HOMER WALTON ET AL. V. PREMIER SOCCER CLUB, INC., ET AL.

By: Katelin Carter

In Walton v. Premier Soccer Club, Inc., the Supreme Court of Maryland held that while statutory violations may serve as evidence of negligence, liability still requires proof of causation-in-fact, without which proximate cause cannot be established. Walton v. Premier Soccer Club, Inc., 490 Md. 204, 213-14, 334 A.3d 784, 789-90 (2025). The court explained that proximate cause cannot be established without evidence directly connecting the alleged statutory violation to the harm. Id. at 222-23, 334 A.3d at 795-96.

In 2017, Sydney Walton (“Sydney”) sustained a concussion and permanent injuries at a Baltimore County recreational center when she collided with another player during soccer practice and struck her head on a wooden boundary wall. In December 2019, Sydney’s Parents, Homer and Kathleen Walton, filed a negligence complaint on their daughter’s behalf that named Premier Soccer Club (“Premier”) and coach Lucio Gonzaga (“Coach”), Michael and Dolores DeCarlo (“DeCarlo”), and four Baltimore County employees as defendants (“County”).

The Waltons alleged that the DeCarlos, and the County Defendants violated the “Concussion Awareness Statute,” Md. Code Ann., Health–Gen. § 14-501, which requires youth sports programs to provide concussion education to coaches, athletes, and parents, and to remove and medically clear any athlete suspected of sustaining a concussion before allowing return to play by failing to provide concussion information required by law. They further alleged that the County failed to notify Premier of its statutory obligations, Premier failed to provide concussion materials to players and parents or ensure coach review, and the DeCarlos enabled these violations by arranging Premier’s unauthorized use of the facility.

The circuit court granted summary judgment for the DeCarlos and the Premier Defendants, finding no evidence that statutory violations proximately caused Sydney’s injuries, and barred related evidence at trial. The Waltons appealed, but the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed, holding that even assuming statutory violations occurred, they were only evidence of breach and insufficient to establish cause-in-fact. The Waltons appealed to the Supreme Court of Maryland, which reviewed the record independently to determine whether the circuit court correctly granted summary judgment.

On review, the Supreme Court of Maryland framed the central issue as: whether a plaintiff bringing a negligence claim under a statute or ordinance can survive summary judgment on proximate cause merely by demonstrating that the injured party falls within the class the statute was intended to protect and suffered the type of harm the statute was designed to prevent. Walton, 490 Md.at 222–23, 334 A.3d at 794–95. Or, more specifically, whether the plaintiff must also present evidence establishing a cause-and-effect relationship between the statutory violation and the injury. Id. at 222–23, 334 A.3d at 794–95. The court further considered whether the Waltons had adduced sufficient evidence that the defendants’ alleged violations of the Concussion Awareness Statute, Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. § 14-501, were the cause-in-fact of Sydney’s head injury so as to defeat summary judgment. Id. at 227, 334 A.3d at 797.

The court reaffirmed that a plaintiff must satisfy two prongs to make a prima facie case of negligence. First, the plaintiff must show they are within the special class of people the statute was meant to protect. Id. at 223-25, 334 A.3d at 795-97. Second, the plaintiff must prove that the “violation proximately caused the injury complained of,” and the Waltons failed to make such a showing. Id. at 226-29, 334 A.3d at 797-98.

The court relied on Maryland’s line of lead-paint cases to clarify that a statutory violation alone does not establish causation-in-fact. Id. at 223, 334 A.3d at 795. The holdings that emerge from these cases establish that plaintiffs must show a reasonable probability of three causal links: that the defendant’s property was a source of lead exposure, that the exposure caused elevated blood-lead levels, and that those levels caused injury. Walton, 490 Md. at 224-26, 334 A.3d at 795-97 (citing Rogers v. Home Equity USA, Inc., 453 Md. 251, 264–65, 160 A.3d 1207 (2017)). Collectively, these cases demonstrate that a statutory violation, such as a failure to follow the Concussion Awareness Statute, does not relieve plaintiffs of proving actual causation. Id. at 222–26, 334 A.3d at 795–97.

Applying this framework, the court in Walton held that the Concussion Awareness Statute cannot relieve plaintiffs of their burden to show that the alleged statutory violation was a cause-in-fact of their injury. Id. at 223, 334 A.3d at 794-95. The court explained that the Waltons failed to provide evidence in the record showing that the statutory violations directly and proximately caused Sydney’s injury. Id. at 227, 334 A.3d at 797. The plaintiffs did not introduce the concussion policies into evidence, nor did they ask the circuit court to take judicial notice of them. Id. at 229, 334 A.3d at 798. Any jury finding that compliance would have prevented Sydney’s traumatic injury would rest on speculation, which is an insufficient basis to survive summary judgment under Rule 2-501. Walton, 490 Md. at 204, 228, 334 A.3d at 784, 798. Therefore, the court concluded that summary judgment was appropriate because the Waltons failed to establish a causal connection between the alleged statutory violation and Sydney’s injury. Id. at 204, 228, 334 A.3d at 784, 798.

Justice Watts dissented, emphasizing that the issue of proximate cause should have been decided by the jury, not resolved as a matter of law. Id at 243, 334 A.3d at 807. In Watt’s view, the Waltons produced sufficient facts for a jury to reasonably infer that the failure to distribute mandatory concussion information contributed to Sydney’s injury, particularly given the statute’s use of the word “shall.” Id. at 240-41, 334 A.3d at 805. Watts further argued that summary judgment should not have been granted where inferences could be drawn in the plaintiffs’ favor and criticized the majority for narrowing the Statute or Ordinance Rule beyond precedent. Walton, 490 Md. at 204, 243, 334 A.3d at 784, 807.

Walton v. Premier Soccer Club Inc. establishes that while statutory safety provisions may bolster negligence claims, they do not excuse plaintiffs from their burden to prove causation-in-fact through admissible evidence. This decision strengthens tort law causation requirements, raising the bar for plaintiffs trying to prove liability in a negligence claim involving a statute or ordinance. For defense counsel, the objective is to identify and challenge weak or speculative causal links in the plaintiff’s chain of causation. For plaintiffs’ counsel, this requires ensuring both the statutory violations and concrete evidence establishing proximate cause are documented in the record. In short, statutory violations can help support a negligence claim, but cannot substitute for proof of how the defendant’s conduct actually caused the injury.

Katelin Carter is a second year at the University of Baltimore School of Law, where she serves as a Staff Editor for Law Forum, a Teaching Assistant for Introduction to Lawyering Skills, a Property Law Scholar, and a member of the Honor Board. She earned her bachelor’s degree in English and Political Science, with a minor in Social Work, from Bridgewater College, graduating with honors. Katelin works as a law clerk at MPL Law Firm in York, Pennsylvania, assisting with municipal and land use matters. Her academic interests include land use, zoning, and tax law.