and describing the contents of such legislation).

[60] Alexandra B. Klass, Takings and Transmission, 91 N.C. L. Rev. 1079, 1094 (2013).

[61] See Barnett v. Charles County, 112 A.2d 492, 494-95 (Md. 1955) (explaining the expanding application of Maryland’s eminent domain and condemnation laws and holding that current interpretations expanded that authority far too broadly).

[62] New Cent. Coal Co. v. George’s Creek Coal & Iron Co., 37 Md. 537, 561 (1873) (holding that condemning private land to lay a privately owned section of railroad for the benefit of a private mining company qualified as a public use because “it has been the settled policy of the State . . . to stimulate [private mining] enterprise for the purpose of developing the large mineral resources in the western portion of the State”).

[63] Id.

[64] See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 457 (Mich. 1981).

[65] See N.Y. Mining Co. v. Midland Co., 58 A. 217, 221 (Md. 1904); see also Baltimore v. Brengle, 81 A. 677, 678 (Md. 1911) (“It cannot be said that because some parties may receive more direct benefits than the public at large, it is . . . a private and not a public use.”); cf. Marchant v. City of Baltimore, 126 A. 884, 887 (Md. 1924) (“The public character of the use to which the [properties] are devoted is not affected by the fact that they may not all be made available for the indiscriminate use of the public.”).

[66] Prince George’s County v. Collington Crossroads, 339 A.2d 278, 284 (Md. 1975).

[67] Mayor of Baltimore v. Chertkof, 441 A.2d 1044, 1050 (Md. 1982).

[68] Id.; Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 459; Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 469.

[69] Dana Berliner, Opening the Floodgates: Eminent Domain Abuse in the Post-Kelo World 5 (Inst. for Just. 2006), https://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/floodgates-report.pdf (on file with the University of Baltimore Law Forum) (reporting that courts in many states are citing to Kelo in finding against property owners and using it to say “the judiciary should not second guess city decisions and that instead they should rubber stamp any eminent domain action that comes across their bench”) (internal quotations omitted).

[70] Id. at 5-6.

[71] See infra Section III.A.

[72] Martin C. Offutt & Ling Zhu, Cong. Rsch. Serv., Data Centers and Their Energy Consumption: Frequently Asked Questions 3-5 (2025), https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48646/R48646.1.pdf (on file with the University of Baltimore Law Forum); Klass, supra note 60,at 1120-22.

[73] See Klass, supra note 60, at 1120–21 (explaining that the Energy Policy Act of 1992, amended in 2005, changed industry requirements in a way that “created a market for private or ‘merchant’ transmission lines that compete with public utilities . . .”).

[74] Id. at 1096.

[75] Id. at 1096, 1101.

[76] Id. at 1097 (explaining that these types of lines “cross multiple state boundaries, providing little, if any, electricity or other ‘public use’ to the citizens of the states through which the lines pass”).

[77] David P. Tuttle et al., The History and Evolution of the U.S. Electricity Industry 5 (Univ. of Tex. at Austin Energy Inst. 2016) https://energy.utexas.edu/sites/default/files/UTAustin_FCe_History_2016.pdf (on file with the University of Baltimore Law Forum).

[78] Offutt & Zhu, supra note 72, at 1101; see also RTOs and ISOs, Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n (Jan. 17, 2024), https://www.ferc.gov/power-sales-and-markets/rtos-and-isos (on file with the University of Baltimore Law Forum) (illustrating the regional nature of the nation’s energy transmission system).

[79] See Rachel Levine & Swad Sathe, What’s Next? Breakthroughs and Roadblocks in electric transmission regulation, Niskanen Ctr. (Feb. 14, 2025), https://www.niskanencenter.org/whats-next-breakthroughs-and-roadblocks-in-electric-transmission-regulation/ (on file with the University of Baltimore Law Forum); National Interest Electric Transmission Corridor Designation Process, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, https://www.energy.gov/gdo/national-interest-electric-transmission-corridor-designation-process (on file with the University of Baltimore Law Forum) (last visited Mar. 30, 2025); see also Ethan Howland, AEP, Dominion, FirstEnergy propose joint 765-kV transmission projects across PJM, Utility Dive (Oct. 8, 2024), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/aep-dominion-firstenergy-pjm-transmission-projects-rtep/729168/ (on file with the University of Baltimore Law Forum) (discussing the current state of regional transmission needs, how the federal government designates those regional needs, and the effect data centers have on regional electricity demands).

