REYES V. STATE

By: Allie Burkinshaw

The Supreme Court of Maryland held that a judge retains jurisdiction to revise a sentence until the moment the sentence is imposed. Reyes v. State, 492 Md. 630, 641, 347 A.3d 428, 434 (2025). The court further explained that once a sentence has been imposed, Maryland Rule 4-345 governs and significantly restricts the trial court’s authority to modify the sentence. Id. at 642, 347 A.3d at 435.

On July 26, 2023, a jury convicted Defendant Jefferey Reyes (“Reyes”) of second-degree assault. At the sentencing hearing, although the trial judge indicated that she would accept the State’s recommendation, she initially announced a sentence of one year incarceration, suspending all but nine months on home detention, followed by three years of supervised probation. While the court was advising Reyes of his post-trial rights, the prosecutor sought clarification regarding the announced sentence. The prosecutor explained that the pronounced sentence would leave only three months of active incarceration in the event of a probation violation. Upon realizing she had misunderstood the applicable sentencing guidelines, the judge revised the sentence to five years’ imprisonment, suspending all but nine month on home detention, followed by three years of supervised probation. This revision occurred while Reyes remained present in the courtroom.

Reyes timely appealed to the Appellate Court of Maryland, alleging that the trial court illegally increased his sentence after its “imposition.”Reyes then petitioned for certiorari, which the Supreme Court of Maryland granted to address two questions: (1) when a criminal sentence is “imposed” under Rule 4-345, and (2) whether the trial court illegally increased the defendant’s sentence when it modified the original sentence during the same sentencing proceeding, before the proceeding had formally concluded.

The court began its analysis by examining the legal framework governing sentence modifications. Reyes, 492 Md. at 637, 347 A.3d at 432. A sentencing court generally lacks authority to increase a defendant’s sentence after it has been imposed. Id. at 637, 347 A.3d at 432. Reyes argued that “once the sentence was announced, the court’s authority to increase the sentence was circumscribed by Rule 4-345, which permits such an increase only if the original sentence was illegal, if there was some fraud, mistake or irregularity, or if the court made a mistake in announcing the original sentence.” Id. at 636, 347 A.3d at 431 (quoting Reyes v. State, 264 Md. App. 616, 620-21, 332 A.3d 637, 640 (2025)). However, the court rejected this claim, holding that a sentence is not “imposed” until the sentencing proceeding concludes. Id. at 636, 347 A.3d at 431. Because the trial court adjusted the sentence during the same proceeding, the court held that Rule 4-345 did not apply, and the increase was lawful. Id. at 636, 347 A.3d at 431. Before Rule 4-345, common law limited a circuit court’s authority to revise sentences. Id. at 636, 347 A.3d at 431.

To remedy the practical challenges that arose when judges misstated sentences but lacked a clear mechanism for correction, the court amended Rule 4-345. Reyes, 492 Md. at 641, 347 A.3d at 434. The 1992 amendment permits correction of “an evident mistake in the announcement of a sentence if the correction is made on the record before the defendant leaves the courtroom following the sentencing proceeding.” Id. at 641, 347 A.3d at 434. This rule allows judges to clarify or fix sentencing mistakes on the record, while ensuring that a sentence cannot later be modified after it has been imposed. Id. at 641, 347 A.3d at 434.

Drawing on precedent, the court confirmed that trial courts retain authority to modify a sentence up until the point a sentence is imposed. Reyes, 492 Md. at 642, 347 A.3d at 435. In State v. Sayre, the court held that a sentence is “imposed” when the sentencing phase concludes—typically when the judge signals the case is over by remanding the defendant or calling the next case. Id. at 639, 347 A.3d at 433 (citing State v. Sayre,314 Md. 559, 565, 552 A.2d 553, 556 (1989)). Any attempt to change the sentence after that point violates Rule 4-345, even if the initial pronouncement was a “slip of the tongue.” Id. at 639, 347 A.3d at 433 (citing Sayre,314 Md. at 562-65, 552 A.2d at 553). Therefore, in Brown v. State, the court upheld a mid-hearing sentence adjustment because the sentencing proceeding had not concluded and the court remained actively engaged in pronouncing the sentence. Id. at 639-40, 347 A.3d at 433 (citing Brown v. State, 83 Md. App. 24, 35, 573 A.2d 403, 408 (1990)).

By contrast, in Simpkins v. State, the court impermissibly increased a defendant’s sentence after he had left the courtroom and the court had called the next case, as the sentencing proceeding had already concluded. Reyes, 492 Md. at 640, 347 A.3d at 434 (citing Simpkins v. State, 88 Md. App. 607, 624, 596 A.2d 655, 664 (1991)). Thus, the court adopted the holdings of these prior decisions and held that a judge has authority to revise a sentence at any point prior to its imposition. Id. at 642, 347 A.3d at 434-35.

After concluding that a sentence may be modified before it is imposed, the court further held that once imposition occurs, Rule 4-345 takes effect and significantly limits the trial court’s authority to revise the sentence. Reyes, 492 Md. at 642, 347 A.3d at 435. After imposition, Rule 4-345 permits sentence increases only if the original sentence was illegal, involved fraud, mistake, or irregularity, or to correct an evident mistake before the defendant leaves the courtroom. Id. at 642, 347 A.3d at 435. These limitations reflect concerns for finality and comity, and draw upon the Double Jeopardy Clause’s protection against multiple sentences for a single offense. Id. at 642, 347 A.3d at 435.

Using this framework, the court reasoned that the trial judge modified Reyes’ sentence during an “ongoing sentencing colloquy,” while the hearing remained open and before the court had concluded the proceeding or turned to another case. Reyes, 492 Md. at 642, 347 A.3d at 435. While advising Reyes of his post-trial rights, the prosecutor raised a concern about sentence structure, prompting the judge to revise the term. Id. at 643, 347 A.3d at 435. Requiring strict finality at the moment a sentence is first announced would unduly limit a trial judge’s ability to correct errors or clarify a sentence, whereas permitting adjustments until the conclusion of the hearing preserves accuracy, appropriateness, and judicial discretion. Id. at 643-44, 347 A.3d at 436.

The Reyes decision underscores that trial courts retain discretion to revise an announced sentence while the sentencing proceeding remains ongoing, and that Rule 4-345 does not apply until the sentence has been formally imposed. The decision strikes a balance between finality and the need to correct or clarify sentences in real time, promoting both fairness and flexibility. This framework provides clear guidance to trial courts and practitioners: under Rule 4-345, a sentence is not “imposed” until the sentencing proceeding concludes, and modifications made prior to that point do not trigger the rule’s post-imposition limitations. Accordingly, practitioners must remain attentive throughout the entire sentencing hearing, recognizing that a sentence does not attain finality until the court formally concludes the proceeding.

Allie Burkinshaw is a second/third-year student at the University of Baltimore School of Law where she serves as a Staff Editor/as the Recent Developments Editor for Law Forum. She earned her bachelor’s degree in Risk Management and Insurance with a minor in Spanish from the University of Georgia. Allie is currently a Summer Associate at Whiteford, Taylor & Preston in Baltimore. She also serves as a Teaching Assistant for Introduction to Lawyering Skills.