By: Allison Comess
The Supreme Court of Maryland held that a plaintiff has standing to sue under Health General Article § 4-304(c) when their attorney requested their medical records and initially paid a fee that the plaintiff later reimbursed. Hollabaugh v. MRO Corp., 491 Md. 165, 176, 339 A.3d 188, 194 (2025). The court further held that Health General Article § 4-304(c) does not allow a health care provider to charge a fee for a medical records search that does not result in any records being retrieved. Id. at 183, 339 A.3d at 198.
In 2020, Petitioner Janice Hollabaugh (“Hollabaugh”), authorized her attorney to request her medical records from her health care provider to use in connection with potential personal injury claims. Her provider used a third party vendor, MRO Corporation (“MRO”). After conducting a search, MRO found no records and issued a cancellation invoice with a $22.88 fee for its search efforts. Ms. Hollabaugh’s attorney paid the fee, and Ms. Hollabaugh reimbursed him in full.
In 2022, Ms. Hollabaugh filed a putative class action lawsuit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, arguing that the fee her attorney was charged violates § 4-304(c) of the Health-General Article, a provision of the Confidentiality of Medical Records Act. MRO moved to dismiss, arguing that “§ 4-304(c) authorizes a fee for records searches that do not result in the production of records, and that Ms. Hollabaugh lacks standing to sue because her attorney, not Ms. Hollabaugh herself, made the records request and paid the fee.” The Circuit Court for Baltimore County granted MRO’s motion to dismiss, finding that Ms. Hollabaugh had standing but that § 4-304(c) allowed the $22.88 fee. Ms. Hollabaugh then appealed to the Appellate Court of Maryland, which agreed with the circuit court that Ms. Hollabaugh had standing, but held that Ms. Hollabaugh’s interpretation was inconsistent with the statute’s purpose of permitting a reasonable cost-based fee. Ms. Hollabaugh then petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Maryland. The Supreme Court of Maryland granted certiorari to consider two issues: (1) whether Ms. Hollabaugh has standing and (2) whether the Confidentiality Act allows MRO’s search fee.
The Supreme Court of Maryland considered the question of standing first and began its analysis by looking to § 4-309(f) of the Confidentiality Act, finding that the statute does not identify those who are able to bring such an action. Hollabaugh, 491 Md. at 174, 339 A.3d at 193. In the absence of statutory guidance, the court looked to common law standing principles. Id. at 174, 339 A.3d at 193. Under Maryland common law, standing requires that a plaintiff be aggrieved such that the plaintiff has a personal stake in the controversy and has been affected in a manner distinct from the general public. Id. at 175, 339 A.3d at 194 (citing Jones v. Prince George’s County, 378 Md. 98, 118, 835 A.2d 632 (2003)). Although her attorney requested the records and initially paid the fee, the complaint alleged that Ms. Hollabaugh authorized the request and later reimbursed her attorney in full. Id. at 175, 339 A.3d at 194. The court thus concluded that she personally bore the financial injury arising from the fee and was therefore personally and specifically affected in a manner distinct from the general public, satisfying the Maryland common law aggrieved standard. Id. at 175, 339 A.3d at 194. Accordingly, the court held that Ms. Hollabaugh had standing to pursue her claim. Id. at 175, 339 A.3d at 194.
The court next addressed whether MRO was allowed to charge a preparation fee for an unsuccessful search. Hollabaugh, 491 Md. at 176, 339 A.3d at 194. The court began its analysis by looking at the relevant statute and applying principles of statutory construction. Id. at 177, 339 A.3d at 195. The court first noted that the statute is designed to ensure patient access to medical records and, in furtherance of that objective, requires health care providers to implement systems for processing records requests while preserving the confidentiality of those records. Id. at 177, 339 A.3d at 195.
The court then turned to § 4-304(c)(2), explaining that it permits fees only for the copying and providing medical records, both of which presuppose the existence of records responsive to the request. Hollabaugh, 491 Md. at 178, 339 A.3d at 195. Section 4-304(c)(3) further allows a preparation fee for the “retrieval and preparation” of records. Id. at 178, 339 A.3d at 195. Because the statute does not define the terms “retrieval” or “preparation,” the court looked to their ordinary dictionary definitions, finding that both terms presuppose the existence of something capable of being obtained and made ready for use. Id. at 179, 339 A.3d at 196. The court explained that “retrieval” ordinarily refers to locating and obtaining something that exists, while “preparation” refers to making something ready for use or delivery. Id. at 179, 339 A.3d at 196. Both concepts thus presuppose the existence of records capable of being located and made ready for use. Id. at 179, 339 A.3d at 196. Where no records are found, nothing can be retrieved or prepared in the ordinary sense of those terms. Id. at 179, 339 A.3d at 196. The court also relied on the fact that the statute’s use of the conjunctive phrase “retrieval and preparation” to conclude that the fee may be charged only when both occur. Hollabaugh, 491 Md. at 179, 339 A.3d at 196. Even if a records search occurs before retrieval, the court explained that does not constitute either retrieval or preparation. Id. at 179, 339 A.3d at 196.
The court then rejected MRO’s argument that it could charge the fee because searching for records is part of the retrieval process. Hollabaugh, 491 Md. at 180, 339 A.3d at 197. In doing so, the court reasoned that although a search may be a prerequisite to retrieval, it is a distinct step and does not itself amount to retrieval or preparation. Id. at 181, 339 A.3d at 197. The court further observed that each subsection of the statute regulates the process of producing existing medical records, and the fee provision lists specific tasks for which charges may be imposed, including retrieval, preparation, copying, handling, and mailing. Id. at 180, 339 A.3d at 196. Because the general assembly expressly authorized fees for those activities, the court declined to infer authorization for an additional fee for a records search not mentioned. Id. at 180, 339 A.3d at 196. Accordingly, the court held that § 4-304(c) does not permit a preparation fee when no medical records are retrieved and produced. Id. at 181, 339 A.3d at 197.
The decision in Hollabaugh v. MRO Corp. directly reduces financial barriers to obtaining medical records. Before Hollabaugh, patients and their attorneys were routinely charged search fees even when no records were produced. By holding that § 4-304(c) does not authorize fees for unsuccessful searches, the court prevents providers from shifting the cost of fruitless record searches onto patients. For Marylanders, this ruling ensures that patients are not penalized simply for attempting to access their own information. Moreover, the decision enhances statutory accountability by confirming that patients retain standing to sue even when attorneys act as intermediaries. Had the court accepted MRO’s standing argument, enforcement of the Act would have been weakened, insulating providers from liability whenever fees were paid by attorneys in the ordinary course of representation. The holding ensures that patients remain the primary beneficiaries of its protections.
Allison Comess is a third-year day student at the University of Baltimore School of Law, where she serves as the Symposium and Alumni Editor for Law Forum. Allison earned her bachelor’s degree from the University of Maryland, College Park in Government and Politics, with a minor in Rhetoric. At the University of Baltimore, Allison is the Co-President of the Jewish Law Student Association and a UB Leads Mentor. Previously, Allison interned at the Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office in the Post Conviction Litigation Unit. Allison currently works as a Law Clerk at Rollins, Smalkin, Richards & Mackie. She expects to graduate May 2027.
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