[80] See, e.g., Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Conerly, 460 So. 2d 107, 113 (Miss. 1984) (holding that public use or purpose cannot apply because “not one Mississippi customer is to be served by the proposed transmission line”) (internal quotations omitted); Clark v. Gulf Power Co., 198 So. 2d 368, 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (stating that use of the state’s power of eminent domain was improper where it is for the “sole purpose of serving a public use in another state”).

[81] See, e.g., Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Parkshill Farms, 905 N.W.2d 334, 338-39 (S.D. 2017).

[82] See infra Section III.A.

[83] See Berliner, supra note 69, at 5-6 (explaining that in response to Kelo “[e]very state legislature that has been in session since June 2005 has considered legislative or constitutional reform” and using Florida, Georgia, and Virginia as specific examples of good and bad law).

[84] See Maryland Eminent Domain Laws, supra note 15.

[85] See id.

[86] See id.

[87] See id.

[88] See id.; Md. Code Ann., Real Prop. § 12-105.1 (West 2024).

[89] Real Prop. § 12-105.1.

[90] See Maryland Eminent Domain Laws, supra note 15 (explaining that while a restricted timeline of four years “may reduce speculative or unnecessary condemnations,” Maryland still needs much more comprehensive protections for property rights, particularly a repeal of provisions in the state constitution authorizing “quick take” condemnations).

[91] Md. Code Ann., Econ. Dev. § 12-803 (West 2024); Local Gov’t § 5-215 (West 2024).

[92] See Bouton v. Potomac Edison Co., 383 A.2d 669, 674 (Md. 1978) (quoting Ligon v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 149 A.2d 376, 377 (Md. 1959)) (“[T]he choice as to the extent and type of taking must rest largely in the sound business judgment of the condemner and that such choice will not be set aside by the court unless it is so oppressive, arbitrary or unreasonable as to suggest bad faith.”).

[93] Md. Code Ann., Econ. Dev. § 12-803 (West 2024); Local Gov’t § 5-215 (West 2024).

[94] Econ. Dev. § 12-803.

[95] See Maryland Eminent Domain Laws, supra note 15; see also U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 13 (explaining that the power of eminent domain is for public use).

[96] See Maryland Eminent Domain Laws, supra note 15.

[97] Id. (discussing how Kelo explicitly allowed takings for “economic development” and in response, states such as Florida, New Mexico, South Dakota, North Dakota, Michigan, and Virginia established some of the strongest property protections through a combination of legislation and constitutional amendments. Over twenty other states, including Oregon, Nevada, Wyoming, Vermont, and Delaware also restricted condemnations for private gain).

[98] Md. Code Ann., Local Gov’t. § 5-215 (West 2024).

[99] Id.

[100] Id.

[101] History of Eminent Domain, supra note 33.

[102] See supra Section II.A.

[103] See supra Section II.A.

[104] See supra Section II.A.

[105] Impacted Landowner Resource Hub, Stop MPRP, Inc., https://stopmprp.com/landowner-hub (on file with the University of Baltimore Law Forum) (last visited Feb. 12, 2025).

[106] Md. Code Ann., Pub. Util. § 7-207.5 (West 2024).

[107] Id.

[108] Id.

[109] Id.

[110] See Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Montgomery County, 560 A.2d 50, 54 (Md. 1989) (explaining the approval process includes comment from “other state agencies,” a public hearing, consideration of the “recommendations of local governing bodies” and other various societal effects of the proposed project). See generally Bd. of Comm’rs of Wash. Cnty. v. Perennial Solar, LLC, 212 A.3d 868, 876-77 (Md. 2019) (describing the comprehensive procedures codified in the Commission’s CPCN application and approval process).

