By: Jamison Young

The Supreme Court of Maryland held that when a decedent dies intestate without a surviving spouse, domestic partner, children, parents, siblings, or grandparents, a claimant may establish equitable adoption by presenting clear and convincing evidence of the decedent’s intent to adopt and supporting conduct demonstrating that intent.  In re Estate of Schappell, 489 Md. 654, 662, 331 A.3d 471, 475-76 (2025).  First, a claimant must provide clear and convincing evidence of the decedent’s intent to adopt, through an unperformed promise, an invalid adoption attempt, or direct statements of intent. Id. at 693, 331 A.3d at 494.  Second, the claimant must demonstrate the decedent acted consistently with this intent by publicly holding out the claimant as their child and treating them as their natural or legally adopted child.  Id.

Michael Gerard Schappell (“Decedent”) died intestate in May 2021 without a spouse, domestic partner, biological children, siblings, or parents.  The Decedent married the mother of Karen Ellis (“Ms. Ellis”) when she was four years old and maintained a close parental relationship with her until his death. Ms. Ellis alleged that the Decedent raised her, attended her milestones, referred to her as his daughter, and treated her children as his grandchildren.  The Decedent also made statements such as “‘all of this will be yours one day’” and acted as though she were part of his immediate family.

Ms. Ellis petitioned the Orphans’ Court for Montgomery County for recognition as his sole heir under the doctrine of equitable adoption. After filing her petition, the Decedent’s intestate heirs, consisting of cousins, aunts, and uncles (collectively, the “Intestate Heirs”), contested her claim.

The Orphans’ Court for Montgomery County denied the Intestate Heirs’ motion for summary judgment and granted Ms. Ellis’s petition to transmit issues to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.  The Orphans’ Court rejected the Intestate Heirs’ argument that equitable adoption required an express contract to adopt, finding that material factual disputes warranted jury determination.

On appeal, the Appellate Court of Maryland vacated and remanded, holding that equitable adoption could be established where the decedent and claimant “intended to and did live as child and parent,” a fairness-driven standard focused on the functional relationship.  The court determined that the equitable adoption question could properly be transmitted to the circuit court.

The Supreme Court of Maryland granted certiorari to resolve the test for equitable adoption.  Schappell, 489 Md. at 669, 331 A.3d at 479.  The principal issue was whether, and under what circumstances, a stepchild may inherit from an intestate decedent under the doctrine of equitable adoption.  Id. at 658, 331 A.3d at 473.  Both the Intestate Heirs and Ms. Ellis proposed tests for the court to adopt, which were ultimately rejected.  Id. at 666–68, 331 A.3d at 478-79.  Given the lack of clarity in applying the Equitable Adoption doctrine and three competing theories across jurisdictions, the Supreme Court of Maryland articulated a narrowed, uniform standard.  Id. at 670, 331 A.3d at 480.

The court first established recognition and application of the doctrine in Maryland by analyzing Maryland precedent.  Schappell, 489 Md. at 672–78, 331 A.3d at 481–85.  In Besche v. Murphy, the court declined to apply equitable adoption where the decedent had left a will.  Id. at 673–74, 331 A.3d at 482 (citing Besche v. Murphy, 190 Md.  539, 548, 59 A.2d 499, 504 (1948)).  In McGarvey v. State, the court recognized equitable adoption for intestate succession for “certain limited purposes.”  Id. at 674–75, 331 A.3d at 482–83 (quoting McGarvey v. State, 311 Md. 233, 238–39, 533 A.2d 690, 692–93 (1987)).  Later, in Board of Education v. Browning, the court allowed an equitably adopted child to inherit from the adoptive parent but not from collateral relatives.  Id. at 675–78, 331 A.3d at 483–84 (citing Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery Cnty. v. Browning, 333 Md. 281, 289, 635 A.2d 373, 378 (1994)).  These cases confirmed that Maryland recognized equitable adoption but did not define the required showing.  Id. at 673–78, 331 A.3d at 482–84.