[111] Md. Code Ann., Pub. Util. § 7-207 (West 2024); see also Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, Md. Dep’t of Nat. Res., https://dnr.maryland.gov/pprp/pages/cpcn.aspx (on file with the University of Baltimore Law Forum) (last visited Mar. 1, 2026) (explaining in detail the process through which an applicant entity proceeds through the approval process for a certificate of necessity and convenience with the Maryland Public Service Commission).

[112] Berliner, supra note 69, at 5.

[113] Id. at 2–3 (“The threat of condemnation for private development is just as much an abuse of eminent domain as the actual filing of condemnation proceedings.”).

[114] Id.

[115] Id. at 2.

[116] Id.

[117] Holiday Hull et al., Transmission Lines and Property Rights: A Maryland Landowner’s Guide to Eminent Domain and the Piedmont Reliability Project, Univ. of Md. Coll. of Agric. & Nat. Res. (Nov. 20, 2025), https://agrisk.umd.edu/post/transmission-lines-and-property-rights-a-maryland-landowner-s-guide-to-eminent-domain-and-the-piedm (on file with the University of Baltimore Law Forum) (explaining landowners’ rights and that they “are not obligated to accept the initial offer for an easement”).

[118] Id. (explaining that landowners on a potential route should pool resources to hire an attorney specializing in eminent domain law due to the complicated and expensive nature of challenging the taking and/or the compensation).

[119] Berliner, supra note 69, at 5.

[120] See Hull et al., supra note 117.

[121] Maryland at a Glance: Agriculture, Md. Manual On-Line, https://msa.maryland.gov/msa/mdmanual/01glance/html/agri.html (on file with the University of Baltimore Law Forum) (last visited February 15, 2025).

[122] Id.

[123] Id.

[124] Proposed Route, supra note 2.

[125] Lori Sallet, State Purchase of Agricultural Conservation Easement Programs Permanently Protect over 3.4 Million Acres as of January 2022, Am. Farmland Tr. (Nov. 18, 2022), https://farmland.org/state-purchase-of-agricultural-conservation-easement-programs-permanently-protect-over-3-4-million-acres-as-of-january-2022/ (on file with the University of Baltimore Law Forum).

[126] Julia Freedgood et al., Farms Under Threat: The State of the States, Am. Farmland Tr., at 38 (2020), https://s30428.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2020/09/AFT_FUT_StateoftheStates_rev.pdf (on file with the University of Baltimore Law Forum) (reporting that Maryland alone has over 350,000 acres of preserved farmland).

[127] Id. at 13 (explaining that the state makes these purchases using public funds to “compensate agricultural landowners for permanently protecting their land with a conservation easement”).

[128] U.S. Dep’t of Agric. Nat. Conservation Serv., Agricultural Conservation Easement Program: Minimum Deed Terms for the Protection of Agricultural Use 1, https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/sites/default/files/2022-10/ACEP%20ALE%20Minimum%20Deed%20Terms.pdf (on file with the University of Baltimore Law Forum) (last visited Sept. 13, 2025) [hereinafter Minimum Deed Terms].

[129] Rachel Pacella, Rural Legacy Farmers and Partners Celebrate 25 Years of Preserving Maryland’s Bucolic Landscape and Working Farms, Md. Dep’t of Nat. Res. (Oct. 17, 2024), https://news.maryland.gov/dnr/2024/10/17/rural-legacy-farmers-and-partners-celebrate-25-years-of-preserving-marylands-bucolic-landscape-and-working-farms/ (on file with the University of Baltimore Law Forum) (highlighting several Maryland families with farms in conservation easement specifically because they do not want to see the land converted to housing developments or other high density uses).

[130] See Minimum Deed Terms, supra note 128, at 10-11.

[131] See id. at 1.

[132] Id.

[133] See Proposed Route, supra note 2.

[134] See id. (showing the proposed routes almost exclusively crossing rural Maryland and avoiding developed areas).

[135] See Minimum Deed Terms, supra note 128.

[136] See Freedgood et al., supra note 126, at 35 (explaining Maryland enacted the first property tax relief program for farmland in the nation in 1956 and introduced the state PACE program in 1977); id. at 46 (explaining New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Virginia all “empower authorities to prevent takings of enrolled lands through eminent domain”).

[137] James W. Coleman & Alexandra B. Klass, Energy and Eminent Domain, 104 Minn. L. Rev. 659, 716 (2019); see also Abraham Bell, Private Takings, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 517, 529 (2009) (“[T]he takings power is . . .  warranted by the need to overcome strategic barriers that would block the government’s consensual acquisition of such property as would be used in the provision of the public good.”).

[138] Coleman & Klass, supra note 137, at 716.

[139] Id.

[140] Id. (explaining that this is referred to as bilateral monopoly or holdout, which “raises transaction costs and may entirely prevent construction of efficient projects”); see also Bell, supra note 137, at 530–31 (“Each[, the government and the landowner,] knows that there is profit to be made in transferring the land to the government, and each side will try to maximize its own share of the profit.”).

[141] See Bell, supra note 137, at 531.

[142] See Coleman & Klass, supra note 137, at 719.

[143] Critical Infrastructure Sectors, Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Sec. Agency, https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/critical-infrastructure-sectors (on file with the University of Baltimore Law Forum) (last visited Feb. 18, 2026).

[144] See Coleman & Klass, supra note 137, at 673.

[145] Id.

[146] See generally id. (discussing the potential impact that broad limits on eminent domain may have on renewable energy infrastructure and how to balance those needs with those of landowners and the environment in the context of defining public use).

[147] See Why is Stop MPRP Opposing the Project, supra note 14 (“Will PSEG need to purchase any land to complete this project? PSEG will need to acquire property rights for the project, mainly in the form of permanent easements, i.e. perpetual rights to construct, repair, maintain, replace, or remove the power lines and associated structures.”).

[148] See supra Section II.B.

[149] See generally Jones v. City of Tallahassee, 304 So. 2d 528, 532 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (holding that landowners were entitled to compensation equal only to the value of the easement and not the full market value of the land within the easement, reasoning that the taken land remained usable for the owner’s purposes); Carroll Elec. Co-op. Corp. v. Lambert, 403 S.W.3d 637, 642–46 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012) (reasoning that a permanent easement, as a partial taking, allows the property owner to retain almost complete control of the land and state law prevents expanded use of the easement absent further negotiation or condemnation proceedings); Otter Tail Power Co. v. Malme, 92 N.W.2d 514, 526 (N.D. 1958) (affirming the trial court’s judgment and holding that the jury awarded damages were appropriate for the value of the easement and landowners were not entitled to compensation based on the ”alleged damages by way of depreciation of the balance of the farm”).

[150] See Jones, 304 So. 2d at 532; Carroll Elec., 403 S.W.3d at 646.

[151] See Jones, 304 So. 2d at 532; Otter Tail Power, 92 N.W.2d at 526.

[152] See supra Section III.B.

[153] See West, supra note 21.

[154] See supra Section III.B; see also West, supra note 21 (discussing ways the Maryland Legislature can upgrade the existing grid infrastructures).

[155] Enhancing the Grid: ITCS Solutions Without New Transmission, Stop MPRP, Inc., https://stopmprp.com/alternatives/f/enhancing-the-grid-itcs-solutions-without-new-transmission (on file with the University of Baltimore Law Forum) (last visited Sept. 13, 2025) (“This approach ensures grid reliability and state-level resource adequacy without the need for new greenfield transmission projects, aligning with both environmental considerations and community interests.”); see also Case Studies and Modeling on the Value of Grid Enhancing Technologies – January 2024, Stop MPRP, Inc., https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/bea7ca9f-15d6-4b59-9636-83641861a7d8/downloads/Case-Studies-and-Modeling-on-the-Value-of-Grid.pdf (on file with the University of Baltimore Law Forum) (last visited Sept. 13, 2025) (explaining the various technologies available as alternatives to the disruptive and damaging construction of high voltage transmission lines across open greenfield and protected lands).

[156] See West, supra note 21; see also Legislation: Senate, Md. Gen. Assemb., https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Legislation/Index/senate (on file with the University of Baltimore Law Forum) (last visited Feb. 20, 2026) (discussing bills introduced in the 2026 Legislative Session relating to the MPRP closely mirror those from 2025 and include SB 0201, SB 0092, SB 0545, SB 0630).