After tracing Maryland’s inconsistent application, the court identified three competing approaches across other jurisdictions: contract-based, estoppel-based, and intent-based.  Schappell, 489 Md. at 678, 331 A.3d at 485.  Contract-based approaches treat equitable adoption as specific performance of an agreement to adopt.  Id.  Estoppel-based approaches prevent heirs from denying adoption where a decedent and child relied upon such a relationship.  Id.

The court rejected a purely contractual theory, explaining that contracts with minors present capacity problems and unconsummated agreements may reflect changed intent.  Schappell, 489 Md. at 694-95, 331 A.3d at 495.  Similarly, the court also declined to rely solely on estoppel principles, noting that children’s reliance is often indistinguishable from ordinary familial relationships and does not necessarily reflect testamentary intent.  Id.

Although the Appellate Court had adopted the intent-based approach, the test was articulated too broadly by allowing inheritance where the parties simply lived as parent and child.  Schappell, 489 Md. at 699, 331 A.3d at 497.  Instead, the Supreme Court of Maryland narrowed the intent-based approach, requiring a two-step showing for equitable adoption.  Id. at 696, 331 A.3d at 495-96.  First, a claimant must provide clear and convincing proof of the decedent’s intent to adopt.  Id. at 693, 331 A.3d at 494.  This can be established through an unperformed promise, an invalid adoption attempt, or direct statements of intent.  Id.  The court emphasized that equitable adoption serves a limited equitable function: approximating the decedent’s likely intent, without displacing statutory adoption.  Id. at 697–99, 331 A.3d at 498–99.  As a result, the court concluded to satisfy step one on remand, Ms. Ellis must show that the Decedent’s repeated statements and efforts to include her as a beneficiary demonstrated a clear intent to adopt.  Id. at 701-02, 331 A.3d at 498-99.

Second, the claimant must demonstrate that the decedent acted in accordance with this intent by both publicly presenting the claimant as their child and treating them as a natural or legally adopted child.  Schappell, 489 Md at 693, 331 A.3d at 494.  Treatment alone, absent expressed intent, is insufficient.  Id. at 697, 331 A.3d at 496.  This two-step approach requires Ms. Ellis, on remand, to corroborate the Decedent’s expressed intent to adopt with evidence that he consistently acted as her parent and publicly acknowledged her as his child, rather than relying on their close familial relationship.  Id. at 701-2, 331 A.3d at 498–99.

By requiring both intent and conduct, the two-step test aims to balance fairness to claimants with fidelity to statutory schemes and decedents’ probable wishes.  Schappell, 489 Md. at 697, 331 A.3d at 498.  Subsequently, the court’s decision in Schappell established a uniform framework, promoting more predictable outcomes.  Id. at 700–01, 331 A.3d at 499.

The decision carries practical estate planning implications. Attorneys advising blended families must emphasize that without formal adoption or a will, equitable adoption claims face a high evidentiary bar, making proactive planning essential to ensure stepchildren and dependents inherit as intended.

By clarifying the doctrine of equitable adoption, the court balanced equitable fairness with statutory fidelity, ensuring that only those claims most clearly aligned with decedents’ probable wishes succeed.  The risks of neglecting these formalities are substantial: children embraced as one’s own may be excluded from inheritance, sparking conflict, litigation, and outcomes contrary to the decedent’s probable intent.


Jamison Young is a third-year day student at the University of Baltimore School of Law and is the Editor-in-Chief for the University of Baltimore Law Forum. He earned his bachelor’s degree in environmental science, with a minor in Spanish, from Roanoke College. At the University of Baltimore, Jamison serves as a Law Scholar for Professor Koller in Civil Procedure II and is the Orientation Director for the Student Bar Association. He was also inducted into the Royal Graham Shannonhouse III Honor Society. He hopes to further his career in complex civil litigation.

Leave a comment

Trending