[157] Legislation: SB0952, Md. Gen. Assemb., https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Legislation/Details/sb0952?ys=2025RS (on file with the University of Baltimore Law Forum) (last visited Feb. 20, 2026).

[158] See West, supra note 21.

[159] Id. (“(a) the implementation of advanced grid technologies, including smart grid technologies and advanced battery storage systems; (b) optimization of existing transmission lines through reconductoring, dynamic line ratings, advanced power flow control and voltage optimization; (c) strategic deployment of distributed energy resources that reduce load on the grid, including battery storage measures; and (d) improvement of energy efficiency programs that reduce grid demand.”).

[160] Id.

[161] See supra Section III.C (explaining that while creating larger hurdles within the CPCN application process might prevent some large transmission line projects, land in preservation would still be at risk if the MPSC approves such projects, and the only certain way to protect preserved and protected properties is to eliminate the loophole in the contract that allows them to be taken through eminent domain).

[162] See supra Section III.C.

[163] See supra Section III.C.

[164] See supra Section III.C.

[165] Fiscal and Policy Note: SB0955, Md. Gen. Assemb. Dep’t of Legis. Serv. (2025), at 5, https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2025RS/fnotes/bil_0005/sb0955.pdf (on file with the University of Baltimore Law Forum).

[166] Id. (explaining thatan “overlay easement” is an easement “over an existing agricultural preservation easement for utility infrastructure”).

[167] Legislation: SB0955, Md. Gen. Assemb., https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Legislation/Details/sb0955?ys=2025RS (on file with the University of Baltimore Law Forum) (last visited Feb. 26, 2026).

[168] Id.; see West, supra note 21.

[169] Legislation: SB0955, Md. Gen. Assemb.; see West, supra note 21.

[170] See West, supra note 21 (explaining “that in any eminent domain action brought to acquire land for an electrical transmission line pursuant to a [CPCN] issued by the [MPSC], not only will the owners of the land . . . have the right to be compensated . . . the owners of any land located within 150 feet of the acquired land will also have the right to be compensated for the diminution in value of their land” and that if the landowner wins in any associated court proceedings, they are entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and court costs).

[171] See supra Section III.C.

[172] See West, supra note 21.

[173] Id.; see also Freedgood et al., supra note 126, at 4 (discussing state policy mechanisms such as PACE programs, land-use planning, agricultural districts, tax incentives, farm link programs, and state agricultural leasing initiatives).

[174] MPRP Landowner Impact Stories, Stop MPRP, Inc., https://stopmprp.com/what-is-at-stake (on file with the University of Baltimore Law Forum) (last visited Sept. 13, 2025).

[175] Maryland General Assembly, Legislative Sessions: 2025, Md. Manual On-Line (Md. State Archives), https://msa.maryland.gov/msa/mdmanual/07leg/html/sessions/2025.html (on file with the University of Baltimore Law Forum) (last visited Sept. 13, 2025); see also American Farmland Trust, supra note 125 (discussing how Maryland leads in the number of acres of land protected).

[176] See Freedgood et al., supra note 126, at 4.

[177] See The First 30 Days, supra note 1; see also Enhancing the Grid: ITCS Solutions Without New Transmission, Stop MPRP, Inc., https://stopmprp.com/alternatives/f/enhancing-the-grid-itcs-solutions-without-new-transmission (on file with the University of Baltimore Law Forum) (last visited Sept. 13, 2025) (discussing the research and technology already being explored in response to increasing energy demands across the nation).

[178] See West, supra note 21.

[179] See Why is Stop MPRP Opposing the Project, supra note 14.

[180] See Freedgood et al., supra note 126, at 4.

[181] Id.; see also supra Section IV.B (explaining that Maryland’s agriculture and farmlands are vulnerable to government takings).

[182] See supra Section IV.A.

[183] See supra Section IV.A.

[184] See supra Section IV.A.

[185] See Proposed Route, supra note 2 (discussing how alternative routes were reviewed but Route H was ultimately selected because it reduced costs).